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Securities Law
Michael K. Wolensky*
WOLENSKY:

I note that although there are many alumni, I am

the only person currently employed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the panel. As always, there is a standard disclaimer
that we at the Commission make. The things that I will say today are
not necessarily the views of my colleagues on the staff of the Commission or of the members of the Commission. The Commission disclaims responsibility for anything I might say.
I will try to focus on some areas that I think are of particular
interest to you and some that are of particular interest to me. First, I
want to talk about the Commission's Atlanta regional office. That
regional office serves North Carolina and the other southeastern
states. The Atlanta office has had a twenty-five percent growth in
staff in the last two years, which is unusual in the face of government
cutbacks. The office had not grown for several years, however, and
in view of the tremendous amount of growth in the securities and
financial industry in the South, and in the Southeast in particular, the
Chairman and Executive Director have taken a serious view of the
situation and have upgraded the staff in the office. Our staff has
grown from fifty-two to sixty-four in the last two years.
About two months ago the Commission reorganized its bankruptcy program. It placed a bankruptcy branch in the Atlanta office,
and has just filled the positions in that branch. We at the Commission will soon start our participation in bankruptcies, primarily
Chapter Eleven proceedings around the Southeast. There have been
several large Chapter Eleven cases recently, particularly the Charter
Company in Jacksonville, Florida. If you practice bankruptcy law,
you will soon be dealing with the people from my office, rather than
with the people from Washington. We are proud to expand into this
area, and I have always found it to be interesting. In the era of uncertainty that we face in bankruptcy, I think it is going to be a very
interesting field of law.
In 1983 the Atlanta region had a very effective regulatory program, and in my view, a very effective enforcement program. We
Regional Administrator, Securities and Exchange Commission, Atlanta, Georgia.
B.S. 1967, Georgia Institute of Technology; J.D. 1971, American University.
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brought enforcement actions in every state, and we brought more
actions in North Carolina than anywhere else in 1983. The subject
matter of those cases was varied.
The one thing that we at the Commission have found in Atlanta
is that we engage in a great deal of actual litigation. The Commission settles at the outset approximately ninety percent of the cases it
brings. In Atlanta, however, we settle at the outset fewer than forty
percent of the cases we bring. For the first six months of fiscal year
1984 more than eighty percent of the Atlanta office's enforcement
resources were spent in litigation. Using most of the resources for
litigation obviously can be stifling. We are going to undertake a program over the next few years to communicate with local and state bar
associations, particularly the banking, corporate, and security sections of the bars. We want to meet with them and explain to them
what the Securities and Exchange Commission is and what our consent judgments mean, and try to create an environment that will foster settlement.
We at the Commission like to think that we are not going to
bring a case if there is not a very good factual position. We recognize that there are legal arguments in many cases, but generally
when we bring a suit we have a good factual case. Ordinarily, it is in
the best interest of everyone to settle the case if an appropriate settlement can be reached. If it is a very close question of law, certainly
it may be in the client's best interest to litigate. But I would like to
generate some feedback from the people with whom I am dealing on
programs such as this for ideas on how the Commission can better
deal with its constituency to create an environment for settlement.
This assumes, of course, that the Commission is going to continue
bringing cases, as it is.
I now turn to the primary subject matter-the events of 1983.
There have been a number of highly important matters, as well as
some seemingly significant matters that probably are not very significant. I will address the decisions of the Supreme Court in this area.
Because other members of the panel will talk about some of these
decisions in some detail, I will not spend a lot of time on them. First,
I will discuss a case in which I was involved, Dirks v. SEC, I decided in
July 1983. I argued the Dirks case in the Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. and won it.2 Subsequently, I left the General Counsel's
office. I find it difficult to disagree seriously with what the Supreme
Court did, assuming its reasoning is sound. I believe, however, that
the Court created more problems for itself and for the other federal
103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
2 See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming a Commission finding
that petitioner had aided and abetted in violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities/laws).
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courts than it solved. It raised and left unanswered many issues, and
those issues are rearing themselves now in the courts as the Commission brings cases involving people who are not strictly insiders, but
who may have gained some benefit from the use of nonpublic information that came into their possession. I cite two examples: SEC v.
Thayer,3 brought by the Commission and currently in litigation, and
SEC v. Brant,4 the recently filed suit against the Wall Street Journal
reporter.
In my view, the pending case of SEC v. Jeny T. O'Brien, Inc.5 is
the most significant Supreme Court case as far as the Commission is
concerned, since SEC v. W.J. Howey. 6 As Stanley Sporkin will speak
about O'Brien, I will not go into much detail except to say that the it is
the first time the Supreme Court has addressed the Commission's
investigative procedures. The Court has extensively scrutinized Internal Revenue Service procedures and has examined other federal
agencies having statutes similar to those of the Commission, but this
is the first time the Court has examined the Commission's
procedures.
The Ninth Circuit in O'Brien ruled that the Commission must
give notice to the subject or target of the investigation whenever it
issues subpoenas requiring documents or testimony from any other
person, so that the target of the investigation may challenge the subpoena. 7 The Ninth Circuit did not suggest what jurisdictional hook
the courts might use to entertain that challenge, and there does not
appear to be any such hook. But the decision is a very serious inroad
on the Commission's ability to investigate promptly and thoroughly
and to bring enforcement actions where necessary. The Commission
petitioned for certiorari, which the Court granted, and the case was
argued in April 1984.8
Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources9 is another case in which certio-

rari was recently granted. In Vista Resources the Second Circuit examined the sale of business doctrine. I want to focus on this because
3 The Commission charged W. Paul Thayer, a former company chief officer, with
disclosing material nonpublic information concerning proposed acquisitions to persons
who later purchased securities of the companies about to be acquired. The traders were
also charged. The Commission seeks an injunction against further violations and disgorgement of the illegally obtained profits. Although a final decision is still pending, recent developments in the case are noted in SEC v. Thayer, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,607 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) and SEC v. Thayer, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,718 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
4 File No. 84 Civ. 3470 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
5 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).

6 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
7 O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1069.
8 Subsequent to Mr. Wolensky's speech, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
SEC v.Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984), rev k 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
9 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982), clarified, 710 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104
S. Ct. 2341 (1984). On August 9, 1984 the writ of certiorari granted in this case was
dismissed pursuant to Rule 53 of the Supreme Court Rules. 53 U.S.L.W. 3115.
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I think that in practice most lawyers will at some time face this issue.
The sale of business doctrine was formulated in the district courts
and then in the courts of appeals. Virtually every court of appeals has
ruled on the issue, and they are evenly divided.
The sale of business doctrine states that, if in connection with
the sale of a business there is a transfer of stock, the business transaction is merely a commercial transaction. It is a sale of the business,
not a sale of stock covered by the securities laws. The protections of
the securities laws do not attach to such a transaction, and therefore,
a defrauded purchaser or a defrauded seller may not sue under the
securities laws to seek relief under an implied right of action.
In Vista Resources one hundred percent of the stock of the company was transferred. In other cases less than one hundred percent
has been transferred without the protections of the securities laws. 10
Generally, a one hundred percent transfer occurs in privately held or
very closely held corporations. I do not know of any case where the
Commission has brought an enforcement action on facts such as
these. Ordinarily, we would not get involved in these types of cases,
involving small closely held corporations that do not have much investor impact. Presumably, the same result would occur if the Commission brought an action. The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have embraced the sale of business doctrine which
states that the sale of a business is not covered by the federal securities laws. The Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have rejected the sale of business doctrine, and the Third Circuit has hinted
that it would reject the doctrine, although there has not been an express holding.
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth" is a short opinion, containing a very good discussion of the
area. The Supreme Court accepted the case on certiorari and will
resolve the issue next term.
I have been involved in discussions with lawyers in private practice and it seems that frequently, a purchaser of a business is extremely interested in having the securities laws attached. That is the
reason for which purchasers buy the stock of the company, rather
than buying the assets or assuming the assets and liabilities of the
business. They wish to have the protections of the securities laws in
case there are misrepresentations concerning the financial position,
inventories, or any of the other things that are considered in deciding to purchase an ongoing business.
10 See, e.g., Sutter v. Green, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); Oakhill Cemetary v. TriState Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
11 [1983-1984 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,705 (9th Cir. 1984),
modified, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,469 (9th Cir. 1984). A petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed on May 31, 1984.

1985]

SECURITIES LAw

In other cases, there have been decisions where both sides had
agreed in side letters or in the purchase and sales contracts that they
did not want the securities laws to attach. Parties, of course, may not
waive the protections of the securities laws. For instance, someone
who is defrauded and desires the protections of the securities laws
will say that the contract is not binding, and the parties will end up in
federal court. Those are the most difficult cases. Thus, in advising
clients you should know exactly where you are going to be, in what
circuit you will be at least over the next six months to one year, and
how you want to tailor the transaction.
The other Supreme Court case I want to mention is United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 12 decided on March 21, 1984. In that case, the

Supreme Court reversed a Second Circuit decision that a limited accountant-client privilege applied when the Internal Revenue Service
sought tax accrual workpapers of an accountant. Interestingly, the
Second Circuit held that the Commission could obtain these documents, but the IRS could not. Tax accrual workpapers are the auditor's and the company's best estimates of a "worst case scenario" of
the company's tax liability if the IRS were to challenge a given transaction. The company is required to accrue a certain amount of reserve for contingency, if in fact it believes it would contest a
transaction. The IRS believed that this would be an excellent
roadmap to audit a corporate return because the company and the
auditor had given their best 3estimate of a worst case scenario should
their return be challenged.'
The Supreme Court in Arthur Young said that the IRS could obtain those worst case records and that there is no federal accountantclient privilege. The Court went so far as to say that auditors doing
independent accounting work have a public duty; their obligations in
preparing financial statements are imbued with a public interest.
They must adhere to the letter and spirit of the law14 and should not
be engaged in helping the client conceal anything.
It is interesting that this was an Arthur Young case, because several years ago the Commission lost a case in the Ninth Circuit called
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co. 15 The Ninth Circuit held that an auditor is
no more than a private contractor and does not have a public duty
merely because he prepares financial statements to be filed with the
public. The new Arthur Young decision seems to flip the coin the
other way in holding that accountants, when doing independent auditing work, have a public duty.
The broker-dealer relationship is another area in which there
12
13
14
15

677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), affg in part, rev'g in part, 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 214-15.
Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1503.
584 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979).
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has been much activism in the courts, particularly in the courts of
appeals. There probably have been more broker-dealer courts of appeals decisions in 1983 than in any previous single year within the
last ten years. One of the most interesting decisions is Berner v. Lazzaro, 16 which held that when a customer sues a broker who is a corporate insider for fraud on the theory that the customer was told he was
being given a tip-inside information-and that tip was false, the
customer could nevertheless maintain a suit over a claim of in pan'
delicto. The in pan delicto defense has been upheld by the Fifth, Eleventh, and other circuits. The Ninth Circuit departed from that line
of decisions, reasoning that broker-dealers who deal with customers
have a very high obligation-a fiduciary obligation-to deal fairly
and equitably. The fact that the customer tried to take advantage of
an inside information tip does not make him quite as guilty as the
person who lied to him by saying that he had such a tip.
In 1983 the regional office in Atlanta instituted an action against
a registered representative of a brokerage firm who had allegedly
falsely claimed that he possessed inside information. A dozen customers were involved, and we had such statements from them as
"Yes, he told me he had inside information about a merger." It
turned out that there was no merger, and the registered representative claimed, first, that he did not say it, and second, that he did not
have it. We tried to prove that he had indeed received a tip because
there had been rumor of a merger. After a year of investigation, we
could not prove that the representative had been privy to any information, but we brought the case on the theory that he had defrauded
his customers by falsely representing to them that he did have inside
information. The case was settled without admitting or denying this
allegation.
The Ninth Circuit, however, seems to allow customers who are
defrauded by a brokerage firm or its registered representatives with
this type of information to bring their own cases, despite the fact that
17
I
they were looking to make money on inside information, too.
have little sympathy for customers who are doing that. They are not
victims.
The thing that bothers me most about the in pan delicto defense
is that it is rather insidious. The broker starts tipping off customers-"I have a tip that Socal and Gulf are going to merge and you
can make a fortune"-which creates a rash of buying activity. This
will generate a tremendous number of commissions for the broker,
especially if the customers are trusting. I am talking about the registered representative who is going to become rich, and does so with
impunity where there is an in pan delicto defense. This representative
16 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984).
17 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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knows he can say whatever he wants to say, and as long as he hooks
the customer who wants to take advantage of the "hot tip," the customer can never sue because of the in pari delicto defense.
I believe the prophylactic effect of the Ninth Circuit decision in
Berner is very good. I think it will have significant impact in this area,
and I hope other courts will follow the decision because of its prophylactic effect, not because the customers are so righteous that they
should be allowed to take advantage of inside information whether
or not they win. The important thing about Berner is that it strongly
emphasizes the fiduciary duty brokers owe to their clients, and this is
a tune that the Commission has been singing for a number of years.
More and more courts have adopted it. An attorney should keep in
mind in advising broker-dealers that they have a very high standard
of care to meet in dealing with their clients.
Ryan v. SEC18 is the first markup case in a long time. The Ryan
court found eminently reasonable the Commission's position that a
ten percent markup over a dealer's contemporaneous cost was fraudulent. The ten percent markup rule has been around for a long time,
but it has not been reviewed recently by the courts. A ten percent
markup generally has been found to be fraudulent, and the courts
have again reaffirmed that position.
SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co. 19 was a parking case, involving a
"hot issue offering," in which the broker, the underwriter, could not
get rid of the last ten percent. He wished to start making the
aftermarket, so he "parked" it in a number of nominee accounts until
the secondary market became active, and entered that market. This
is not a full distribution in the sense that the escrow account can be
broken if it is an all-or-none or a best-efforts-or-none offering. The
result is a situation where the broker reaps a tremendous benefit because in the aftermarket it is a "hot issue." The stock increases in
value, and the broker reaps a benefit that he should not have. In
effect, the company is not as high a quality as one would expect from
a hot issue market.
The Commission also brought a case involving underwritings,
18 No. 82-7312 (9th Cir. May 23, 1983). The Ryan court affirmed Commission administrative sanctions imposed upon the president of a broker-dealer company, arising
from Commission findings that he failed to disclose excessive markups, illegally sold unregistered stock, and failed to comply with the recordkeeping requirements of the Securities Exchange Act.
19 692 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1982). The court affirmed the district court decision permanently enjoining Blinder, Robinson & Co. and its president from further violations of
the Securities and Exchange Act. The violations arose as a result of the firm's activities
when acting as managing underwriter for an unseasoned issuer offering securities to the
public on a best-efforts, all-or-none basis. When defendants were unable to sell the entire
offering by the specified date, they engaged in a series of transactions designed to create
the impression that the offering was sold on the terms stated. After the purported completion of the offering they continued the distribution while making a market in securities of
the same class.
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which is still in litigation in Greensboro, North Carolina. The case is
the first "gun jumping" case the Commission has brought in some
time. The Commission alleged that the broker was accepting money
from customers prior to the effective date of a registration statement,
and, indeed, in a case or two, prior even to the filing of a registration
statement. The money was placed in the customer's account-noted
as a free credit balance, not for any specific purchase of securitieswith the understanding that when the registration statement became
effective the money would be used to purchase the stock in the initial
offering. For many years, the Commission has viewed that as "gun
jumping," and it is not permissible until the registration statement is
effective.
Finally, another interesting case in the broker-dealer area is
Carter v. SEC20 in the Ninth Circuit. In Carter the registered representatives had been doing business away from the firm. When they
did business at the firm, of course, the firm had an obligation to supervise them. Occasionally, a few representatives would get together
to sell a few tax shelters on the side or to engage in some securities
activity, not through the auspices of the firm, but at home during
evenings and weekends, to the customers with whom they dealt at
the firm. Carter held that there is no such thing as an "away from the
firm" transaction for a registered representative dealing with customers of the firm. The firm still has a strong obligation to supervise
those people to ensure that they comply with the federal securities
21
laws.
Another area that has received some scrutiny from the courts of
appeals is the grant, denial, or dissolution of injunctions. In a case
out of the Atlanta regional office, the Sixth Circuit recently ruled on
the so-called "Black test" in SEC v. Youmans. 2 That is the test the
Fifth Circuit had developed in 1979 or 1980 setting out the factors to
determine whether to enter an injuction in an SEC enforcement action. The Youmans court held that no single factor is controlling. A
mere change of occupation at or about the time the Commission files
its suit is not sufficient for the court to deny the injunction, if that is
the only change.
There is nothing drastic about the Youmans decision, but it
seems as though every year or two the Commission is compelled to
get a decision from a court of appeals such as this so that the district
courts will pay heed. In Tennessee we brought a similar suit against
20 726 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1983). The Commission found that defendants had sold
unregistered securities in violation of the 1933 Securities Act, and that they had effected
those transactions without the knowledge or approval of their employer, a registered broker-dealer. Defendants argued that there was no evidence that the sales were concealed

from their employer or were effected without notification to their employer.
21 Id. at 473-74.
22 729 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984).
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a loan and thrift operation called Southern Industrial Banking Corporation. 23 Defendants had claimed the fifth amendment throughout our investigation. They would not provide us with any
information, would not give us their wives' or children's names or
any basic background information. We had fairly strong evidence
and filed an affidavit in court showing that approximately twelve million dollars had been withdrawn from Southern Industrial Banking
Corporation. This money had been withdrawn in a one-year period
on forged notes and could be traced to one particular defendant's
bank account. We did not allege that this person forged the notes,
although we traced the money, or at least a very large part of it, to his
bank account. Also, there were numerous other allegations of insider loans.
The Loan and Thrift that had been in business for fifty to sixty
years, had started making commercial loans, and some were made to
individual defendants to the tune of approximately sixty percent of
the total loan portfolio. They were all signature loans without collateral; for instance, a five million dollar loan with no collateral and no
payments ever made on it. Every three months the loans merely increased to cover the interest.
We brought suit against the individual defendant seeking a preliminary injunction. The judge denied our preliminary injunction on
the basis that we could not prove, right then, that the individual was
engaged in that kind of conduct. We said, "But your Honor, he will
not tell us what he is doing now. He took the fifth, along with everybody else. We do not know what he is doing now." The individual
never denied any of the allegations and did not file an answer denying anything. He merely argued that, "Because the Commission cannot show that I am engaged in the same occupation, the court should
not enjoin me."
Consequently, the court denied the preliminary injunction on
the basis that we could not prove that he was engaged in that conduct at the time we filed the suit. We promptly appealed, and that
case is currently pending in the Sixth Circuit. The Commission will
not walk away from cases in which a preliminary injunction is denied.
In egregious cases, we are going to pursue them.
One other case I would like to mention in that area is SEC v.
Clifton,24 which involved the dissolution of an injunction. The Commission will soon issue a statement with respect to what it will or will
not be doing in the area of dissolution and modifications of injunctions. In Clifton the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district
25
court's refusal to dissolve an injunction and adopted the Swift test.
23 Kohntopp v. Butcher, 98 F.R.D. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).

24 700 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
25 Clifton, 700 F.2d at 747 (citing Swift v. United States, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
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Swift v. United States26 is an early antitrust case in which the Court said
there had to be a new, unforeseen, and drastic change that caused
the injunction no longer to have merit. Many people have questioned the efficacy of Swift after all the years, but the Clifton court
seems to have adopted that holding.
I want to discuss briefly legislation in the securities area. The
recent "tender offer" legislation 2 7 developed by the Tender Offer
Advisory Committee does several things. First, it cuts down the tenday window period for many companies once they reach the five percent level. They then have ten days to file their 13D acquisition report. Once they reach the five percent mark, they buy everything in
sight to try to get as much as they can before they have to report.
One of the objects of the proposed legislation is to cut that window
down. If there is a tender offer taking place, there is a proposed
requirement to file immediately. Another object of the legislation is
to eliminate the golden parachutes and certain poison pill defensive
tactics.
There is other proposed legislation dealing with enforcement
remedies. The Commission is seeking to broaden its authority in the
administrative proceeding area to include proxy violations and to include officers and directors of corporations, currently a questionable
area.
Finally, in the Freedom of Information Act 2 8 area, the Commission is seeking to give itself the opportunity to avoid subpoena enforcement problems and other things through legislation stating that
documents presented to the Commission in the course of an investigation are not records of the Commission subject to disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act. A few years ago the Commission issued a proposed rule that these documents are not records
subject to disclosure. The rule defined records as not including investigative records. We received a letter from Washington criticizing
this position and stating that Congress would sue us if we tried to go
through with it. In the era of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Justice Department trying to exempt themselves from the Freedom of Information Act, we felt we would get on the bandwagon and
propose legislation in that area. I do not know what is going to happen to it. I believe that, under this Administration, the chances are
better than they would be under some other administrations, but I
do not know how to project that.

26
27
83,630
1984).
28

286 U.S. 106 (1932).
See generally Proposed Tender Offer Reform Act, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(Letter of SEC Chairman John Shad to Congressman Timothy Wirth, May 21,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).

Recent Developments in Corporate Law
Russell M. Robinson, II*
ROBINSON: I have selected three particular cases in two general
areas in which corporate law developments have been most noticeable in the past several years. First, in the area of shareholder derivative actions, I have chosen to discuss Aronson v. Lewis,' recently
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court, and Miller v. The Register
and Tribune Syndicate, Inc. ,2 decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa in
1983. Second, in the area of closely held corporations, I want to
discuss Meiselman v. Meiselman,3 decided by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in January 1984.
The derivative action area is probably one of the most active areas in corporate development and has been in the past few years.
The derivative action is the most effective, perhaps the only effective,
private means by which the duties and responsibilities of management may be enforced. It has long been recognized as a means by
which corporate management may be called to account by the
shareholders.
It is also recognized, however, that the derivative action is subject to great abuse because in any derivative action there is a selfappointed plaintiff who frequently has motives other than benefitting
the corporation or enforcing some corporate principle. That, of
course, sets up a classic tension between two fundamental principles
in corporate law. On the one hand, there is the principle of managerial freedom, which is the authority that directors of the corporation
must have to manage the corporation; they are the ones who manage
it and not the shareholders. On the other hand, there are the directors' fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and accountability to the
shareholders. Courts and commentators in this area struggle with
the question of how to resolve the tension between those two conflicting and basic principles.
Several years ago corporations began to use special litigation
* Partner, Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina. A.B.
1954, Princeton University; LL.B. 1956, Duke University. Author, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1974).

1 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
2 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
3 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
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committees to provide a voice for the corporation to examine, express, and assert the corporate interest. This evolved out of the
broader development of using committees in general to perform various functions of the board. It was also prompted by the Supreme
Court decision in 1979 in Burks v. Lasker,4 which resulted in the use
of the special litigation committee appointed by the directors to examine the merits and the cost/benefit analysis of a derivative action
and to report to the board. On the basis of such a report, the corporation would move for summary judgment or dismissal.
Two lines of authority developed in the area of special litigation
committees. One of the early cases is Auerbach v. Bennett,5 a tightly
reasoned decision by the Court of Appeals of New York, holding that
a special litigation committee's report and recommendation are subject to limited inquiry by the court. The court is to examine only the
good faith and independence of the committee and the regularity of
its investigative procedures. If those elements pass the test, the
court will not look beyond the recommendation of the committee. It
will not inquire into the merits, which, of course, is a very pro-management
decision. Auerbach has been followed by a number of
6
courts.

On the other end of the scale, there developed a line of authority to the effect that the special litigation committee's report and
findings are in fact subject to judicial scrutiny. Probably the strongest statement of that authority is the Delaware Chancery Court opinion in Maldonado v. Flynn, 7 holding that the business judgment rule
was intended to shield directors against liability for decisions made
in good faith. It was not intended to be used, and should not be
used, as a sword to cut off a derivative action.
That lower court decision in Delaware was followed by several
courts8 until that case reached the Delaware Supreme Court, which

handed down its famous decision in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.9 In
Maldonado the court tried to steer a middle course between the two
extremes of no review on the merits and full review on the merits. It
ruled that a trial court should examine the good faith and independence of the special litigation committee. The trial court should go
further in some cases, however, and examine the factual basis on
which the committee reached its recommendation to dismiss the action, as it almost always recommends. Furthermore, a trial court
4 441 U.S. 471 (1971).
5 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979).
6 See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Anderson,
615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
7 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
8 See, e.g., Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va.
1980)(applying Virginia law).
9 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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should inquire whether the dismissal of an action would serve a
broader public purpose. In sum, Maldonado tried to resolve the tension between the managerial freedom of directors on the one hand,
and the managerial responsibility of the directors on the other hand.
In defining the proper scope of inquiry as to a special litigation
committee's report, the Maldonado court classified the cases into
those in which the demand on the directors is required and those in
which it is not required. Before maintaining a derivative action, a
shareholder must satisfy the court that intracorporate remedies have
been exhausted by making demands on the directors to assert the
claims that are being asserted in the suit. The purpose of that requirement is to give management the opportunity to correct the
wrongs if possible or to take control of the litigation and seek a remedy on behalf of the corporation. Demand is excused if it would be
futile. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the state statutes in virtually all states, a shareholder who claims that demand
would be futile must allege with particularity the reasons it would be
futile.
In Maldonado the Delaware Supreme Court said that a distinction
must be drawn between a demand-required and a demand-not-required case. If demand is required, that is, if the directors are independent of the action and disinterested in the claims or the
transaction being asserted, the action of the directors in refusing the
demand is protected by the business judgment rule, and is therefore,
subject to very limited judicial scrutiny.' 0 The special litigation committee probably will not be needed. In virtually all cases in which
demand is required the courts have held that the directors' action on
that demand is conclusive. In cases in which demand is excused, the
court must apply a two-step analysis: first, examine the good faith
and independence of the special litigation committee and the factual
basis on which it reached its conclusions; and second, determine
whether the dismissal of the action would serve a broader public
purpose.
The Maldonado court explicitly left open the question of when
demand is or is not required; that is, what test is to be applied to
determine whether or not demand is required. The Delaware
Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1984 in the definitive Aronson
opinion.
The Delaware Chancery Court in Aronson had adopted a rule of
reasonable inference. The court held that if the allegations in the
complaint permit or raise a reasonable inference that the directors'
action on the demand would not be protected by the business judgment rule, demand is excused. That, of course, is a pro-plaintiff rul10 Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 782.
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ing. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected that test, reasoning that
it is too liberal, and that if that test were to be applied, demand futility would be virtually automatic in derivative actions based on conclusory allegations in the complaint.
The Delaware Supreme Court instead announced another rule,
a rule of reasonable doubt. To prove demand futility, the allegations
in the complaint must be particular enough to raise a reasonable
doubt that the directors are interested and not independent, and that
their action on the demand would not be protected by the business
judgment rule. The court stressed the particularity of the facts that
must be alleged in meeting that requirement. They may not be
merely conclusory allegations; they must be particular facts. If the
alleged facts raise a reasonable doubt as to the independence or
good faith of the directors, demand will be excused. If the directors
appoint a special litigation committee, the recommendations of that
committee would be subject to the second level of scrutiny prescribed by the court in Maldonado."I
The Aronson court also addressed the question of when a director is interested. What constitutes "interest"? How does one determine whether a director's participation in or affiliation with the
transactions constitute interest? Mere board approval of a transaction does not overcome the presumption of propriety. The personal
liability of the directors for approving a questioned transaction,
standing alone, would not be sufficient to challenge either the independence or the disinterestedness of the directors. In announcing
that principle, the Aronson court was implicitly following the Second
Circuit decision in Lewis v. Graves,' 2 which held that naming a director as a defendant does not alone taint that director with interest,
because if that were the case, plaintiffs could readily circumvent the
demand requirement merely by naming all board members as
defendants.
Another question addressed by the court in Aronson was when
the test of disinterestedness and the propriety of the proceedings
should be applied. Is it to be applied at the commencement of the
action or at a subsequent time? In Aronson plaintiff had argued that
the court should look not only to the interestedness or independence
of the directors at the time the action is brought, but also to future
events. Plaintiff in Aronson had asserted that the hostility of the board
and the futility of demand was shown by the board's move to dismiss
the derivative action. The court disagreed, stating that the test is to
be applied at the time the action is brought. The court makes a determination on the basis of the facts known and existing at that time
as to whether the directors are independent and disinterested
II
12

See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812, 813.
701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1982).
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enough to be capable of exercising a business judgment on the demand that would be entitled to respect by the court.
In other cases, defendants, the board of directors or management, have argued that the test of disinterestedness should be applied at a later time when the board of directors has been
reconstituted after the derivative action is brought. Then there will
be directors who are not involved in the action, and the board may
move to dismiss the action or may require demand to be made. The
courts have rejected that argument.
The Aronson case also announced a presumption of good faith on
the part of management. It is presumed that the directors are acting
in good faith and that the special litigation committee is acting in
good faith. Plaintiffs bear the burden of overcoming that
presumption.
The final point in Aronson is the discussion of what has come to
be known in the cases and commentary as "structural bias" of the
directors of a corporation. The argument is that there is an inherent,
unavoidable structural bias in boards of directors. That structural
bias makes it unrealistic to expect any board of directors to name a
special litigation committee that is in fact independent and disinterested and that could examine the merits of a derivative action and
reach a fair decision on whether it should be dismissed. The idea is
that there is a common shared culture among directors, which produces a natural empathy or collegiality among the types of people
who serve as directors of corporations. That makes it impossible for
3
them to reach an objective decision on this point.'
The Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata v. Maldonado referred to
that collegiality as the "there-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I" syndrome. Plaintiff's lawyers are not appointed to boards of directors,
and the history of these cases seems to indicate that is a point. I
believe a study showed that on only one occasion has a special litigation committee made any recommendation other than that the action
be dismissed.
Courts and commentators have been struggling with the questions of how to recognize structural bias if it does exist and of how to
deal with it. In Aronson the court rejected the argument that a board,
so affected by interest that it cannot make an independent determination on a derivative action, could not delegate to any other committee or body the power to exercise authority that it did not have. If
a board is tainted, the committee it appoints would necessarily be
tainted by the same disability. The Delaware court said that it realized that it would be criticized for rejecting that argument by those
who say that the structural bias is so strong that it should disable
13 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
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even independent committees. Nevertheless, the court announced
the rule that a board of interested directors has the authority to appoint a disinterested committee, although careful scrutiny would be
14
applied in such a case.
The Iowa Supreme Court in Miller v. The Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc. arrived at the opposite conclusion.' 5 The opinion contains a good discussion of structural bias, referring to the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance guidelines, and concludes that
the potential for structural bias on the part of a litigation committee
appointed by interested directors is sufficiently great and difficult of
precise proof to require the adoption of a prophylactic rule. Such a
rule would prevent the potential for structural bias in some cases by
6
effectively limiting the powers of directors in all cases.'
The Iowa Supreme Court heard Miller on a certified question
from a federal court. The court held that the board of directors did
not have the authority to appoint a special litigation committee. It
observed that the alternative would be to have such a committee appointed by the court itself. This is an interesting way of dealing with
the question and one that has been rejected by the Delaware court.
Recently, the question of standing of the parties has arisen.
This refers to the standing of the plaintiff-shareholder to bring suit if
the status as a shareholder is lost by reason of a transaction occurring after suit was brought. The federal courts are generally stricter
than the state courts on the standing rule in requiring continued
shareholder status. 17
It is interesting that the ubiquitous Mr. Lewis in Lewis v. Chiles' 8
was dismissed out of court. He had instituted a derivative action
against the corporation, and then the assets of the corporation were
sold, including the derivative claim. The buyer moved to dismiss the
derivative claim, and the court granted the motion. Lewis ingeniously argued that if the claim was sold and the buyer bought it, it
must have been worth something. If it was worth something, he was
entitled to attorney's fees. The court rejected that argument.
In a Southern District of New York case, however, the court held
that a cash-out merger eliminating plaintiffs status as a shareholder
did not disqualify plaintiff from maintaining the derivative action. 19
His name was not Lewis. In another case in the Fifth Circuit Lewis
14 Id.

15 Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 805.
16 Id. at 815.
17 See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984) (suit brought under
Investment Company Act of 1940); Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982); Issen v. GCS Enterprises, Inc., 538 F. Supp.
745 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
18 719 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1983).
19 Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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was bumped out in a reverse stock split which cashed him out.20 Per-

haps the lesson is that if your name is Lewis, you lose your status; if it
is not, you do not.
There have been some cases on the independence of counsel
and conflict of interest. One decision in Oregon held that it is unethical for corporate counsel, counsel of the corporation who has represented the corporation in a derivative action, to represent either the
corporation or the majority shareholders in a derivative action. 2 1 In
some cases such representation has been permitted if there is a perfect identity of interest. In Lowder v. All State Mills Inc. ,22 decided in
1983, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court held there was
not such a perfect identity of interest between derivative plaintiffs
and receivers of a corporation, and therefore, dual representation
was required. Thus, the area of derivative actions is very lively.
In the world of close corporations, and especially in North Carolina, Meiselman v. Meiselman23 is a landmark decision. North Carolina
lawyers know that the North Carolina statute has long been recognized as having been, when it was enacted, in the forefront of the
recognition of close corporations. 24 The Meiselman case represents a
situation that is very common in law offices that deal generally with
corporate matters. The issue is a dual one. First, there is the withdrawal situation, as in Meiselman, where one of the shareholders
wants out. Second, there is the situation where the majority wants to
eliminate a shareholder. These are essentially two sides of the same
situation.
In the withdrawal situation, if it involves a partnership, a partner
may dissolve the partnership, get his money, and go his way. But the
corporate form presents a different situation; it may not be dissolved
at will. The Meiselman case presented in the purest form the question
whether a court will recognize the difference between close corporations and corporations whose stock is more widely held, and whether
it will recognize the different considerations that apply to an incorporated partnership.
Meiselman concerned two brothers, both of whom had received
their stock by inheritance from their father in an enterprise that had
become very valuable- worth twenty million dollars or more. One
brother owned slightly more stock than the other so that he was in
control. The controlling brother was married and had a family, and
therefore, had entirely different interests from the minority shareholder, who was single, without a family, and wanted a larger current
20
21
22
23
24

Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983).
In re Kinsey, 294 Or. 544, 660 P.2d 660 (1983).
309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983).
309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a)(4) (Replacement 1982).
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return. The controlling brother, who managed the corporation, was
interested in the future and in building the corporation-a built-in
conflict of interests. There was in fact no fraud, dishonesty, or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the majority shareholder. There
was merely an irreconcilable difference of interest and temperament.
The plaintiff, whom I represented, wanted out, so we brought an
action to get him out. The trial judge dismissed the case because we
did not prove any wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, and in a 2-1 decision the court of appeals reversed. The
court noted that under the North Carolina statutes, involuntary dissolution is allowed where reasonably necessary for the protection of
the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder.2 5 The next
section of the statute allows the court to fashion any type of alternative remedy it sees fit. 26 The statute was intended, the court stated,
to allow some remedy when the shareholder had shown, not oppression or fraud, but simply that basic fairness compels the dissolution
or the alternative remedy. The court held that the complaining
shareholder is not required to show bad faith, mismanagement, or
wrongful conduct, but only real harm. The court remanded the case,
finding that the trial court had not only misapplied the law, but had
abused its discretion in not granting relief.
The North Carolina Supreme Court struck a middle ground.
The court recognized the differences between close corporations
and publicly held corporations. It stated that this distinction is crucial because the two types of corporations are fundamentally and
functionally quite different. The relationships in a close corporation,
which is little more than an incorporated partnership, require close
cooperation and a high degree of good faith and mutual respect.
The opinion quotes Professor O'Neal on Close Corporations to the
effect that close corporations are based on personal relationships
which give rise to certain "reasonable expectations." Those reasonable expectations include the expectation by the minority shareholder that he will participate meaningfully in the management of
the corporation and will be employed by the company.27
The court further stated that when there is a breakdown such
that those expectations are frustrated, a court should grant relief.
Therefore, applying the North Carolina statutes, the court held that
plaintiff has the burden of proving that his rights or interests are being controverted in some manner. Those rights or interests include
his reasonable expectations, and reasonable expectations are those
that existed at the time the relationship began or that have devel25 Id.
26 Id. § 55-125.1.

27 See O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus.
LAw 873, 885 (1978).
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engaged in the course of dealing within the
oped as the participants
28
corporation.
The court said that the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff
minority shareholder must be known to or assumed by the other
shareholders and concurred in by the majority shareholders. In the
conclusion of the opinion, however, the court omitted the phrase
"concurred in by the majority" and stated only that the plaintiff must
prove that he had one or more reasonable expectations known or
assumed by the other participants, that the expectation has been
frustrated, that the frustration was without fault of the plaintiff and
was in a large part beyond his control, and that under all circumstances, it would be fair either to dissolve the corporation or require
29
the minority shareholder to be bought out.

In Meiselman plaintiffs most compelling reasonable expectation
was his expectation of receiving a reasonable current return on an
inheritance worth nine or ten million dollars. He was receiving dividends of $60,000 sometimes and with some effort. The court did
not explicitly mention that, and the settlement of the case leaves
open the question as to the weight a court should put on that
expectation.
Meiselman is an interesting case that announces a rule difficult to
apply because it requires ad hoc application under the facts and circumstances of each case. It remains to be seen how the rule will be
handled by the courts in the future, but it is now certain that a disgruntled minority shareholder need not prove fraud, mismanagement, or oppression in the traditional sense to obtain relief from a
situation that has become unfair to him.
On the other side of that coin is the expulsion case in which the
majority shareholders wish to rid the corporation of a minority
shareholder. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 30 the Delaware Supreme
Court rejected the business purpose test and held that a minority
shareholder may be cashed out if the test of entire fairness is satisfied. There need not be any specific business purpose to the cashout merger. It is more complicated than that, but that is a fair
summation.
There has been a great deal of commentary on the Weinberger
case, but it has been applied primarily in the context in which that
case arose and was decided. All of the commentary that I have read
has been directed to larger corporations with public minority shareholders, or numerous minority shareholders in the second step of a
two-step acquisition. I have not seen any commentary directed to
the question that arises most often in the normal corporate practice:
28 Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 297.
29 Id. at 301.
30 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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may two or three shareholders have a cash-out merger and eliminate
the third, if they are entirely fair to him in that there is no overreaching, and a fair price is offered? If the three shareholders had begun
business together, and then went their separate ways so that one now
has different views or has gone in a different direction, may the two
that are in the majority have a cash-out merger, provided they are
completely upfront with the minority shareholder and pay him a fair
price and get him out of the business? That question must arise so
often that it is bound to get to reported decisions of the courts
sometime.
In Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills3 l the judge stated in gratui-

tous dictum, "[p]laintiffs allegation, taken as true, that defendants
intended to freeze out the minority shareholders adequately states a
breach of fiduciary duty claim." '3 2 If that dictum is taken literally, all
one needs to do is characterize the cash-out merger as a freeze-out
merger, which it virtually always is, and it thereby becomes a breach
of fiduciary duty and is prohibited. I do not think the North Carolina
courts will go that far. I believe that they will recognize that the entire "fairness doctrine" announced by the Weinberger court should
apply.
Perhaps the North Carolina courts will apply the reasonable expectations test announced in Meiselman to the corollary situation
where the minority shareholder is not seeking to withdraw. Instead,
he is being expelled by the majority shareholders, and the question
whether the right of dissent and appraisal is exclusive so that the
majority shareholders may cash him out depends upon the reasonable expectations of all of the parties. If those reasonable expectations of the plaintiff minority shareholder are being unfairly
frustrated by the cash-out, then the merger would not be permitted;
otherwise it would. No one knows what the courts are going to hold,
but I think it is an interesting and important point.
I wish to discuss some changes that have been adopted by the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, and I wish to call attention
to the American Law Institute (ALI) project, The Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure.
The Principles of Corporate Governance are not stated exclusively in terms of what the law is, although it purports to do that to
some extent, but in terms of what the law should be. I believe it is
tremendously significant that the Iowa Supreme Court looked to
those statements of principles, to that ALI project, in reaching its
decision in Miller on derivative actions.3 3 I think the fact that a state
supreme court would look to a project that represents the cutting
31 578 F. Supp. 342 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
32 Id. at 345.

33 Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 717.
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edge of corporate law development, is very significant. In litigation
involving corporate principles it may perhaps be argued that a court
should consider the factors being taken into account by the ALI project in saying what corporate law should provide. The Miller case is
an instance in which one state supreme court has done so, and I believe that is one of the most significant aspects of that decision.

Banking Law
C. Boyden Gray*
GRAY: I have been invited here because of my general role in
regulatory reform or deregulation and because of the Vice President's task of formulating recommendations to restructure, if appropriate, the regulatory agencies that govern the financial services
industry. There are relationships between all of these things. When
you rearrange these relationships, however, either someone will lose
a monopoly in the private sector, or a bureaucrat will lose some
ground.
The whole area of deregulation is, in many ways, somewhat
hopeless because it sometimes takes two steps forward and three
steps backward. I thought I would use D & G Enterprises v. Continental
Illinois National Bank' as a focal point for discussing some issues involving deregulation of the banking system. It has become fashionable, at least in Washington, D.C., to use ContinentalIllinois as a way to
criticize the Reagan Administration's push for deregulation or regulatory reform. It is said that this is an example of how we must not
only stop this deregulation, but we must turn the clock back to where
we were a number of years ago. I will discuss the three or four relevant allegations.
2
The first allegation is that the 1980 Monetary Control Act,
which was a Carter Administration bill, and the 1982 Garn-St
* Legal Counsel, Office of the Vice President of the United States, Washington, D.C.
B.A. 1966, Harvard University; J.D. 1969, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 574 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Plantiffs, multiple investors in entities identified
as the Longhorn Partnerships, brought this action against Continental Illinois alleging that
Continental Illinois, along with Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma and the Longhorn Partnerships, conspired to defraud plaintiffs in connection with the sale of the Longhorn Partnership interests. Plaintiffs alleged that the three entities caused them to invest in the
Partnership by furnishing letters of credit in favor of Penn Square, issuing "false and misleading" reports concerning the success of the Partnership, and fraudulently obtaining
loans to generate banking business for Penn Square. The court considered defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint ruling that plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient but granting leave to amend.
Subsequent procedural issues involving this case were ruled upon in: In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 572 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Continental Illinois
Securities Litigation, 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Continental Illinois Securities
Litigation, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 91,457 (7th Cir. April 23, 1984).
2 Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, Title I, 94 Stat. 132 (1981).
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Germain legislation 3 are partly responsible for the problems in the
banking industry. The theory is that lifting Regulation Q 4 which
placed a ceiling on the interest payable on small time deposits, has
led to an unseemly outbreak of competition for funds for deposits.
This has raised the rates that banks have had to offer to get these
deposits, and, the theory goes, has forced the banks to make even
riskier loans to cover these higher costs. These high-rate loans tend
to be high-risk, and this is said to be a source of trouble in Continental
Illinois.
The problem with that theory is that Continental Illinois did not
have a significant proportion of consumer loans or consumer deposits. Like most money center banks, Continental Illinois had been
purchasing virtually all of its funds in the uninsured certificate of deposit market where interest rate levels have never been regulated.
Indeed, because Illinois law is the most restrictive against branching
of any major state, Continental Illinois was probably affected less by
the decontrol of interest rates on retail deposits than any other
money center bank. Because it was limited by law to only three
branches, all in Chicago, Continental Illinois was forced into virtually total reliance on "hot" money, without even the option of attracting a larger proportion of less volatile insured consumer
deposits. With ninety percent or more of its funds in uninsured deposits from institutional sources, and often from Europe and Asia,
Continental Illinois was more vulnerable to a run than an institution
of similar size would be if it were able to branch and attract a larger
base of stable consumer deposits. Therefore, regulatory restraints
on where it could have branches in Illinois, not deregulation of interest rates, was a contributing factor in Continental Illinois' difficulties.
The second allegation is that the exploitation of loopholes in the
Bank Holding Company Act 5 allowed "nonbank" banks to participate in interstate banking and to create consumer banks that led to
financial instability. I do not believe this to be the case, and I think
the reverse is probably true. That is, the more that you can diversify
your risks, both numerically and geographically, the safer your operation is likely to be. Congressman St Germain's legislation to outlaw
the creation of consumer banks seems to be a somewhat misguided
proposal. It might make sense on the theory that a consumer bank
would siphon away highly reliable business from traditional center
banks. But it certainly does not make any sense on the ground that
consumer loans are too risky, because they are not. They are far
safer in the aggregate than third world country loans, for example.
3 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469.
4 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1984).
5 Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982).
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Outlawing the creation of consumer banks will not make banking
safer for the big banks. Even more important than consumer lending
is the ability of the nonbank bank to evade current geographic restrictions on bank branching. There certainly can be little doubt that
banks with a broad geographic base are safer than "unit" banks limited to a single community or limited area. I believe that the effect of
a prohibition on nonbank banks as a tool to allow interstate expansion of traditional banking institutions will be to perpetuate greater
risk in the banking system.
The third allegation is that because of the instability that we are
now seeing in the unseemly competition that has developed, we
should not allow banks to get into any other related financial business, whether it be real estate, insurance, brokerage or underwriting.
The theory is that if banks cannot safely handle the banking business,
we should protect them from hurting themselves in any other field.
This again turns the principle of risk diversification on its head. One
way to reduce risk, of course, would be to treat banks as public utilities, but I do not think that it would be a good thing for capital allocation in the United States if our banks generally behaved like public
utilities.
The insurance business, the real estate business, and the brokerage business do not want banking in their businesses, although they
want to get into banking. They do not want banking in their business, not because they are altruistically worried about banks, but because they think that the competition is going to harm them. In
other words, they think it is a profitable activity. If it were not profitable, banks presumably would not want to do it.
Looking at it from the other side, if bankers were bad businessmen as the critics of deregulation say they are, then the people who
scream the loudest about broadening their powers, the insurance industry and the real estate brokers, should have nothing to worry
about, because the bankers are going to make mistakes to their benefit. They should want banking in their businesses because they could
profit by correcting the mistakes.
I am reminded of what the president of Wachovia Bank told me
at a meeting. People at Wachovia Bank had started an insurance operation at the turn of the century because no one else in WinstonSalem would do it. When the Bank Holding Company Act was
passed, Wachovia's insurance operation was grandfathered. Insurance interests in the community brought pressure to have the bank
spin it off. It was a small insurance operation that was profitable, but
was not critical to the bottom line of Wachovia. Consequently, as a
matter of comity, and not through any legal requirement, Wachovia
spun it off. Once liberated from its sleeepy bank parent, however,
the reinvigorated company has provided new competition that the
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existing insurance interests now dislike, and they regret having asked
Wachovia to spin it off.
Many people in Washington seem to have a sense that deregulation has led to instability, when in reality the reverse may be true.
For instance, Continental Illinois Bank could not do very much. It
wanted to grow, its shareholders wanted it to grow, its management
wanted it to grow, but it could not grow into anything that was profitable at the time, like insurance or real estate. The bank was limited
to what was an increasingly risky and contained business. It became
involved in energy and started bidding on loans on a portfolio that
was marginal at best, and when it turned sour, there was nothing else
on which to fall back. Had Continental Illinois' management been
able to think about things other than the limited nature of banking,
perhaps the bank would not have put itself in such a risky posture. I
cannot guarantee that would have been the case, but I suspect that it
would have been likely. I base my conclusion on an article published
recently in the Wall Street Journal. 6 It was written by a vice president of a financial services giant that is not regulated as a bank because it is not a bank, and because it has managed to find good
lawyers to figure out ways to avoid the clutches of the bank regulators. He wrote that, in fact, securities houses, thrifts, insurance companies, retailers and finance companies have thrived by exploiting
loopholes, and thus have diversified both in terms of geography and
types of financial services offered. Note that he was concerned about
the competition they provided, not the failures they were suffering.
Should it be the national policy that banks should not thrive? I
think this is not the approach we should take. Preventing banks from
maintaining related financial services, services that would help them
understand and operate their own banking business better, is tantamount to saying that drugstores should not be selling magazines,
food, pencils, or cigarettes. I think the fact that banking is included
in this "Securities law" symposium indicates that lawyers who deal in
securities or lawyers who deal in banking should be aware of the law
that deals with those related services.
In the Bush Task Group on Financial Services we examined the
structure of regulation to see how we might confront some of the
issues that have arisen. The suggestion that we stop and refrain from
doing anything would not be disastrous, but it would mean the loss
of a good opportunity.
One defect of the current structure is fragmented responsibility:
two and three regulators look at the same business organization.
There is a little of the problem of two polite infielders deferring to
each other, saying, "You catch the ball. No, you catch the ball." It is
6 Garten, Dealingwith a Changed Banking System, Wall St. J., May 29, 1984, at 30, col. 3.
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not now always clear who is ultimately responsible in the federal regulatory scheme. If that is in fact the case-if there is a "No, it is your
problem. No, it is your problem" scenario-there may be a situation
where two agencies are not giving the proper attention to a bank's
problems or may not fully appreciate the significance of a development in one area of the firm, because they are unaware of other developments in a subsidiary regulated by a different agency.
Moreover, there is probably an irreconcilable conflict of interest
between the Federal Reserve Board's central bank and monetary policy roles and its regulatory and supervisory responsibilities. Can the
Board's use of its regulatory authority and expertise as "leverage" to
achieve a goal of monetary policy, such as extending further credit to
a debtor nation, always be consistent with sound regulatory policy? It
might make more sense, as we have proposed, to strengthen the
Comptroller of the Currency and to have that agency be given the
primary rulemaking responsibility to determine what banks can and
cannot do, with the Federal Reserve Board having a veto power. It
would probably make more sense to have a banking agency rather
than the Federal Reserve Board as the principal rulemaking
authority.
Similarly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should be
principally an insurance corporation and not a regulator, so that it
can oversee its fund. For example, in ContinentalIllinois, if the FDIC
had been given enforcement authority and the right to examine troubled banks, it might not have permitted Continental Illinois to pay
over $100,000,000 in dividends after the failure of Penn Square
made the size of Continental Illinois' problems painfully clear. But
that is what has happened. People knew that Continental Illinois had
purchased almost a billion dollars in loan participations from Penn
Square, and it was obvious then, if not before, that most of these
loans would be uncollectable. Yet nothing happened, and
$100,000,000 went out in dividends in the interim that eventually
had to be replaced by the FDIC. I do not think the FDIC would have
let that happen if it had been involved, or had the right to become
involved, two years ago. These are just some of the examples of the
improvements that the Task Group hopes to make.
Regulatory agencies are sitting on top of a vastly diversified and
more complicated financial service industry than existed when the
Comptroller of the Currency was established during the Civil War.
The regulatory structure has not been rationalized, and it needs rationalization. All of this, of course, is part of an effort to reach the
ultimate goal, which is to improve both the soundness and the efficiency of capital creation and allocation in the United States. It may
be due more to the capital gains tax cut of 1978 than to any other
single thing, but the fact remains that in 1977 the venture capital
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industry was able to raise only $4,000,000. In 1983 the number increased by forty times. The increase is due primarily to the cuts in
the capital gains tax in 1978 and 1981, but I believe it is also due to
the improvements made at the Securities and Exchange Commission
to make it easier for small companies to go to the market.
Reform does help raise and allocate capital. It is very important
in this country that this happen. Much of our new job creation has
been fueled by venture capital over the last decade. The Europeans
and the Japanese are looking back and remarking that what we are
doing is working. The financial industry is central to all of this. If
allowed to go its own way, the industry might encounter problems,
but if it is too closely regulated, it will almost certainly be smothered.

Banking Law
John D. Hawke, Jr.*
HAWKE: The topic that I will discuss is bank expansion through
the process of mergers and acquisitions, and I will speak about some
of the details of the legal standards that apply in this area.
In recent years there seem to be larger and larger bank acquisitions being proposed and approved. Several years ago I had occasion to look back through Federal Reserve decisions over a ten-year
time span, to try to determine the extent to which size alone might
have an effect on regulatory decisions in bank acquisition cases. I
found that during that period, which ran approximately from 1965 to
1975, the Federal Reserve Board had not approved any acquisitions
in which there were billion dollar banks on both sides of the transaction. In fact, there had been very few transactions of that magnitude
even proposed. Indeed, the Federal Reserve had not granted many
applications involving a billion dollar bank on one side of the transaction and a five hundred million dollar bank on the other side. It
had been denying applications in that size range quite routinely.
In the last two years, things have changed radically. There have
been approximately a dozen large bank acquisitions, mostly in Florida, Texas, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, states where there has been
much acquisition activity, in which multibillion dollar banks have acquired other multibillion dollar banks. Recently, the Federal Reserve Board approved the acquisition of Southwest Bancshares in
Texas, which is the seventh largest bank in the state and a five-and-ahalf billion dollar institution, by Mercantile Texas, which is the fifth
largest bank in the state and a seven billion dollar institution. Those
banks are combining to form the second largest bank in Texas. Last
year the Federal Reserve Board also approved an application by First
Chicago, a thirteen-and-a-half billion dollar institution, to acquire
American National, a two billion dollar institution. It also recently
approved the acquisition by Chase, a twenty-six billion dollar bank
measured by domestic deposits, of Lincoln First Bank in Rochester, a
three billion dollar institution.
Clearly, the magnitude of the size of bank acquisitions has in* Partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.; former General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board. B.A. 1954, Yale University; LL.B. 1960, Columbia University.
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creased tremendously. One of the reasons for this dramatic shift
may be that a billion dollars is not what it used to be, but the change
is not simply the result of inflation. There have been a number of
significant changes in the law and in the application of the law by the
regulators that have led to this change. I will list them first and then
explain them in discussing some of the components of bank merger
acquisition analysis.
The first and probably most important reason for the change is
that as a result of two decisions, County National Bancorporation v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System' and Mercantile Texas
Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2 the courts have
now firmly established the rule that banking agencies do not have
discretion to deny a bank acquisition on competitive grounds unless
the acquisition would violate the antitrust laws. During a long period
of time prior to these decisions the Federal Reserve Board had asserted a broad discretionary authority to apply its own competitive
tests, which in some instances were much more stringent than those
of the antitrust laws. For example, in the County National case, the
Board refused to permit a merger of two banks in the St. Louis market with market shares of about two percent and three percent, a
combination that even the Board admitted would not rise to the level
of an antitrust violation. The court of appeals reversed the Board on
that decision, and the reversal was reaffirmed en banc. 3 Thus, the
rule was established that the Board must follow the antitrust laws,
which are built into the governing statutes that relate to bank mergers and acquisitions: the Bank Holding Company Act 4 and the Bank
5
Merger Act.
The County National and Mercantile Texas decisions, which withdrew discretion from the agencies to apply a competitive test
tougher than the antitrust laws, resulted in a significant change of
market expectations about what can be approved. In fact, the Federal Reserve Board has not denied a bank acquisition on competitive
grounds in three years, with the exception of a few cases in which
there was a dispute about market definition.
The second reason for the increase in the size of mergers has
been the demise and virtual destruction of the doctrine of potential
competition. I will expand on that further. The third factor is the
increased willingness of the banking agencies to include thrift institutions-savings and loans and savings banks-in their competitive
analyses of bank acquisitions, that is to treat savings institutions as
comparable to banks for purposes of calculating market shares.

1654
2
3
4
5

F.2d 1253 (8th Cir.
638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir.
County Nat'l, 654 F.2d at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849
Id. § 1828.

1981).
1981).
1260.
(1982).
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Fourth, the increased and more sophisticated use of divestitures to
cure competitive problems has facilitated many mergers that otherwise would have been denied. Finally, an additional factor may be a
market perception that the Justice Department is not going to be a
strong force in the bank merger and acquisition area. I will expand
on some of these points as I discuss the elements of bank merger
analysis.
First, the Bank Holding Company Act and the Bank Merger Act
both expressly embody an antitrust standard in that they prevent the
agencies from approving bank mergers and acquisitions that would
violate the conventional standards of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act. Those statutes provide one exception, however. The
agencies may approve a transaction that would otherwise violate the
antitrust laws if they find that the probable effects of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community clearly outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the merger. This balancing test
was built into the statutes in 1966 to mitigate the application of pure
antitrust principles to bank mergers and allow the banking agencies
to approve mergers that would have public benefits from a banking
point of view, notwithstanding antitrust problems. As a practical
matter, that balancing test was undercut by the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville,6 which requires
that before an agency may justify an anticompetitive merger on the
basis of the balancing test, it must find that there is no less anticompetitive way of solving the same problems or providing the same
kinds of public benefits. As a result of that decision, few cases have
been approved in which an antitrust violation would otherwise be
present, and the approval is based on the favorable balancing of public benefits.
The conventional approach to bank merger analysis, as followed
by the agencies, involves three quite discrete steps. First is the process of market definition, which further breaks down into definition
of the product market and definition of the geographic market. The
purpose of formulating a market definition is to establish a matrix in
which market shares may be calculated and the competitive analysis
of the merger carried out under antitrust standards. The product
market definition issue may be reduced essentially to the question
whether thrifts are to be included in the calculation of market shares,
and if so, to what extent.
Over the past five years the three banking agencies have
adopted the viewpoint that thrift institutions should be included in
product market analysis. Thrift institutions now have virtually all the
powers that commercial banks have. Commercial banks are no
longer the unique provider of demand deposit services, nor are they
6 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
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the unique provider of commercial loans. Thrift institutions are getting increasingly into those lines of business. Thus, several years ago
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and more recently, the Federal Reserve, concluded that
thrifts should be included in the product market analysis. The Federal Reserve Board will now give virtually full credit to thrift institution deposits in calculating market shares if there is any showing that
thrift institutions are engaged in, or are trying to engage in, commercial lending, or are offering retail demand deposits or transaction
accounts.
I think the reason that the inclusion of thrifts has been a facilitating factor with respect to the increasing size of bank mergers is obvious. The inclusion of thrifts in the product market and the market
share calculation increases the size of the denominator in the market
share calculation and consequently diminishes the size of the market
share that is attributed to the merging parties. Federal Reserve decisions over the past year have increasingly accorded weight to thrift
deposits as a mitigating factor.
The second step in the conventional merger analysis is geographic market definition. The three banking agencies have taken
different approaches in this area. The Federal Reserve defines geographic markets largely without reference to the locations in which
the particular merging banks may be doing business. For example, if
you have a bank merger involving the banks in Charlotte, North Carolina, the Federal Reserve Board will tell you what market they use in
that area, which will probably be something like the Charlotte Metropolitan Statistical Area or some other predefined area that they perceive to be the economic market centering on the City of Charlotte.
The extent of the market in any sizeable metropolitan area will have
been predefined by the Federal Reserve Board. Therefore, if a
merger has to go to the Federal Reserve Board, the first step is to
find out how they define the market and to decide whether to agree
with it or to contest it. Obviously, the way in which the geographic
market is defined will be outcome-determinative in many cases because it can significantly affect the calculation of the market share
fraction.
The Comptroller of the Currency follows quite a different approach, the service area-oriented approach, which looks principally
to locations in which the merging banks are doing business. The
Comptroller will define markets by determining from what geographic area the merging banks derive approximately seventy-five
percent of their deposits and loans. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation uses a similar technique. The area may or may not have
any relationship to the kind of predefined market used by the Federal
Reserve Board. This disparity in technique for defining geographic
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markets is of great importance to any lawyer who is involved in planning a merger transaction. To some extent the merger may be structured in such a way as to come within the jurisdiction of one or the
other of the federal banking agencies that will apply a market definition most hospitable to a favorable antitrust analysis of the
transaction.
The Justice Department does not use any single method. It
tends to follow the approach of the Federal Reserve Board but sometimes will follow an approach that sounds like the service area approach. The Justice Department will rarely look to any area of a size
smaller than a county for purposes of determining the geographic
market, and it tries to define an area in which a customer might turn
for alternative services if one of the alternatives that he presently has
is eliminated by a merger. To define that area, the Department will
try to project from what geographic area other competitors might
attempt to enter that market if the local banks tried to raise their
prices by five percent. It is not an easy technique for prelitigation
analysis.
The Justice Department follows an approach that differs quite
markedly from the banking agencies on the issue of product market
definition. The Department is willing to give some credit for thrift
institution deposits in the product market analysis but basically divides the banking markets into two segments: retail banking and
commercial banking. This is the definition used in the most recent
suits that the Department has filed in Virginia and New York. The
complaint in the New York suit defines retail banking as banking
services offered to individual customers, including time deposits,
savings deposits, transaction accounts, consumer loans, and residential mortgage loans. In contrast, the complaint defines commercial
banking as banking services offered to commercial customers, including commercial type transaction accounts and commercial loans.
I do not know how to apply those tests in counseling clients on bank
mergers, because the kind of data that is needed to make that analysis generally is not available, and the Department has not yet had an
occasion to litigate fully that approach.
Once you have gone through the process of deciding what product market and geographic market you will use, you will be able to
calculate market shares. Determining the shares of the incumbent
firms in the market-banks, or banks and thrifts, depending on how
you define the market-is a simple mathematical exercise. The market shares generally are calculated in terms of deposits. Branch office deposit data is readily available from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation as of June 30 of each year, and it is virtually
universal to use deposits as a proxy for all of the other measures of
market presence.
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When you have calculated the market shares, the next step is to
determine whether the acquisition is going to have the kind of competitive impact that would rise to the level of a violation of the antitrust laws. Two years ago the Department of Justice issued new
guidelines for competitive analysis incorporating the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI). This economist's measure of market concentration is now being used by virtually all the banking agencies in
their analyses of the competitive impact of bank mergers. The HHI
is calculated by determining and squaring the market share of each
participant in the market, and adding up the squares of all the shares
in the market. This Index is the starting point for analysis under the
Justice Department guidelines.
The Department divides markets into three categories based on
the size of the HHI. There are highly concentrated markets, where
the Index is over 1,800; moderately concentrated markets, where the
Index is 1,000 to 1,800; and relatively unconcentrated markets,
where the Index is under 1,000. Under the Department's guidelines,
mergers may or may not be subject to attack under the antitrust laws
if the postmerger HHI falls into one of the three categories, and the
increase in the HHI resulting from the merger is within certain parameters. If the postmerger HHI is less than 1,000, the Justice Department will tolerate virtually any increase in the HHI. If the
postmerger HHI falls in the 1,000 to 1,800 range, and the increase
resulting from the merger is less than one hundred, it is a safe harbor, but if the increase is over 100, there is a good chance of Justice
Department attack. Finally, if the postmerger HHI is over 1,800 and
the merger results in an increase in the HHI of less than fifty points,
you are safe, but if the increase is more than one hundred points
there is a likelihood ofJustice Department attack. If the increase falls
in the area between fifty and one hundred, you will probably have to
negotiate with the Justice Department because it may or may not attack in that area.
This Index and these advance warnings given by the Justice Department in its guidelines are quite theoretical. In all bank merger
and acquisition cases the Department gives an advisory report to the
banking agency that has approval authority. This report is intended
to indicate the Department's view on the merger. If the Department
considers the merger to have a significantly adverse competitive effect, which is the Department's term for a conclusion that the merger
would violate the antitrust laws, the merger is supposedly subject to
attack. A recent study shows, however, that in the last five years the
Department has submitted forty significantly adverse competitive
factor reports on bank mergers, and the agencies nevertheless have
approved twenty-three of those mergers. The Department has only
sued in four cases, however, notwithstanding those approvals. It lost
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three of the four cases and settled the fourth. Thus, the Department's record has not been very good in attacking approved bank
mergers, nor has their resolve to sue been very strong.
The third reason that I mentioned for the increased size of
mergers was the demise of the doctrine of potential competition.
This doctrine is basically an antitrust theory that applies where a
company is making an acquisition in a new product or geographic
market in which it is not presently doing business. In the banking
area, this generally means a bank acquiring a bank in a new geographic market, as would be the case in an interstate banking environment. The theory of potential competition is that if a bank
proposes to move into a highly concentrated local market by acquiring one of the largest banks in that market, and if it can be shown
that if denied that acquisition it would probably to go into the market
in a small way, either de novo or by a toehold acquisition, the proposed acquisition of the large bank should be viewed as anticompetitive and the transaction denied.
Several years ago, in the Mercantile Texas case the Federal Reserve Board denied Mercantile's proposed entry into the El Paso and
Waco markets on the theory of potential competition. 7 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the Board and set a very demanding factual test for
the application of the potential competition doctrine, 8 which has resulted in the decline of the doctrine. In the last three years the
Board has not turned down a single acquisition on potential competition grounds. Two years ago the Board issued a set of proposed
guidelines to identify those market extension acquisitions that are
likely to give rise to potential competition problems. The sieve that
they proposed to create with these guidelines has been so coarse that
every transaction that has been proposed so far has fallen through it
and has not been scrutinized under the potential competition theory.
In fact, the Board's hostility to potential competition now seems so
extreme that it has even approved mergers in the past year that
would have fallen under its own proposed guidelines.
In April 1984 Chairman Volcker dissented in a significant decision as to a merger between the largest bank in Omaha, Nebraska
and the largest bank in Lincoln, Nebraska. In his dissent, Chairman
Volcker said:
[T]his case raises a significant issue as to the applicability of the poThe standards established in
tential competition doctrine ....
Mercantile Texas Corporation v. Board of Governors for application of the

probable future competition doctrine, standards reflected in the
Board's proposed guidelines for assuring probable future competition, are quite rigorous. Under conditions existing in most banking
markets today, particularly in light of the competition afforded by
7

Mercantile Texas, 638 F.2d at 1255.

8 Id. at 1264-66.
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thrift institutions, it has been the Board's experience that these standards would proscribe only a limited number of proposed market
extension mergers. 9
It is not entirely clear why Chairman Volcker signalled his discomfort
with the potential competition doctrine while other members of the
Board did not seem to share that discomfort, but certainly his conclusion is right that very few transactions today would be likely to
trigger antitrust concerns under the potential competition doctrine.
If state lines are broken down in the interstate banking environment,
the applicability of antitrust to bank acquisitions will be even less because as the the state line barriers break down, there will be more
and more potential entrants into local markets, which will undercut
the application of the potential competition doctrine.
There is one final point relating to divestitures of which attorneys should be aware when counseling banks in bank mergers where
there may be a competitive problem that can be cured by a divestiture. Divestitures have been used selectively in a number of recent
bank mergers to cure competitive problems in local markets so as to
eliminate antitrust problems while allowing the consummation of the
larger part of the transaction. One of the best examples of this is the
merger in Virginia between Virginia National and First and
Merchants, the second and fifth largest banks in the state, which
combined to create the largest bank in Virginia as of December 31,
1983. There were substantial overlaps in the Richmond and Norfolk
markets, among others, which were cured by divesting a total of
thirty-four branch offices around the state. This resulted in the elimination of some of the deposit base that would otherwise have been
acquired in the merger, without eliminating such a large amount that
the principal objectives of the transaction were frustrated.
The most significant point regarding divestitures is determining
in advance how much to divest so as to avoid the antitrust problem.
Once you have done that, it is important to remember for counseling
purposes that under the rules of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Department of Justice, divestitures must be accomplished no later
than the time that the principal merger itself is consummated.
Therefore, since you are working in a regulated area, not only will
the principal merger transaction have to satisfy all of its regulatory
approval requirements, but the purchaser who is buying the divested
properties will have to obtain all of its own regulatory approvals to
buy the branches in time to allow the principal transaction to be consummated on your timetable.
Our experience has been that the timing of those divestitures is
a continual problem. Everyone wants to close mergers, for example,
9 Omaha National Corp., 70 FED. REs. BULL. 522 (1984) (dissenting statement of
Chairman Volcker) (majority opinion published at 70 FED. REs. BULL. 447 (1984)).
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on December 31 for accounting purposes, and the month of November is generally a frantic month at the banking agencies that are trying to get divestiture transactions approved to facilitate mergers. If
you are in that situation, you would be wise to plan well in advance
for divestitures.

Banking Law
Ralph N. Strayhorn*
STRAYHORN: I will discuss some of the recent developments in
interstate banking. As a matter of background, it is necessary to consider the statutory framework within which interstate banking works.
Geographic restrictions on national bank and state charter banks are
covered by the McFadden Act.' The McFadden Act defines a branch
as being a place of business at which deposits are received, checks

are paid, or money is lent.2 It further provides that a national bank

may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, operate
new branches at any point within the state in which the national bank
is located, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to start banks by state statutory language affirmatively
granting such authority and not merely by implication or
3
recognition.
The McFadden Act thus specifically prevents ndtional banks
from branching if state banks are not permitted to branch. Interstate
acquisitions by bank holding companies are governed by the Bank
Holding Company Act 4 and must have the approval of the Federal
Reserve Board. This is triggered when one buys five percent or
more of the voting shares or obtains control of the bank. The Douglas Amendment, section 1842(d) of the Act, prohibits the Federal
Reserve Board from approving any application that
will permit any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to
acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all
or substantially all of the assets unless the acquisition of such shares,
or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State holding company is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such
bank is located,
by language to that effect and not merely by
5
implication.

Thus, there must be a specific authorization.
Recently, there has been a great deal of publicity generated
* General Counsel, The Wachovia Corporation, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
B.S. 1947; J.D. 1950, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
2
3
4
5

Id.
Id.
12
Id.

§ 36(g).
§ 36(c).
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
§ 1842(d)(1).
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about the possibilities of amending or repealing the McFadden Act
and the Douglas Amendment, which prohibit banking operations
from going beyond their home state. Congressional action would be
necessary to amend both acts as they are federal laws.
More recently, however, most of the real activity and the easing
of geographic barriers has centered on the language of the Douglas
Amendment, which arguably permits states to determine conditions
under which out-of-state bank holding companies may acquire a
bank in another state. The conscious loosening of geographic restrictions by state action is a rather recent phenomenon. The first
act to loosen those restrictions was passed by Maine, effective in January 1978.6
Currently, there seem to be five main avenues that have been
used by states to allow the expansion of out-of-state institutions inside a state. The first avenue is full unrestricted entry. This was enacted by Alaska in 1982 and permits out-of-state holding companies
to acquire banks and bank holding companies within Alaska. 7 Alaskan law does not contain a reciprocity provision. Alaska seems willing for anyone to come in and acquire Alaskan banks without
requiring similar treatment by the acquiring state. Maine recently
has eliminated its reciprocity provision, so that both Alaska and
Maine now qualify under the first heading of full unrestricted entry.
The second avenue is nationwide reciprocity. New York permits
out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire bank holding companies within that state provided that New York bank holding companies may acquire banks in other states.8 That impetus of the New
York law originates from the money center banks because those
banks desire to expand wherever they can.
The third category is a geographically limited reciprocity. Massachussetts9 and Connecticut'0 have enacted these types of statutes.
Rhode Island I has passed similar legislation, which will take effect
July 1984, and Georgia 12 has passed a reciprocal interstate banking
statute for banks within the southeastern region of the country. Florida passed a reciprocal interstate banking statute embracing fourteen
southeastern states and the District of Columbia, effective as of May
22, 1984. Kentucky has also passed such a statute embracing only
the states contiguous to Kentucky.' 3 The statute also contains a
"trigger" provision, which provides that the geographical limitation
6 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B § 1013 (as amended Feb. 7, 1984).
7 ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.235 (Supp. 1983).
8 N.Y. [Banking] LAw § 142-b (McKinney Supp. 1983).
9 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 167A, § 1(a) (Michie/Law Co-op. 1984).
10 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-418 to 36-430 (Supp. 1984).

11 R.I. GEN. LAws § 19-30-2 (1984).
12 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-620(10) (1980).
B5 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.900(6)(a) (1982).
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to contiguous states will be repealed after two years. Utah has
passed such a statute also on a reciprocal basis, embracing eleven
western states.14
The fourth type of entry is the limited purpose entry. Limited
purposes include the acquisition of single banks and credit card operations. The fifth type is emergency entry. Washington passed
such a statute,' 5 which permitted the Bank of America in California
to take over the Seafirst in Washington. Oregon and Utah also have
such types of emergency legislation.
Those are the five main categories that the states have enacted
by legislation. There are also grandfather expansion provisions, but
I will not discuss those because they are varied, and some of them
probably were unintentional and brought about by some very innovative members of the bar.
In Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Washington, interstate bills are pending. I
include South Carolina, although it enacted a Reciprocal Interstate
Banking law with an effective date in 1986.
Currently, there is pending a report to the General Assembly by
the Legislative Research Commission on Taxation, Regulation of
Bank Savings and Loan Associations and Credit Unions. A part of
that report is the Commission's recommendation that a Reciprocal
Interstate Banking bill be passed by the legislature in North Carolina. This recommendation is significant because the legislature is in
a short budget session in which there must be a suspension of the
rules to discuss anything other than a budget item, a report of a commission, or a bill that has been passed by one house in the 1983
session.
During the latter part of 1983, there were a number of informal
gatherings of lawyers and bankers in the Southeast to discuss the
possibility of a Reciprocal Interstate Banking Bill. Many bills were
prepared, circulated, marked up, and discarded. Finally, Georgia
lawyers drafted a model bill. The Florida and North Carolina bills
6
are patterned after the Georgia bill.1
The Georgia bill required that an eighty percent asset base be
required and retained in the region composing the southeastern region, which includes twelve states, including North Carolina and the
District of Columbia. This region together with Arkansas and Kentucky, is the earlier Fifth and Sixth Federal Reserve District. The
legislation, of course, effectively relaxes the restrictions imposed by
the Douglas Amendment, as it permits bank holding companies to
14 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-702 (1982).

15 WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.230 (1982).
16 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-620(10) (1980).
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engage in acquisitions and mergers involving banks and bank holding companies across state lines. The legislation does not effect a
relaxation of the McFadden Act, however, and consequently, interstate branch banking is still prohibited. Thus, to participate under
the terms of the bill, a holding company structure is necessary.
The bill begins with a series of precise definitions of terms such
as banks and bank holding companies. A bank holding company's
principal place of business must be in the southeastern region, and
that principal place of business is determined by the primary location
of the deposits of the subsidiary banks of the bank holding company.
For a regional bank holding company to acquire a bank in North
Carolina, the laws of the state in which the regional bank holding
company has its principal office must permit North Carolina bank
holding companies to acquire banks and bank holding companies in
that state. This is the basic reciprocity test.
There is also a specific transitional reciprocity test, sometimes
referred to as the "mirror image" test. The purpose of the "mirror
image" test is to ensure that any target institution has a comparable
opportunity to make acquisitions in the state where the acquiring
bank holding company has its principal place of business. This prevents the other state from imposing burdensome and unfair restrictions on North Carolina bank holding companies desiring to make
acquisitions in that state. There is also a requirement that a regional
bank holding company that already has a North Carolina bank subsidiary obtain approval of the North Carolina Commission of Banks
for any additional acquisitions of North Carolina banks or bank holding companies, assuming all requirements have been met. That provision was inserted in the bill during the committee hearings on the
bill, and the North Carolina Commission of Banks is given appropriate authority to promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to implement the statutes.
I believe the remainder of the bill is standard. Notably, the bill
contains a nonseverability provision, so that if any section of the bill
is declared unconstitutional, the entire bill falls. Thus, we will not be
compelled to accept nationwide interstate banking without intending
to do so. The effective date of the bill is January 1, 1985.
There are, of course, certain constitutional issues raised by these
regional banking statutes. The first argument is raised under both
the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
The argument for the regional statutes is that Congress limited bank
holding company acquisitions to banks in a single state and gave the
right to states under the Douglas Amendment to make exceptions to
that limitation. Further, since Congress has the right to regulate interstate commerce, including the right to use state boundaries as lim-
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its of bank holding company expansions, states acting under that
delegated authority should also be allowed to regulate.
One argument against the constitutionality of these statutes is
that they violate the Commerce Clause because they seek to prevent
bank holding companies located outside the borders of the defined
region from expanding into the state, and this is an unconstitutional
attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Another consideration is
whether such regional banking statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In an attempt
to strike the statutes under the Equal Protection Clause, the threshold test is whether the statute decrees a suspect classification or impinges on fundamental rights. If neither of these conditions are
present, the test is whether the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
The argument advanced against the validity of such statutes is
that there is no legitimate legislative purpose in lifting the provision
of the Douglas Amendment as to a certain region. The argument in
favor of these regional statutes is that there are a variety of valid
reasons to form a banking region: history, economic affinity, bank
structure, and desire to maintain home financial institutions. The final argument against the constitutionality of such banking statutes is
that they violate the Compact Clause, which forbids states to enter
into compacts unless they are approved by Congress.
Eight states have enacted laws similar to that proposed for
North Carolina: Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Utah, South Carolina, and Florida. On March 26,
1984 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System had an
opportunity to consider the legality of the Regional Reciprocal Interstate statutes. The Board was faced with the merger of the Bank of
New England Corporation of Boston, Massachusetts and the Connecticut Bank and Trust Corporation of Hartford, Connecticut.' 7
The Board approved the merger of those two banks from two different states under their Regional Reciprocal Banking laws. It had been
speculated, however, that the Board would not approve that merger.
By approving this merger, the Board seems to have indicated to
courts and to Congress, as well as to the banking community, that it
will approve such transactions under these Regional Reciprocal
Banking laws. The burden is on Congress and on the courts to deal
with the question whether these statutes should be permitted to continue. Chairman Volcker apparently does not like these kinds of statutes, because he has indicated that he considers this type of
legislation a Balkanization of the process.
The ruling by the Federal Reserve Board was appealed to the
17 See FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)

99,922 (April 13, 1984).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York, in which an
injunction against the merger was sought. The case was argued
before the Second Circuit on May 14, 1984. I believe it would not be
too far afield to speculate that no matter how the Circuit rules, the
case will be taken up for a ruling by the Supreme Court.
There are miscellaneous interstate banking developments that I
would like to mention. One is the United States Trust Corporation decision, 18 holding that, under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, United States Trust could convert to something other than
a trust company, for instance, to a "consumer bank" where it could
receive deposits and make consumer loans, not commercial loans,
although the latter is the definition of a bank. Consumer loans are
loans that are made for personal, family, household, or charitable
purposes. As a consequence of that decision, there has been a flood
of applications to form consumer banks all over the country. Some
of the North Carolina banks made applications on these kinds of
banks, and the Comptroller imposed a moratorium for applications
after March 31, 1984 stating the moratorium was "an effort to encourage Congress to enact legislation to set the guidelines for banks
and other financial institutions as to what the rules were.",
There is one other significant decision, a New York district court
decision holding that automatic teller machines are branch banks. 19
I do not know of any other such holding. The Comptroller has ruled
that they are not branch banks, and thus, banks have been busy forming networks across state lines. If the New York district court decision should become the law of the land, these networks will have to
be dismantled. I doubt very much that would happen.
Not long ago, banks were perceived as public utilities, and their
stocks were viewed as safe and sound investments. The image of
banks has changed dramatically, however, as banks have expanded
into many different fields and are anxious to expand even further.
We could conclude that the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment are teetering a bit. The web of geographic restraints is unraveling. There are many different views on what restrictions should be
retained and which deregulations should and should not be enacted.
We have a pool of many different opinions as to the mixing of expansion and freedom and questions of how far and in what direction we
should go. Banking today is an exciting field , and what is in vogue
and legal today, may not be tomorrow, and vice versa.

18 73-78 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)

49,120.16 (FRB 1973).
19 Independent Bankers Assoc. of N.Y. v. Marine Midland Bank, 1036
L. REP. (CCH) 86,031 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1983).
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Insider Trading
Theodore H. Levine*
with input from Stanley Sporkin
LEVINE: I will focus today on the subject of insider trading by
analyzing case law development and suggesting some practical solutions to insider trading problems. As most of you may know, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has made its enforcement program against insider trading a very high priority. Since September
1981, there have been sixty-one enforcement cases instituted by the
Commission. Even before that time, when Stanley Sporkin and I
were working together at the Commission, there were significant efforts in this area. Despite these efforts, there has been a proliferation of insider trading abuses involving not only traditional
corporate insiders but also relatives, friends, associates, and other
non-traditional corporate insiders such as financial printers, brokers,
investment bankers, lawyers, and most recently,journalists and other
media persons.
On the whole, the Commission's enforcement program has received favorable treatment in the lower courts, and despite Chiarella
v. United States' and Dirks v. SEC, 2 there has been widespread support. In fact, in the May 28 issue of Business Week, there was a poll of
corporate executives that overwhelmingly supported keeping or expanding the insider trading regulations, and a majority believed that
an insider should be defined to include anyone who possesses nonpublic corporate information.3 I think the Supreme Court in
Chiarella and Dirks intended to restrict significantly insider trading liability. In some of the decisions that I will mention, however, the
lower courts seem to have ignored or at least have interpreted
loosely the mandate of the Supreme Court.
* Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission. A.B. 1966, Rutgers University;J.D. 1969, National Law Center, George Washington
University.
1 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
2 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
3 See A Get-Tough Mood on Insider Trading, Bus. WK., May 28, 1984, at 16. Approximately two-thirds of the executives believed that insider rules should be maintained in
their present form, and one-fifth felt that the rules should be made stricter. Sixty-eight

percent felt that anyone with confidential information about a company should be considered an insider.
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Except for the prohibition against short-swing trading in the Securities Act of 19344 and the Commission's rule 14e-3, 5 dealing with
insider trading in connection with tender offers, there is no specific
statutory prohibition against insider trading. Case law has developed on an ad hoc basis essentially under rule lOb-5 antifraud provisions. 6

In the classic opinion in In re Cady Roberts & Co. 7 the

Commission, under Chairman William Cary, developed a disclose or
refrain rule; that is, an insider must either disclose the information if
it is material and nonpublic or refrain from trading. When that rule
was applied in the 1970s it was assumed to be based on an informational or equal access theory. If an insider had information that
someone else did not have, either he had to disclose it or he could
not trade. The decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 8 also focused
on the equal access theory. 9
After Chiarellaand Dirks, however, courts became more careful in
interpreting the trading prohibitions. Three theories developed.
One theory is what has been referred to as the "information" theory.' 0 The second is what the Supreme Court has identified as the
4 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1983).
5 17 C.F.R. 240, 14e-3 (1980). Rule 14e-3 states in pertinent part:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section
14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender
offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to
be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into
or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to
dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time
prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly
disclosed by press release or otherwise.
6 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1984).
7 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
8 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
9 The law of insider trading developed primarily under the federal securities laws,
especially section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970).
There is common law precedent, however, for the disclose or abstain rule. See, e.g., Strong
v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (the "special facts" of a particular case may result in a duty
to disclose information). The Texas Gulf Sulfur court approved the construction of rule
lOb-5 as covering fraud on the marketplace. The court stated:
Whether predicated on traditional fiduciary concepts . . . or on the "special
facts" doctrine [citing Strong v. Repidel], the Rule is based on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.
Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 848.
10 SeeJudge Skelley Wright's decision in Dirks, 681 F.2d at 833-37.
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"fiduciary" theory, and the third is what some of the justices on the
Supreme Court have called the "misappropriation" theory.
Essentially, the Supreme Court has rejected the concept of an
equal access or informational theory, stating that a fiduciary relationship must have existed for the disclose or refrain obligation to apply.
Clearly, the traditional insider who has distinctly different fiduciary
obligations to both the corporation and to the shareholders was
bound by the disclose or refrain obligation. In applying that fiduciary concept beyond the traditional insiders, however, courts have encountered much uncertainty, which has resulted in various
interpretations, some of which have been favorable to the
Commission.
Also left uncertain by Chiarella and Dirks is the viability of the
misappropriation theory. The majority opinion in Chiarella, written
by Justice Powell, stated that mere possession of material nonpublic
information does not create a duty to disclose to shareholders from
whom securities were purchased. There was an alternative misappropriation theory, however, argued by the Government in Chiarella.
The majority stated that because that theory had not been argued
before the jury, the Court would not decide its viability. In a dissenting opinion, agreed to by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan,
Chief Justice Burger raised an alternative theory that has become
known as the "Burger misappropriation theory." According to that
theory, the misappropriation of information-unlawfully obtaining
and using material nonpublic information-imposes upon the user a
general obligation to the entire marketplace, including the shareholders of the target company, to either disclose or refrain from
trading. I
In addition to the Burger misappropriation theory, Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion in Chiarella suggested a more limited
misappropriation theory, which states that if an insider breaches a
duty to a person by stealing information, such as wrongfully taking it
from an employer and indirectly from the employer's client, he has
breached a duty to that person. That breach coupled with trading
possibly could be a rule 1Ob-5 violation. Justice Stevens observed in
his analysis, however, that because of the decision in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 12 which denies standing under rule lOb-5 to
someone who is defrauded unless he was a purchaser or seller, there
were some problems with respect to private plaintiffs. Since the person defrauded was not a purchaser or seller, he could not have
standing to sue and thus, was left without a remedy. Justice Stevens
13
wisely left the resolution of that issue for another day.
II Chiaretla,

445 U.S. at 239-45.

12 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
13 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at

237-38.
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After Chiarella, however, the lower courts began applying the
Stevens misappropriation theory in almost every case in which there
was insider trading in a merger or acquisition context. The court in
United States v. Newman 14 was forced to deal with the misappropriation theory.
In Newman employees of Morgan Stanley were stealing and selling nonpublic information about impending tender offers in which
Morgan Stanley was involved. The Second Circuit in Newman held
that Morgan Stanley had been defrauded because its reputation was
sullied. Additionally, the clients of Morgan Stanley were also defrauded because it was more difficult to acquire the securities in a
tender offer due to the fraudulent buying activity, which had manipulated the price of the target company stock upward. Endorsing the
misappropriation theory suggested by Justice Stevens, the court held
that such activity was a rule lOb-5 violation, and the employees could
be criminally prosecuted.
When the Second Circuit was faced with the same facts, however, in Moss v. Morgan Stanley,1 5 it rejected the Burger misappropriation theory. The Moss court dismissed the action in the private
context, which resulted in a very interesting dilemma. One could be
criminally convicted of a rule lOb-5 violation, yet not be subject to a
private action for damages. I am certain the Supreme Court did not
intend the law to develop that way.
After Newman and Chiarella, the Dirks case was decided. Dirks was
a decision that focused primarily on aiding and abetting, or tippee
liability. In Dirks the Supreme Court held that for there to be a tippee, the tipper had to have breached a fiduciary duty. According to
the Supreme Court, to determine whether the tipper has breached a
fiduciary duty, a court must first determine whether the tipper received any kind of direct or indirect personal benefit. Personal benefit means receiving some type of pecuniary or reputational benefit, or
conveying a gift to a friend or relative. A tippee is viewed as being a
participant after the fact if he knew or should have known of the
breach of fiduciary duty. The Court found that Dirks was not in that
position, and consequently, the judgment against Dirks was
reversed. 16
Although the Court in Dirks was provided with the opportunity
to address the misappropriation theory, it did not discuss the theory.
The Supreme Court found that the case was not one in which Dirks
had misappropriated information. In fact, he had received information from an insider for the purpose of revealing a fraud. Therefore,
the Court concluded, there was no breach of fiduciary duty by the
14 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
15 719 F:2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
16 Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266-68.
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insider and no obligation on the part of Dirks to disclose the information before he traded or passed it on to others.
As a result of Dirks, discerning a tippee's liability under rule lOb5 has become very difficult. If a situation exists where analysts inadvertently are provided with nonpublic information, but personal
benefit to the tipper cannot be shown, the tippee is free to do
whatever he wants with that information-trade on it or pass it on.
On the other hand, if there is any personal benefit to the tipper, the
analyst faces liability if he knows or has reason to know of the benefit. Such an approach may encourage analysts to become more active
in ferreting out material nonpublic information. While this may benefit the efficient market theory, it creates enormous problems for corporate management, investment bankers, and law firms in
controlling information.
Corporations want to control the public release of information
in a way that is consistent with their own business planning and not
be subject to inadvertent leaks which make transactions in the company's securities more difficult. Controlling information becomes
more difficult, and legitimate insider transactions become more difficult to accomplish because insiders never know when information
may surface in a manner contrary to the interest of the company.
Later I will talk about some procedural steps to guard against that
problem. Analysts have more flexibility as a result of Dirks, and the
determination of whether the insider received personal benefit from
the disclosure becomes the dispositive question in the typical tippee
case.
Despite the Supreme Court's restrictions of rule 10b-5 in the
insider trading area, the lower courts have proceeded as if the cases
had never arisen. Three cases are worth mentioning. In SEC v.
Materia,17 the facts of which are very similar to those in Chiarella, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that a printer who had misappropriated information from his
employer, traded on it, and passed it to others, had breached the
fiduciary duty to his employer and to the employer's clients. Endorsing the Stevens misappropriation approach, the court found that defendant's actions violated rule lOb-5.
In SEC v. Lund' 8 the United States District Court for the Central
District of California found a rule lOb-5 violation when defendant
had received information from an insider concerning a possible joint
venture and had then purchased shares in the company. The court
viewed the passing of the information as having a legitimate business
purpose, because the insider was trying to obtain the opinion of the
17 [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
amended, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
18 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).

99,526 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
99,583 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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tippee to evaluate whether the corporation should proceed with the
possible joint venture. The tippee was a confidant of the corporation
and the insider. The court said that because of his long-standing
relationship with the company, the tippee should be viewed as a
"temporary insider," and consequently, bound by the disclose or refrain from trading rule.
The Lund opinion seems to focus on footnote 14 in the Dirks
decision where the Dirks court identified a group of persons such as
lawyers, accountants, investments bankers, and consultants who may
be viewed as quasi-insiders. 19 Persons who have confidential relationships with a corporation and receive information in a situation
where the corporation intends that they keep that information confidential must use it only for the purposes for which it was received. If
information is received in that context, a person may be viewed as an
insider and therefore bound by the traditional fiduciary obligations
of an insider. It may be argued that the court narrowly viewed the
misappropriation theory by assessing liability only if the person has a
certain relationship with the corporation and receives information legitimately, but then misappropriates it. Those who want to read that
footnote narrowly view it as a limitation on the misappropriation theory, while others view it as an expansion of the traditional insider
concept.
I think the Supreme Court itself is not clear as to the direction in
which it intends to go, because Chief Justice Burger, who dissented
in Chiarella and articulated a broad misappropriation theory, concurred with the majority in Dirks. Moreover, in Chiarella there were at
least four justices who viewed the misappropriation theory as a viable one. I believe it is a viable theory, and I think the lower courts
will continue to use it.
Another insider trading case that I think is important is the SEC
v. Musella20 decision. In that case, the office manager of Sullivan &
Cromwell had learned about takeovers and acquisitions and had
been passing inside information to different people. Once again the
court found the misappropriation theory to be viable and held that
the tipper and various tippees had breached their fiduciary duties to
Sullivan & Cromwell and to the clients of the firm by misappropriating the information. 2 1 The court strongly supported the Commis19 Id. at 1402-03. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261.

20 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
21 The Musella court issued an opinion containing an exhaustive analysis of the theories of liabilities upon which a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 may be premised.
Based on that analysis, the court recognized a distinction concerning the source of material nonpublic information. The court stated:
The rather anomalous result of the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella,
supra, at least from a policy perspective is that an individual who obtains nonpublic information regarding a tender offer from the acquiring company,
rather than from the target company, is not subject to liability at least under
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sion's theory of misappropriation. In a footnote to the decision, the
court distinguished the Commission's rule 14e-3 on insider trading
of
from section 10(b) and stated that the the fiduciary duty concept
22
section 10(b) is not a necessary element of a rule 14e-3 action.
That brings us to the recent action of the Commission in SEC v.
Brant.23 Defendant Winans was the author of the Wall StreetJournal's
"Heard on the Street" column and had allegedly misappropriated
information from the Journal concerning the publication of articles in
the Journal. Winans then conveyed the fact of the publication of the
articles to certain persons who traded on the information in anticipation of the effect that the article would have on the market price of
stocks of the companies discussed in the articles.
The Commission used two theories in its complaint. First, following the misappropriation approach, the Commission alleged that
Winans had breached his duty to the Journal and possibly to its readers by stealing information from the Journal. At least with respect to
the Journal, that theory made sense and is consistent with Newman,
Materia, and Musella. The Commission articulated a second theory,
however, which has created substantial controversy. The Commission argued that a journalist should be viewed as a registered investment adviser in the sense of having an obligation to his clients, his
readers. This theory follows the 1963 Supreme Court decision in
SEC v. CapitalGains Research Bureau, Inc. ,24 in which Justice Goldberg
articulated the "scalping" theory under the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940.25 The Commission's attempt to apply the scalping theory

to Brant has created much controversy. First amendment lawyers
cried foul. The Journal, even with its self-righteousness, cried foul,
26
and there was a search for precedent. Except for SEC v.Campbell
and the companion Ninth Circuit case, Zwieg v. Hearst,27 I am not
aware of any other case in which that variation on the scalping theory
was actually articulated and used.
SPORKIN: As you know, I have been a proponent of that theory
the Chiarella rationale-if he or she chooses to capitalize on this information
by trading in the target company's securities.
Id. at 436.

The Musella court concluded that the office manager owed a fiduciary duty to Sullivan
& Cromwell and its clients not to trade on the basis of misappropriated market information, which was a duty inherited by any tippees who knew or should have known that the

information had been obtained improperly. Based on this analysis, the court enjoined
defendants from further violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The court also enjoined defendants from violating section 14(e) and rule 14e-3 and temporarily froze the
profits that defendants had realized on their trades.

22 Id. at 436 n.10.
23 File No. 84 Civ. 3470 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
24 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (1982).
26 SEC Litigation Release No. 6567 (Oct. 30, 1974).
27 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1025 (1975).
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for quite some time. I think it is a fraud or deception for a person to
take a position in a security, to impact that position by putting out
some information concerning it, and then once that information
causes the price of the stock to rise, to trade on that slight movement
in the market. I think it is the theory that is apropros to the Capital
Gains case. There are some distinctions in the Brant case. In Capital
Gains there was the involvement of an investment adviser. But if you
can prove the elements that the person was buying, taking a position,
and then disseminating the information and capitalizing on that information, you have the elements of a crime aside from the insider
trading. It is on a different track than Dirks.
LEVINE: I agree with the latter point. But in terms of rule lOb-5,
in light of Dirks and Chiarella, I think the fiduciary theory is a tough
road for the Commission to travel. While the Commission did get
their temporary restraining order in Brant, if the case is litigated, I
think the Commission will rely more heavily on the misappropriation
theory than on the scalping theory. That raises a second problem
that I pose to Stanley Sporkin and the audience. Suppose the Journal
itself traded. Would there be any violation? If anyone says no because there is no breach of a fiduciary duty to anyone, then how
could it be said that a reporter for the Journal, who steals information
from the Journal, has a fiduciary duty? It raises an interesting question, because I think we all might agree that under rule lOb-5, the
Journal does not owe a fiduciary obligation to anyone. It is a situation
where the Journal conceivably would not be liable, but an employee
under the same facts would be liable under the misappropriation
theory. I wonder if that does not skew the entire development of
rule lOb-5 in this area. At least it is food for thought, and if anyone
has a response or wants to make the argument on behalf of the Commission, I would be happy to hear it.
SPORKIN: I think that the Commission became involved in a fiduciary theory because of some early writings, namely the Fleischer
article.28 I agree that unless the civil laws change, it will be required
to show the duty and the fiduciary responsibility concepts in connection with traditional insider trading cases. I do think, however, that
the scalping theory is a respectable argument and one that must be
addressed, because there is a Supreme Court case that does discuss
scalping. When someone is disseminating information concerning a
stock that will cause that stock's price to move, and they then capitalize on that without disclosure, it seems that the elements of a scalping case have been established.
28 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973) (management's duty to disclose should
be limited to extraordinary situations that are reasonably certain to affect significantly the
security's market price).

1985]

INSIDER TRADING

LEVINE: Assume you are an analyst or a broker-dealer representative being interviewed by a reporter. Often you can determine
which way a story will go simply from the nature of the reporter's
questions. Assume you do glean the slant of the story, and you trade
on that unintentional tip. Does that create liability?
SPORKIN: I think that is a different situation. You might have
someone who is taking advantage of a situation, but you do not have
a person who is creating the opportunity. I think that is the
distinction.
LEVINE: Let me pose another question. Assume that the
Supreme Court or another court is going to find an obligation on the
part of a newspaper or some other periodical to its readers. Is the
newspaper's situation a more difficult one?
SPORKIN: Why? Is it because the first amendment is implicated?
LEVINE: Because of the first amendment and also because normally, newspaper readers are not clients in the sense of investment
advisers. Even a regular column, such as "Heard on the Street,"
should be viewed differently in terms of reporting than an adviser/client situation where one is paying for the investment advice.
I do not think you can develop the kind of fiduciary obligations that
would support use of rule lOb-5 in that context.
SPORKIN: I do not think you should be intimidated because people raise that issue. Although there has not yet been a test, the Commission recently had to confront that issue. In the national security
area, we were confronted with certain underground newspapers publishing the names of our secret agents. Congress became concerned
about it and recently passed a law that made it a crime for a newspaper or anyone else to be naming agents for the sake of naming
agents. 2 9 That has not been tested by the Supreme Court or by any
of the courts, but there is a law on the books that prohibits such
activity.
Although there is no comparable securities statute, I would not
be concerned merely because a newspaper says that it has the right
to take advantage of people because it holds the license of being a
newspaper. Remember the facts in this case. They involved a pattern of behavior, not one isolated case, and the reporter had been
receiving money for supplying this information. This is not what I
would consider to be protected first amendment conduct, but rather
a violation of the securities laws. Indeed, one of the theories that I
would have put forth in this case is a section 17(b) charge under the
Securities Act of 1933,30 which specifically prohibits anyone from
29 50 U.S.C. § 421 (1982).

30 15 U.S.C. § 71q(b) (1983).

Section 17(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
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publishing information about a security for payment without disclosing that there has been payment. In other words, it would be similar
to a newspaper printing an advertisement as a news item when in fact
it was getting paid for an advertisement. Why was that not charged
in this case?
LEVINE: I do not know. But I would suggest that the fact that an
element of criminality or even conspiracy may be identified does not
necessarily suggest that the Supreme Court or any court will find that
there is a violation of rule lOb-5. It is a difficult theory under rule
lOb-5 today, and it is even more difficult under section 17(a) 3 1 because there is a specific charge in section 17(b).
This leads me to what I think are some of the practical problems
in this area. The most common problem with insider trading from
an investigative point of view is that most people lie about their conduct. Consequently, some close cases, which the Government arguably could have won, resulted in lay-down cases.
Lying also increases the stakes substantially because the Government will routinely refer that case criminally. In fact, forty percent of
all insider trading cases are referred criminally, and a good portion
of those involve people who initially lied. My advice to clients is to
either tell the truth or not talk at all. A client should not tell halftruths or change his story throughout the process. The numerous
cases in which people have been indicted for obstruction and perjury
lend support to this advice.
As counsel, you should be aware of the fact that you can influence the investigation, thereby minimizing the risk of an enforcement action. You should not wait for a call from the Commission
after the investigation, informing you that your client is going to be
the subject of an enforcement recommendation. In my experience as
Associate Director in the Division of Enforcement, those who were
most successful were those who both on factual and legal bases were
dealing regularly with the staff, trying to suggest to the Commission
mails, to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communication
which, though not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly,
from an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt,
whether past or prospective, of such consideration and the amount thereof.
31 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1983). Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-

(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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what the applicable theory was and more appropriately, what the correct facts were. These cases essentially depend on circumstantial evidence and credibility, and you can be very effective for your client if
you actively participate rather than sit back and hope that the Commission goes away.
If you are involved in representing a financial intermediary such
as a broker-dealer, you should be especially careful about the points
I just made because of the possibility of losing the broker-dealer's
license. For those who want some guidance on the Commission's
attitude, look at the Musella case. Two of the persons involved in the
stealing from Sullivan & Cromwell were bond traders for two brokerdealers. They plead criminally, and afterwards the Commission
brought an administrative proceeding. Probably because of negotiation or cooperation, their licenses were withdrawn, with the right to
reapply after eighteen months for one and twelve months for the
other. I asked someone at the Commission why such a light sanction
was given to someone who had plead criminally to receiving inside
information. I did not get an answer, and the only answer I could
formulate is that the bond traders must have been cooperating criminally, and the administrative sanctions must have been part of the
bargain.
I would like to make two other points before concluding. First,
Congress has proposed a civil treble penalty that would give the
Commission the opportunity in a civil action to seek a penalty fixed
by the court of up to three times the profits, gains, or losses avoided
due to insider trading. The House passed such a statute, and the
Senate held hearings in the spring of 1984. At those hearings, Senator D'Amato floated a definition of insider trading that was not
warmly received. There was no consensus, however, as to what the
definition should be.
As a consequence, the securities bar has been working on a definition that is acceptable to the various constituents. While I think
there is general agreement as to a prohibition of insider trading, everyone has their own views as to what the definition should be. The
current belief is that there will not be a definition established soon,
but there will be a movement in Congress to pass a treble civil penalty provision without a definition, leaving the formulation of a definition to a later time when the cognisentia can formulate one.3 2 The
Commission does not support a definition at this time.
My second point concerns section 16. 3 3 Sections 16(a) and
16(b) are rather routine and sometimes confused areas of the law.
32 Subsequent to Mr. Levine's speech, Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, providing for treble penalties for
insider trading.
33 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1983).
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Last fall, Ralph Nader reported that thirty to fifty percent of those
required to file Forms 3 and 4 were either filing late or not filing at
all. 3 4 This was brought to the attention of the Commission. Nader's

numbers were incorrect at least in terms of those who were late. The
Commission did not know who did not file, because if it did, it would
have gone after them.
The Commission did know, however, that a substantial number
of people filed late. Because of that revelation and its publicity,
there have been thirty-two enforcement actions brought against late
filers of Forms 3 and 4. My advice to those who are advising corporate legal departments is to implement a system that ensures that
officers, directors, and ten-percent shareholders will be timely in
their filings. The embarassment is unnecessary, and it creates collateral consequences for officers and directors who have to take injunctions. It is something that should be controlled.
SPORKIN: Were you bringing cases against simply first-time late
filers?
LEVINE: No. I think the Commission looked for recurring situations where the filings were more than a few days late. Normally, a
one-time problem was not the subject of an enforcement action, and
I do not think it should be. I think the Commission identified approximately one hundred different recidivist cases in the first three
month period.
AUDIENCE: Does the Commission reconcile Forms 3 and 4 with
the proxy statements selected for review?
LEVINE: The Commission looks at them but has no way of connecting information because the system is not mechanized or automated to the point where Forms 3 and 4 can be compared.
Sometimes the Commission does not even know which corporations
are delinquent in filing an annual report in their 10-Ks, and obtaining a Schedule 13D out of the Commission takes two weeks after
the filing. If the new automated electronic system gets into place, the
Commission may be more successful with filings.
Given the uncertainty in the insider trading area and the
problems that flow from it, my strong recommendation is to adopt
procedures and policies to control the flow of information and the
points at which insiders can trade. After Dirks, a corporation runs
into the risk of losing control of the public dissemination of information concerning new contracts, new business opportunities, mergers,
earnings, or operations, which could be catastrophic. A corporation
loses control if it does not have strict policies and procedures for
contacts with the press, analysts, investment advisers, and the public.
Historically, rule lOb-5 insider trading prohibitions were a
34 See Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 16, col. i.
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strong discipline in the marketplace. Analysts were very wary of approaching corporations and obtaining information that was material
and nonpublic, since there was a possibility that they might have
been held liable for trading or tipping. It is clear now that if analysts
can obtain the information, and if there is no benefit running to the
corporate executive from whom they receive it, they can trade or tip.
That is little solace to the corporation that does not want information revealed prematurely. It must be controlled at the corporate
level, and the point of contact must be maintained. Someone must
respond to the New York Stock Exchange or the NASD when they
inquire to avoid misstatements that could be a source of embarrassment and result in an enforcement action.
I think it would be wise to prohibit short selling by officers and
directors. Corporations should adopt clearance or reporting procedures in certain situations designed not to inhibit transactions or interfere in the lives of executives, but to assure an orderly flow of
information in a controlled environment.
Finally, law firms and broker-dealers have the same problems.
SEC v. Karanzalis,35 involving Skadden Arps, SEC v. Florentino,'36 the
Wachtell, Lipton situation, and the Musella case, involving Sullivan &
Cromwell, are instances where law firms in possession of very sensitive information have had embarrassing leaks. Thus, it is very important to emphasize in the law firm, accounting firm, or to a brokerdealer the need for controls and procedures to protect information,
and prohibitions and restrictions on trading. Additionally, there
should be periodic reinforcement of those policies and procedures
among the employees and professionals in the organization.

35 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

91,513 (S.D.N.Y.June 4, 1984). The Commis-

sion alleged that defendant, a word processor and proofreader at Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, had misappropriated material nonpublic information concerning tender
offers. The information was passed to a securities salesman for Prudential-Bache and
Paine-Webber. All defendants purchased the securities involved in the takeover battle and
made substantial profits.
36 [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 99,465 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); and [198182 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
98,290 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).. A grand jury in the
Southern District of New York indicted Carlo M. Florentino on June 17, 1982. According
to the indictment, Florentino, an attorney, had purchased securities of a company that was
involved in tender offer and merger negotiations in which his firm was also involved. The
indictment charged that while Florentino was associated with various law firms including
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, he purchased stock from several companies planning
tender offers. Florentino plead guilty to two counts of securities fraud.

O'Brien and RICO
Stanley Sporkin *
SPORKIN: I have selected two important topics in the field of securities litigation to discuss: the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
2
Organizations Act (RICO)' and Jeny T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC.
RICO was passed in 1970 to protect legitimate businesses from
being overtaken by the organized criminal element. It contains some
very stiff criminal penalties. The law makes it a crime to conduct a
business through a pattern of racketeering activity, or to invest the
proceeds obtained from a pattern of racketeering activity into a legitimate business. There is an exception that says you can buy up to
one percent of a corporation's stock with the proceeds. 3 The penalties are quite steep: up to $25,000 in fines, up to twenty years in jail,
4
and possible forfeiture of the business interest.
I did not come here to discuss the criminal sanctions, however.
In addition to the criminal sanctions, section 1964 of Title 18 provides for certain civil remedies. Section A allows for injunctive proceedings and section B authorizes the Attorney General to institute
and conduct those proceedings. Section C is the critical civil action
provision, which authorizes the bringing of a civil action by any person injured by a violation of section 1962. Section C further grants
to a private plaintiff the right to obtain treble damages and attorney's
fees. Usually in the field of securities legislation, we talk about implied private rights of action, but here is an explicit right.
Although the statute has been on the books since 1970, it has
been widely used only in the last three years. According to the
American Bar Association's Task Force, there was not more than one
civil case reported per year between 1970 and 1979. Since 1980,
however, the number of cases has increased rapidly. The Task Force
Report shows the following statistics: In 1980 there were three
cases; in 1981, twenty-two cases; in 1982, twenty-five cases; and in
* General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency; former Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission. B.A. 1953, Pennsylvania State University; LL.B. 1957, Yale Law School.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
2 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
4 Id. § 1963.
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1983, fifty-eight cases.
Although it was contemplated when the statute was enacted that
the civil actions would parallel the criminal proceedings, this has not
been the case. Of the one hundred eight private civil RICO cases
studied, only three involved violent crimes, and all three were arson
cases. 6 The ninety-three remaining cases largely involved businessrelated crimes, such as securities fraud or some type of criminal
fraud.
RICO is a complex statute, yet, it can be broken down into several components. There must be: (1) an injury to a person's business or property caused by (2) an enterprise or person engaged in
(3) a pattern of racketeering offenses. Thus, a plaintiff must show
injury, an enterprise, and a pattern of racketeering offenses.
The first element of injury or standing has been construed on
two different levels. Some courts have required that the injury arise
out of the RICO violation itself. For example, the injury may be that
the plaintiff has been placed in a noncompetitive position because of
the RICO enterprise. Since RICO was patterned to some extent after the federal antitrust laws, a line of cases holds that the injury has
to be to someone in a legitimate business, competing with the illegitimate business, or competing with a legitimate business that is being
financed by illegitimate proceeds. 7 For example, whereas the racketeering company launders money through the operation, the legitimate business may have to pay the going rate to borrow money.
That is a sufficient showing of injury.
There is, however, another line of cases that says that the mere
8
existence of the racketeering activities may be the harm or injury. If
someone is defrauding another in sales of a security, these courts
hold that is enough for standing.
The enterprise element is an interesting one because there are
also two different lines of cases. One line of cases indicates that an
ABA COMM. ON TASK FORCE ON RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZANo. 11953 (1984).
6 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1982); Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
7 Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D.
Mass. 1982); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,772 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Landmark Savings and Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); North Barrington Development Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill.
1980). These cases hold that there must be injury to a competitive or commercial interest.
8 See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527
(1982); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, C.A., 554 F. Supp. 222 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v.
Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd. [1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742,
at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Hellenic
Lines, Inc. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Heinold Commodities v. McCarty, 513 F.
Supp. 311 (N.D. IIl. 1979). In each case fraudulent activity was found to be sufficient
"harm or injury" to allege a RICO violation.
5
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enterprise means that it has to be some form of a business entity. 9 It
could be a proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. There is another line of cases, primarily in the Second Circuit, that indicates that
the dishonest activity itself may be an enterprise.' 0 For example, a
conspiracy by two or three people to defraud someone of his property may be an enterprise for the purposes of RICO.
The third element, the pattern of racketeering activity, is met
when two predicate offenses take place within a ten-year period. The
predicate offenses are defined in the statute and include the normal
crimes of violence, as well as mail fraud, wire fraud, and fraud in the
sale of securities. I emphasize the word "sale" because of a loophole
that exists in the language of the statute, which does not refer to
fraud in the sale or the purchase of securities. The cases, however,
seem to say that fraud in the sale of securities is enough to encompass the purchaser also. " Of course, the use of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce is also an element of the
offense, but that is not hard to establish in these types of cases.
RICO actions federalize many state criminal laws and give the
practitioner or plaintiff a new weapon in their arsenal for business
fraud or business-related cases. This discovery by some inventive individuals is causing a tremendous increase in the number of cases
12
being filed. As you can see, you need not have a criminal finding.
You can prove the predicate offenses in a civil forum using a preponderance of the evidence.
LEVINE: Is the suit res judicata if there is a criminal conviction
and a later suit is brought?
SPORKIN: The Act itself provides for that where it states that a
criminal conviction may not be contested. 13 There has been much
9 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (enterprise includes "a group
of individuals associated in fact" for criminal purposes); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d
647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1983) (enterprise does not exist where

there is no structured association).
10 United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302 (1 th Cir. 1984) (conspiracy to participate
in planned bankruptcy to defraud creditors sufficient to constitute an enterprise); United
States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (conspiracy to
commit criminal activities held sufficient to constitute an enterprise).
II See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at
93,738; Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. 1981). See generally Bridges, Private Rico Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities, " 18 GA. L. REV. 43, 62 (1983).
12 See Parnes, 487 F. Supp. at 647.
13 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982). The section provides that "[a] final judgment or decree in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States
under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the
criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States." Subsection (c), authorizing civil suits by private plaintiffs, makes no mention of collateral estoppel. Section 9046 of RICO, however, provides that the Act "shall [not] supersede any

provision of Federal, State or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording legal remedies in addition to those provided [by RICO]." Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 947 (1961). Since collateral estoppel
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movement in Washington, D.C. to bring about a change in RICO.
Even though I spent many years on the prosecutor's side, I think a
case has been made for an adjustment to this law. I think it is being
misused. When an act that addresses the organized criminal element
is enacted, and is used in such a way that three of one hundred three
cases contain that criminal element, while the remaining cases contain only alleged offenses, there is a problem. The problem is that
organized crime cannot be defined constitutionally the way in which
organized crime is perceived. The drafters have defined it in a way
that is so broad by requiring only two predicate offenses and then
listing predicate offenses as having the minimum threshold under
the federal law.
LEVINE: What you are really arguing about is whether you need
an express or implied private right of action for treble damages.
SPORKIN: I would not want to eliminate the private right of action, and even the people who are seeking to change it-the brokerage firms and accounting firms-would not go so far as to eliminate
the private right of action. What they would like is some type of
screening mechanism, by requiring that there be either a conviction
or an indictment before the explicit right of action would arise.
LEVINE:
But then you would effectively eliminate the right of
action.
SPORKIN: It is merely a very low threshold.
AUDIENCE: How would an action under RICO interface with an
arbitration clause in a customer's agreement? Some time ago the
Supreme Court said that violations under the Securities Act of 1933
are not arbitrable. Recently, however, there have been a number of
cases that give greater scope to arbitration provisions.
SPORKIN: If you are asking if the signed arbitration provision
would preclude that individual from bringing a RICO charge in a
civil action, I would say no for several reasons. One is that an arbitration proceeding would not cover fraud anyway. Second, Wilko v.
Swanl 4 indicates that arbitration clauses do not take precedence over
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Indeed, I think the Commission
itself has recently issued something that questions those arbitration
5
provisions in the brokerage contracts.'
LEVINE: What the Commission announced and what Swan says is
that you cannot force someone to arbitrate and forego the use of the
federal courts in a securities case. Swan does not say that you are not
precluded from arbitrating, only that it cannot be a defense to a filed
"is without a doubt a civil remedy of historical standing," some courts have said that it is
available to private plaintiffs. See, e.g., Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F. Supp. 1124, 1128
(W.D. Wash. 1982); County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136, 138-39 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
14 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1983).
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action. Recently, the Commission has required specific disclosure of
that right in the customer agreement, which in fact forces everyone
to arbitrate.
AUDIENCE:

My question was predicated on Southland Corp. v.

Keating,16 in which the Supreme Court eliminated the ability to maintain an action under California's franchise laws, finding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the right of action.' 7 The Supreme
Court seemed to place great stock in the contrary stipulation of the
"void" clause of the 1933 Securities Act.' 8 I was wondering if you
had any impressions on whether or not that might make it vulnerable
to an arbitration covenant?
LEVINE: I do not think so, but there is the argument that the
legislature intended to preclude an action.
AUDIENCE:

Have criminal sanctions from section C of RICO

been asserted against the promotors or sponsors of the abuse of tax
shelters?
SPORKIN: I have not seen it. But it would have to fall within the
predicate offenses requirement. It would have to be a mail, wire, or
securities fraud. Again, there is the in pan delicto problem with tax
shelter abuses because those that are involved in the abuse of tax
shelters are the ones that want abuse. One of the problems we had
at the Commission in bringing the abusive tax shelter cases was trying to convince the Commission that there was a victim. The victim
is the system itself, quite frankly, not the individual. No individual is
going to bring a claim when he is getting a four to one tax deduction.
Mike Wolensky, do you have any thoughts on RICO involving the
Atlanta region?
WOLENSKY: Yes, I see a lot of it, and I read about it. I think I
share your view that it is being misused. I think it is creating many
issues of litigation. A plaintiff's lawyer may file a good securities case
and have a good claim. The corporation's lawyer goes to the chairman of the board to suggest that they try to work it out, but also tells
the chairman that he has been accused of being a racketeer and having a tie-in to organized crime. Of course, the chairman goes
through the ceiling and wants to fight it. In other words, it creates a
lot of unnecessary litigation. I regret that the Commission has not
become involved in it in an amicus curiae position. I guess this is too
hot for them to handle right now.
LEVINE: I understand that if you are a RICO plaintiff and you go
into the Colorado courts you will be running into a brick wall with
16 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
17 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
18 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1933). This section provides that: "[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
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almost every judge. They are so turned off at the district court level
by the use of RICO that it is almost a negative. So rather than face
malpractice for not asserting it, you have to be very careful using it
because it may adversely affect your substantive case because of the
way some judges view the use of RICO. You have to know your jurisdiction before you use it.
SPORKIN: Or at least you should tell your client why you are not
using it. I would now like to discuss the O'Brien case. A party who
was the target of an SEC investigation sued the Commission to enjoin the investigation on two grounds. First, the target challenged
the appropriateness of the investigation insofar as it involved him.
Second, the target asserted his claimed right to be notified of any
subpoenas being issued to third party witnesses. The district court
stated that it would not accept either of these claims and denied the
injunction. 19
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said that on the first issue,
the matter was not ripe for decision. The court reasoned that if an
individual claims that an investigation is improper, he must wait until
he has been subpoenaed to be able to frontally assault the matter.
The court reasoned that the Commission's right to issue subpoenas
is not self-effectuating. The only way it may compel someone to testify is to obtain a court order. Therefore, until the Commission seeks
to enforce a subpoena in court against an individual, the individual
does not have standing to resist the subpoena.
On the second issue, the O'Brien court issued an injunction
against the Commission and required it to provide notice to the
party being investigated of subpoenas issued to third parties. The
court reasoned that while a target may test a subpoena issued against
him in court, he has no ability to have a judicial test of a subpoena
issued to a third party. The court reasoned that third parties typically are disinterested innocent stakeholders who will usually provide
information to the Government to avoid additional expenses and adverse publicity. A target is therefore entitled to raise objections
when a third-party subpoena is issued.
The court based this decision upon United States v. Powell, 20 a
Supreme Court case that dealt with a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service. Powell held that, with respect to the IRS, there
are certain standards that the Government must meet in sustaining
the right to effect process. The first standard is that there be a legitimate purpose for the investigation. The second is that the inquiry be
relevant to the legitimate purpose. The third requires that the
agency not possess the information sought. I do not think that standard has been thoughtfully considered because there are many times
19 See O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1065.
379 U.S. 48 (1964).

20
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when the Government may want the information from a particular
person, even though it might have obtained the same information
from other parties. For example, perhaps the contract or the agreement obtained from the target has something written in the margins
that the other party does not have. Indeed, when I was at the Commission there were several cases that were made on the basis of marginal notes. I do not understand why an agency may not go out and
seek the information if it already has it. Do you agree with that Mike
Wolensky?
WOLENSKY: I argued that issue a number of times in the courts

of appeals in subpoena enforcement cases. I think it is an anomaly to
the IRS statutes that prohibit seeking information already obtained
without the authorization of the Commissioner of the IRS.
SPORKIN: The fourth standard ensures that the agency adhere to
the administrative steps required by law. In other words, did it dot
its "i's" and cross its "t's," give proper notice, and observe formalities? The O'Brien court said that to meet the Powell test, an individual
had to know when someone else was being subpoenaed. The Commission argued that the court of appeals decision is neither required
by the Constitution, nor by statute. It also argued that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the Commission to conduct investigations without notice to the third parties.
The O'Brien decision will cause serious problems with the Commission if a target is notified as to everyone that is being subpoenaed, because the target is given the opportunity to go out and
destroy evidence. It gives the target the ability to derail and delay
the investigation, and it injects too much uncertainty in the proceeding, because the Commission does not always know who is the target
of an investigation. If the Commission neglects to give notice, what
are the sanctions that may be imposed? The decision will encourage
needless and time-consuming litigation.
It also may be argued that when legislators want to provide a
right of notice, they know how to draft a statement of such a right.
Therefore, a court cannot legislate, and in effect write such a law
when Congress itself has not chosen to do so, or when Congress has
chosen to write it in a very narrow and confined way. I agree with
Mike Wolensky in that I think the Commission has the better case
21
and will win.
The Commission did several things as a result of the O'Brien
case. First, it suspended all investigations pending in the Ninth Circuit, hoping it could obtain a quick reversal of the action. When it
21 See O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984).

Onjune 18, 1984 the Supreme Court reversed

the Ninth Circuit decision in O'Brien. As Mssrs. Sporkin and Wolensky predicted, the
Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required to notify the
target of a nonpublic investigation.
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appeared that the Commission could not get a speedy resolution, it
continued to investigate those cases in the Ninth Circuit in which
notice was feasible. In some instances, the Commission sought
waivers.
In connection with the investigation of the Washington Public
Power Supply System, 2 2 the Commission did something very interesting to comply with O'Brien. It took the extraordinary step of publicly announcing the investigation and stated that copies of all
subpoenas issued would be kept in the public file in the Seattle regional office and in Washington, D.C. That would be bothersome to
me as defense counsel, because if I represented an innocent client, I
would not want to have my name involved in an SEC investigation. I
would not want myself listed in a public announcement as a target of
an investigation. Nor would I want people to know that I had been
subpoenaed, and certain very confidential records had been sought.
The waiver practice might be to the advantage of an individual to
sign so as to avoid this unnecessary kind of publicity.
With respect to proceedings outside the Ninth Circuit, the Commission is following the same practice that it has for the past fifty
years-issuing subpoenas without attempting to make a determination of target status or give notice.
WOLENSKY: For some reason in the last two weeks I have received four O'Brien demand letters in my office, and we have been
sued in Florida in one case. Everyone has to know that the decision
is imminent, and maybe they are trying to jump on the bandwagon.
But in the Washington Public Power Supply System investigation the
Commission was forced to act as it did. The subject's counsel
thought the Commission would halt the investigation. The Commission continued the investigation, however, and even published it in
the Federal Register. The Commission is hopeful of containing the
damage, but if forced, it will proceed in some other fashion, like publishing the fact of an investigation. We have had two cases impacted,
and in one we have worked out voluntary testimony. Both lawyers
did not want it prematurely published that their clients were under
investigation.
LEVINE: In the home office of the Commission there has been a
significant decrease in O'Brien requests in the past several months. I
think people are anticipating that the Commission will be successful
in the Supreme Court. Even if the Commission wins, it is a year-anda-half behind on this case and it will be very difficult for the Commission to resurrect this investigation because the facts are so dated at
this stage. In that respect, the Commission loses, proving that it is a
22 The Commission targeted the Washington Public Power Supply System for investigation when the system defaulted on millions of dollars of revenue bonds. The bonds had
been secured by nuclear power plants, most of which were never built.
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tremendous risk to say you are going to play hardball. As a defense
lawyer, the first thing I would do before I start battling in court is
find out what the investigation is about. I would want to know what
the potential exposure is for my client, and whether the matter could
be successfully disposed of quickly. You might not get one hundred
percent of what you want, but it is the better way to proceed because
of the time savings involved.
AUDIENCE: Is there any chance that the Supreme Court in
O'Brien will hold that Powell does not apply to the Securities and Exchange Commission?
LEVINE: I think at least that those aspects of Powell requiring
proper authority, reasonableness of the investigation, and other procedural requirements will remain in the Supreme Court holding because all the courts have applied those standards, and I do not think
that the Supreme Court will allow the Commission to do whatever it
wants.

Attorney-Client Privilege: Case Law
Harvey L. Pitt *
Prr: The topic I have been asked to address is attorney-client
privilege. It is probably inhospitable of me to start by being critical
of the topic. It is divided into two categories: cases and practical
problems. I do not think that the topic lends itself to that type of
division. First, cases involving attorney-client privilege are infrequent and conflicting. You probably can find a case to support almost any position you wish to espouse in a given set of
circumstances. I believe the issue is not so much what the law is, but
the practicalities of lawyering when a question of privilege arises.
There is a significant difference between an attorney's role as
counselor and an attorney's role as litigator. As counselor, an attorney strives to avoid litigation. In the area of attorney-client privilege
and work-product doctrine, however, an attorney essentially must
anticipate litigation. Indeed, an attorney cannot derive fully the benefits of work-product doctrine without contemplating actual litigation. Every case in these areas depends heavily on facts and
circumstances. Therefore, the attorney's mandate in the attorneyclient privilege and work-product areas is to know facts and
circumstances.
The work-product doctrine is a well recognized doctrine. Not as
well established are the "self-evaluative" privilege and "accountantclient" privilege doctrines. The Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Arthur Young & Co. 1 has provided a new perspective on this
subject.
I would like to highlight some evolving trends and offer some
pragmatic observations. I think one has to start in the privilege area
by recognizing that the Supreme Court, which has decided very few
privilege cases, appears to be on a different wavelength than the
lower federal courts. If I were to characterize the way cases have
* Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C.; former
General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission. B.A. 1965, Brooklyn College;
J.D. 1968, St. John's University.
104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984), aff'g in part, rev g in part 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), afg in
part, rev g in part 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Supreme Court firmly rejected workproduct immunity for accountants' papers).
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been decided since Upjohn Co. v. United States, 2 the seminal decision
on attorney-client privilege, I would conclude that the lower courts
basically are antagonistic to assertion of the privilege. Although the
lower courts have rendered a number of decisions favoring assertion
of the privilege, generally they have not accepted the philosophical
principles embraced by the Supreme Court. While the Upjohn Court
emphasized important benefits that flow from attorney-client privi-4
3
lege, lower court decisions, such as In reJohn Doe, In re Sealed Case,
and Permian Corp. v. United States,5 stress obtaining evidence, building
cases, and doing justice in the public courts.
Placing a great deal of reliance on the Supreme Court decision
in Upjohn, while intellectually and academically sound, may nevertheless lead to less desirable results than looking to the lower court
opinions. In my view, these lower court cases would not have been
decided the same way had the Supreme Court heard them. But the
Supreme Court has not heard or decided these cases, and thus, we
are dealing with the lower courts on most of these issues.
In the area of work-product, I start with ten rules of thumb that
are intended to be pragmatic and not scholarly. First and most important, never assume you can keep anything confidential. No matter how fervent your belief in attorney-client privilege, how brilliant
2 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn the Supreme Court rejected the "control group"
test as too narrow and resolved certain aspects of the controversy concerning the scope of
attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting. The "control group" test had been formulated in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
1962). Several other courts had adopted the "control group" test, citing its purported
consistency with the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of facilitating broad discovery. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,
400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
The Upjohn decision, however, did more than merely reject the control group test. In
accepting the procedures employed by counsel there, the Court articulated those factors
that will give rise to a valid corporate claim of privilege. The Court adopted an eightpronged test, holding that attorney-client privilege applies to:
1. a communication;
2. to corporate counsel "acting as such;"
3. made by corporate employees who are aware of the legal implications of the communication;
4. concerning matters "within the scope of the employees' corporate duties;"
5. at the direction of corporate superiors;
6. in order to permit the company to secure legal advice;
7. where the communications were considered "highly confidential" when made;
and
8. where the communications have been kept confidential by the company.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
3 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (a showing that
attorney was being used to assist in the commission of a fraud or crime may vitiate the
application of work-product doctrine).
4 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (by agreeing to investigate itself pursuant to the
SEC's voluntary disclosure program, defendant company waived work-product doctrine as
to any information needed by the Commission to evaluate the company's disclosure).
5 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (attorney-client privilege must be "narrowly construed" because it "inhibits the truth-finding process").
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your lawyering, how cogent your analysis, if you start with the assumption that you cannot keep anything confidential, you will not be
disappointed. In fact, you may well take steps that protect your
client.
Second, if secrecy is important, there is no effort too small or
too large that should not be undertaken to preserve confidentiality.
Courts recently have not only stressed the necessity of establishing
all the substantive elements of attorney-client privilege, but have examined whether the communications sought to be protected were
intended to be confidential. Did the parties act toward those communications in a way that suggests they believed the communications
confidential? The ambience and the surrounding circumstances thus
have become critical in attorney-client privilege cases.
Third, no action is too bizarre to pursue. This is an area for
creativity, although it should be stressed that it is not an area for bad
lawyering. Fourth, the creation of any corporate document must be
attended by careful procedures. This is an area in which scienter is
relevant. An attorney must have scienter in creating documents that
were intended to be kept confidential.
Fifth, where sensitivity is at issue, the entire process must run
through counsel for attorney-client privilege to attach. That means,
particularly in the self-evaluative area, the process of hiring accountants and investment bankers and conducting interviews must be
channelled through the lawyers. The question arises: is there a difference between corporate counsel and outside counsel in regard to
attorney-client privilege? The answer is maybe. Conceivably, there
may be a difference depending on the roles each performs. Theoretically and intellectually, it is safe to say that there should not be a
difference in the assertion and application of privilege whether the
attorney involved is inside or outside counsel. In fact, Upjohn involved inside as well as outside counsel.
Sixth, follow procedures carefully. It is important to maintain a
record of the steps taken and approaches followed. You need something substantive that will enable you, in the event there is litigation,
to prove what you did to protect the privilege and why you believe
the privilege applies.
Seventh, never create a document that is not needed. It is very
difficult for most corporate clients to adhere to this policy. It is important, however, that an attorney have a sense of discretion about
what he or she creates.
Eighth, never keep a document that is no longer required. If the
document has served its purpose, there probably is no longer a need
to keep it. The pack-rat syndrome, which is peculiar to lawyers, is
that every draft, no matter how minor, is kept. If there are five lawyers, two inside counsel, and three senior management officials
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working on a problem, there is apt to be ten files created in addition
to the central files. Many first drafts created by lawyers are worthless, or worse, are damaging. They may be damaging because the
attorneys were trying out ideas on paper. Because of this danger and
because they are rarely helpful, counsel should dispose of drafts.
Real documents, unlike drafts should not be destroyed lightly.
First, if an attorney is under subpoena or investigation, real documents should not be destroyed. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. 6 illustrates the potential magnitude of problems. Second, the ad

hoc destruction of documents may be far more devastating than explaining away the document itself. For instance, if the corporation
does not have a regular program of document destruction, the ad
hoc destruction of critical documents will be a negative inference
against the company. Therefore, there should be a sensible, regulated program for the routine destruction of documents. An attorney also should take into account specialized regulatory and other
statutes. Some entities have record-keeping obligations under local,
state, and federal rules. Other entities simply must keep documents
to conduct business effectively. Nevertheless, a corporation should
maintain a regular program to eliminate unnecessary documents on
transactions long since closed.
AUDIENCE: Word-processing poses a special problem in relation
to attorney-client privilege as it is very difficult to get documents out
of the system.
Pi-rr: That is a very good point. Because of word-processing
equipment with disks, and typewriters that make impressions on specialized ribbons, an attorney may wind up with some unexpected
records. Thus, a routine regulated program is important.
If an attorney attempts to destroy a document simply because it
is believed to be damaging, there is a strong possibility that after
every known copy is destroyed there will be one copy remaining
somewhere. If an attorney does not assume this, he or she may be
making a serious mistake. A regulated program is the best and perhaps only way to deal with this problem.
Ninth, never claim privilege for more documents than needed.
One of the difficulties attorneys have is the notion that once an attorney claims privilege it becomes easy to claim it for everything. For
example, an attorney may claim privilege for a large file and then go
before a judge only to discover that a few recipes somehow have
filtered into the file, along with five newspaper clippings, and two law
review articles. Judges or adversaries see this and find it difficult to
sympathize with the legitimate claims.
The tenth and final guideline is that if any problem arises in re6 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (use of work-product documents to aid a witness's
testimony operates as a waiver of work-product privilege).
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gard to the privilege, it should be because of the client's records and
activities, and not those of the lawyer. This is fundamental to the
practice of law. Lawyers never should perceive their files as being
inviolate. Case law demonstrates that lawyers' files are being obtained with a fair degree of regularity. Lawyers frequently prepare
documents that clients never see, some with good reason. Yet this
can be very detrimental to a client's interest. If a client has difficulty
asserting attorney-client privilege, it should be only because of
something the client has said or done or written, not because of
something the attorney has said or done or written.
Another important distinction should be drawn between attorney-client privilege and work-product. Attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine are two separate privileges. Both emanate
out of common law, but attorney-client privilege today is still common law except under some state laws, whereas work-product has at
least some modicum of codification in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The elements of each of these privileges serve
different purposes. Although attorney-client privilege, in the absence of any waiver, can be more sweeping, more absolute, and thus,
comprehensive, work-product can be more valuable in terms of the
claim. An attorney should make certain to assert all applicable privileges to protect documents at both the times of creation and
litigation.
Work-product and attorney-client privilege are comprised of different elements. First, for attorney-client privilege to apply, a lawyer
must be involved. There must be an attorney acting as such, either
with respect to an existing or prospective client. Communications
with respect to an attorney are not the only communications protected under attorney-client privilege. Communications of certain
entities or individuals working for a lawyer under a lawyer's supervision also may qualify, provided the other elements are met. This
concept is not so obvious because in a number of cases courts have
recognized the pragmatic fact that lawyers do many things other than
simply lawyering. The trend in the lower courts is antagonistic to the
assertion of privileges. Courts have said, therefore, that if someone
wishes to prevent disclosure of important evidentiary material, they
must meet the burden of showing that the lawyer involved in the case
was acting as a lawyer.
In SEC v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. 7 the outside general coun-

sel also was a close confidant of the CEO of the company and a member of the board of directors. This individual thus wore at least three
hats in the organization. When an effort was made to preclude that
individual from testifying or the Securities and Exchange Commission from using that testimony, the district court required that the
7

518 F. Supp. 675 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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corporation show that the communications for which it was claiming
privilege were communicated or spoken when the attorney had been
acting as a lawyer. In In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983 (Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States) 8 the Second
Circuit stated that the privilege must relate to legal, not business
advice. 9
Furthermore, the intermeshing of the two types of advice may
cause loss of privilege, depending on facts and circumstances. Holding that tax advice suffices as legal advice, the Marc Rich court explained that although some of the underlying information forming
the focus of the communication ultimately may be disclosed publicly,
it does not denigrate the status of the document as legal advice.' 0
What is being looked at is the document itself.
Another element of the requirement of a lawyer's involvement is
that confidentiality must be intended. Otherwise, the privilege may
be lost. In cases such as In reJohn Doe, communications from a lawyer to someone who arguably is not the client conceivably may give
rise to a waiver of the privilege." 1 Thus, a court will examine the
entire requirement of facts and circumstances.
In re ContinentalIllinois Securities Litigation,12 a Seventh Circuit decision, involved derivative litigation instituted on behalf of Continental Illinois arising out of the Penn Square fiasco. Continental had set
up an independent special litigation committee to decide whether
the derivative litigation should be terminated. The special litigation
committee, which had retained esteemed counsel, concluded that
some though not all of the litigation should be dismissed, including
the litigation against Continental's outside directors.
The court ordered the production of the special litigation committee's report to make certain that the committee had reached the
proper conclusion. Subsequently, the report was produced under a
claim of protection. That is very important. The order pursuant to
which that report was produced had specified that Continental was
not waiving any applicable privilege. When evidentiary testimony
was taken, however, everyone forgot about the confidentiality of the
report, full testimony was given, the judge referred to it, and Dow
Jones and the Chicago Sun Times sought the report.
Had that been the only disclosure pursuant to the order, perhaps the Continental case might not have arisen. Nevertheless, because disclosure was in fact made in the court and there was
adequate testimony, the public's right to know superseded any privi8 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984).
9 Id. at 1037.
10 Id.
II John Doe, 662 F.2d at 1079.
12 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,457 (7th Cir. April 23, 1984).
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lege; therefore, the Seventh Circuit ordered the report made public.
This serious result suggests the propriety, particularly in a litigated
context, of obtaining protective orders either by agreement or court
order before turning over documentation to ensure the preservation
of privileges.
How does one ascertain whether, when lawyers give advice, they
are acting as lawyers? For instance, does the writing of a memorandum by a lawyer constitute the giving of advice? When you write a
memorandum, you should indicate in writing that you are a lawyer,
by adding "Esq." after your name and also the name of your law
firm, unless you are inside counsel. If the fact that you are a lawyer is
not indicated on a memorandum, when the issue arises eight years
later and the records are in disarray, people may not know that it was
written by a lawyer, or perhaps more importantly, they may not know
that it was written in a legal context.
Always label documents. It is useful to put at the very top of
each legal document in capital letters and underscored: "CONFIDENTIAL and PRIVILEGED." The next line should read: "Communication from Counsel," or "Communication to Counsel," or
"Communication between Counsel." The last line should say "Attorney's Work-Product." Labeling a document, however, will not
necessarily grant it the status of privilege, but failure to label it may
prevent it from being recognized as privileged, if in fact, it is other-

wise entitled to the status.
The form of the memorandum also is important. It is useful to
begin a memorandum in which legal advice is being given by saying,
"You have requested this law firm's advice." Ajudge who picks up a
document that is clearly labeled for in camera inspection and reads
the first paragraph as making it clear that the document was intended
to convey legal advice is apt to resolve the ambiguities in favor of the
proponent of the privilege.
Oral communications, which were involved in the Gulf & Western
case, 13 are far more difficult to accord the status of privilege. An
attorney who gives oral advice should follow the niceties without unduly formalizing oral discussions. The attorney should make clear
exactly what is transpiring between the two indivdiuals and should
try not to mix business discussions with legal discussions.
The recent Arthur Young decision has a significant impact on law-

yers, although the case dealt particularly with accountants. 14 The Ar13 518 F. Supp. at 678.
14 See Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1503. In Arthur Young ChiefJustice Burger stated:
The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the private attorney's
role as the client's confidential advisor and advocate, a loyal representative
whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most favorable possible
light. An independent certified public accountant performs a different role.
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's finan-
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thur Young analysis potentially is troublesome for lawyers. Refusing
to recognize the creation of a privilege for accrual workpapers prepared by auditors who essentially were formulating "worst case scenarios," the Court distinguished lawyers from accountants.
Accountants supposedly are more independent than lawyers. Noting
the Commission's disclosure requirements, the public's confidence,
the integrity of information in the marketplace, and the fact that auditors were following prescribed standards by the Commission, the
Court concluded that discussions prior to disclosures should not be
protected. ' 5
Arthur Young has not yet been expanded to encompass lawyers;
however, there are several possible scenarios. In a number of its disclosure areas in connection with registration and other requirements, the Commission requires an opinion of counsel. What about
all the legal work that went into that opinion? Conceivably an argument may be made that the legal work behind counsel's opinion fits
within the Arthur Young rubric. This has been an area of some dispute on pure disclosure documents such as the 13D statement and
its drafts. Although I do not advocate this position, one could argue
that lawyers' work is far more analogous to what the auditors were
doing in Arthur Young than to what lawyers normally do.
A second element of attorney-client privilege is that there must
be a communication. The privilege does not protect underlying
facts; it protects communications. There must be a legal opinion being given and legal services being performed. There must be some
assistance vis-a-vis some type of legal proceeding.
The district court opinion in In re InternationalSystems and Controls
Corp. Securities Litigation (ISC) 16 is instructive with respect to attorney
surrogates. The Fifth Circuit rendered a subsequent opinion that in
many respects is far more helpful for protecting privilege. ' 7 The ISC
case, however, is valuable as a primer on how not to retain attorney
surrogates. A written agreement specifying the nature of the work
and particularly the legal purposes, and indicating that the surrogate
cial status, the independent auditor assumes public responsibility transcending the employment relationship with the client. The independent
public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to investing public.
This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to
the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's
interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.
Id.
Id.
91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
17 In re International Systems and Controls Corp. Securities Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235
(5th Cir. 1982), vacating 91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
'5
16
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is hired by, reports to, and is paid by the lawyer is required. A lawyer
may wish to charge the accounting firm's fees as a disbursement on
the bill, but the lawyer should have the primary obligation to the
accounting firm.

Finally, there must be a notion that the product being created is
not the accountant's or the investment banker's or the surrogate's,
but the lawyer's, and that it may not be used under any set of circumstances without the lawyer's permission.
There are two situations in which attorney-client privilege will
not apply: waiver and exception. A third much less important category is shareholder derivative and class actions. In Garner v.
Wolfinbargert 8 the Fifth Circuit developed the startling concept that
shareholders are the owners of corporations and applied it to the
retention of counsel. The Garner court held that where shareholders

have brought a derivative or class action suit, it is not necessarily
appropriate to view the shareholders as being distinct from and having interests adverse to the corporation. Under certain circumstances, therefore, a corporation may not withhold its legal advice
from the true owners of the corporation, the shareholders. This is a
facts and circumstances balancing test. 19
The District of Columbia Circuit has taken the Garner concept
and expanded it in the pension area. 20 When the Department of Labor brings suit on behalf of the beneficiaries of a pension plan
against the trustees, and the trustees claim privilege, the district
courts have held that the Government, in the form of the Department of Labor, may obtain the legal advice because the Government
is standing in the shoes of the beneficiaries, and the trustees may
manage a pension plan solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
The Government was, therefore, one step removed. This is potentially a very explosive concept.
In the ISC case the Fifth Circuit, which spawned Garner, ruled
that the Garner principle does not apply to bona fide work-product
18 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub noa., Garner v. First American Life
Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974 (1971), on remand, 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972). The court of
appeals stated:
The attorney-client privilege still has viability for the corporate client. The
corporation is not barred from asserting it merely because those demanding
information enjoy the status of stockholders. But where the corporation is in
suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder
interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and
of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the
right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the
particular instance.
430 F.2d at 1103-04.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Star
Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982).
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materials. 2 1 This should be'almost self-evident. At the time of litigation between shareholders in a corporation, materials created after
that adversarial relationship cannot be said to have been created for
the benefit of shareholders. This is an important distinction, which
makes work-product doctrine superior to attorney-client privilege.
The area of waiver relates to the notion of disclosure. Attorneyclient privilege is lost if the attorney or client discloses. Courts have
focused on two types of disclosures: third party disclosure, which is
disclosure to persons not within the attorney-client relationship or
not acting for the attorney or client, and disclosure to the Government. The rule of thumb for attorney-client privilege is that if an
attorney discloses to anyone, including the Government, he or she
may be in serious trouble.
With respect to work-product doctrine, the disclosure issue is
not clear. In the Permian case the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that even though an attorney or client might lose attorney-client privilege, they would not necessarily lose work-product
doctrine and, indeed, most of the documents were withheld from
disclosure on the basis of work-product doctrine that was not challenged adequately on appeal by the Justice Department.2 2 Nevertheless, an attorney will find himself in positions where he is required to
submit documents to the Government.
There are methods of submitting documents to the Government, and most government agencies will cooperate to the extent of
allowing the attorney to preserve whatever arguments he or she has.
Usually the government agency likewise will preserve its own arguments. The mere act of disclosing a document is deemed not to be a
waiver, and thus, arguments are preserved. The Securities and Exchange Commission is now proposing legislation that effectively
would deem the submission of materials not to be a waiver of attorney-client privilege. The circuits are in conflict. The Eighth Circuit
in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith23 held that there sometimes
may be a limited waiver. Most of the other courts appear to be rejecting the limited waiver theory.
AUDIENCE: I am perplexed as to why it is not advisable to assert
a privilege for anything that needs protection. Can an attorney ever
be safe about releasing a document of a general subject matter, a
part of which he or she may later wish to keep confidential?
PIrr: Undoubtedly, this situation frequently requires compromise. For example, an attorney may negotiate with the Government
to take access to, and not possession of, certain documents. An at21 ISC, 693

F.2d at 1238-40.

22 Permian, 665 F.2d at 1219-20.

23 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), afrd in part, rev'd in part, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978)

(en banc).
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torney may negotiate with the Government to retrieve documents
once the Government has completed reviewing them to avoid claims
under the Freedom of Information Act. Whether this will preserve
privileges, such as attorney-client privilege, probably depends on the
court in which the attorney is litigating. For instance, an attorney in
the Eighth Circuit, apparently will be able to preserve the privilege.
An attorney in the District of Columbia Circuit, however, will face
much more difficulty in preserving it.
Nevertheless, a client's troubles may be far less severe if it cooperates with the Government, makes whatever deal it needs to make,
attempts to minimize its losses, and proceeds with its normal corporate activities. Still, that corporate client should not abandon its attempt to protect truly sensitive material in documents. Within those
documents there may be things that are irrelevant. The mere disclosure of the existence of the investigation, however, may be so dramatic that it causes the client to claim protection for everything.
Thus, it is important to take steps to preserve the privilege, even
when it is imperative to cooperate with the Government.
In the work-product area not only is there an exception vis-a-vis
the Government, but there is an exception vis-a-vis third parties. For
example, in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 24 disclosure by MCI of documents to the Justice Department gave rise to an
AT&T claim for all work-product that was computerized. This request successfully was defended against on the theory that the Government and MCI had a community of interest, and therefore,
disclosure on that ground would not give rise to any problem.
The crime or fraud exception is an important area, in which
there is the same distinction between attorney-client privilege and
work-product. 25 Essentially, the rule is that if a client consults an attorney about a fraud it has committed without the attorney's knowledge, the communication is fully protected. If the client is seeking to
obtain the attorney's advice to continue, further, or perpetrate a

fraud or a crime, however, the attorney's advice to the client probably will be exposed under the crime or fraud exception. This is true
even though the attorney is not aware that is what the client is doing,
and even though if he knew, he would not give any assistance.
The Marc Rich case yielded some important rules. First, the client's conduct does not have to constitute a crime. Second, even if it
is fraudulent, it does not have to be successful. The fact that a client
tried to perpetrate a fraud is sufficient to vitiate. Third, all that is
24 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (attorneys representing clients with common interests may share work-product without being deemed to have waived protection of the
doctrine).
25 See supra notes 3 and 17 and accompanying text; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (A)(7) (1976).
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needed is a prima facie showing. In Marc Rich the client had retained
a law firm to transfer the assets of one of Marc Rich's companies.
Marc Rich was under attack, and the transaction took place time-coincident to the day that Marc Rich had to commence paying contempt penalties. A prima facie showing was made that Marc Rich was
attempting to use its lawyers to design a way to defraud the Government, to make a fraudulent conveyance that was not a violation of
federal law, not a crime, and not successful. The Second Circuit,
however, stated that all the materials are not privileged and could be
26
obtained to prevent obstruction of justice.
The other important case in this area is the Jenner & Block case,
In re Special September 1978 GrandJury (11).27 The law firm ofJenner &
Block had been abused by a client in connection with payments made
to a campaign fund. The Seventh Circuit decision is important for
two reasons. First, the court held that there is a difference between
work-product and attorney-client privilege for purposes of the fraud
exception. 2 8 The work-product of an attorney's mental impressions
may not be disclosed even though it was used for part of an ongoing
fraud or crime, because that privilege belongs to the attorney.
Everything else will be disclosed, however, because it belongs to the
client. The court also adopted the very lenient but broad definition
of the term "fraud." Under this definition the statement of making
campaign contributions without indicating that they may have been
illegal qualifies as a material nondisclosure.2 9 This is one of the
broadest interpretations of materiality under the federal securities
laws. The court further held that this definition suffices for the crime
30
or fraud exception, and therefore, raises many concerns.
That is an overview of where the cases have taken us today.

26
27
28
29

Marc Rich, 731 F.2d at 1040.
640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 58-60.

30 Id.

Attorney-Client Privilege: Practical Problems
David B. Russell*
RUSSELL: I propose to deal with some of the non-theoretical
problems that confront a practitioner in perfecting the attorney-client privilege for corporate clients and in making its availability in
desired circumstances as certain as possible. The best nuts and bolts
advice I can give at the outset is that whenever there is any colorable
basis for asserting the privilege, do so, even if you have not taken all
the desirable precautions for protecting the privilege in the original
situation.
I will focus on three areas of attorney-client privilege: procedures that will help to create the confidentiality of communications
between corporate employees and corporate counsel, procedures to
be followed in corporate internal investigations that will help to preserve that confidentiality, and matters relating to waiver of attorneyclient privilege.
The burden of establishing the existence of attorney-client privilege rests, of course, on the person or entity seeking to invoke the
privilege.' It is therefore essential that a corporation establish procedures that will help to maintain the confidentiality of legal communications. As a first step, it is important to identify particular written
communications as coming from or being directed to a lawyer. For
example, an internal legal department might have distinctive stationery, or each corporate attorney might have a legal title that is printed
or typed on correspondence generated by the law department. All
copies of correspondence should include legal titles to facilitate the
separate filing of legal communications, as well as to aid in the identification of potentially privileged material during the pre-production
process at the discovery stage.
Requests for legal advice or responses to requests should use
the attorney's legal title, not business title, especially if the attorney
wears more than one hat within the corporation. Persons who maintain files at the various locations within the corporation should file
communications to and from the law department or outside counsel
* Associate, Arthur, Dry & Kalish, P.C., New York, New York. B.A. 1967, Allegheny
College; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.
I People's Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 F. 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1902).
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in separate legal files and should limit access to those files. Maintenance of separate files facilitates screening prior to production. It
also helps to prove that such segregated communications were intended to be confidential in the first place.
In addition to using identifiable stationery and legal titles, marking documents that contain privileged material as "Confidential"
eases both screening and filing. If some documents are marked
properly, and others are not, however, an adversary may argue that
the documents that are not marked were not intended to be privileged. Similarly, if privileged documents that are normally segregated are not in fact properly segregated, an adversary may argue
that the documents were not intended to be privileged. Everyone at
every level of the corporation should be familiar with established
procedures and should follow them consistently.
These procedures are particularly important today when inside
counsel often is involved actively in business decisions. It is wise to
separate legal and business advice into different documents, as only
the legal advice is protected by the privilege. 2 From a practical viewpoint, however, it probably is burdensome to write separate documents on one matter that entails legal as well as business advice. It is
therefore important to acquire the habit of using what might be
called "legal opinion language" in rendering legal advice. In this
way, the practice of segregating business and legal advice becomes
second nature, as the author constantly is reminded that a privilege
may exist with regard to the legal advice.
Where possible, legal opinions should state the request for legal
advice, the facts and questions submitted to the attorney, and finally,
the attorney's analysis and legal conclusions. If business advice is
also sought, the attorney should state that it is based on his or her
view of the applicable legal requirements.
It is also important to limit the distribution of legal opinions to
those who requested the advice and who clearly need to know the
answers, so that when a claim of privilege is later asserted, confidentiality can be shown. An attorney should not automatically send copies of a legal opinion to everyone who received copies of the initial
request. Also, corporate employees should send copies of written
requests for legal advice only to those other employees who clearly
need to know. Those who receive the legal opinion should be advised specifically by counsel not to disseminate the information without prior consultation.
Disclosures made during board meetings and recorded in corporate minutes are not considered privileged, because they lack the
requisite confidentiality. 3 Counsel should exercise extreme care in
2 United States v. I.B.M. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911).
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reviewing agendas or other documents prepared prior to board
meetings. If privileged matters will be discussed at a meeting, the
agenda or another document should indicate that the presence of
counsel is desired for the purpose of rendering legal advice. Any
references in minutes to legal advice from counsel should be drafted
in such a manner as to avoid waiving the privilege.
It is also desirable to have a written company policy stating that
legal opinions and advice should not be communicated to anyone
outside the corporation without prior consultation with counsel.
The policy specifically should cover employee contacts with governmental agencies and should emphasize that while it is company policy to cooperate with law enforcement and other governmental
agencies in appropriate situations, employees should report formal
or informal contacts with governmental personnel to corporate
counsel before releasing any information.
Governmental agencies sometimes contact employees informally during a criminal investigation to determine what information
the employee has. In exchange for information damaging to the corporation, the agency may offer the employee immunity from prosecution or a reduced sentence recommendation. Because employees'
statements may be binding on the corporation and could result in
the disclosure of privileged communications, the company policy
should address this situation. It should provide that employees must
inform their superiors and corporate counsel when they are called or
approached for a governmental interview, and if they decide to attend the interview, they must attend with corporate counsel.
The next topic I wish to address is attorney-client privilege in
4
of corporate investigations. Upjohn Co. v. United States
context
the
arose in the context of a corporate investigation of questionable or
illegal payments. Often initiated voluntarily before possible SEC or
other governmental action begins, such investigations are conducted
with the Commission's informal approval or are required by the
Commission pursuant to the terms of a formal settlement. If the attorney conducting such an investigation functions solely in an investigative capacity, the privilege does not apply. In addition, the
privilege may not apply where a corporation institutes an investigation pursuant to the terms of a settlement, and special counsel is
appointed to conduct the investigation, because the corporation may
counsel may
not be the client of the special counsel, since the special
5
corporation.
the
to
advice
legal
rendering
be
not
4 449 U.S. 383 (1981).

5 SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978) (stating that no
attorney-client relationship existed between corporation and special counsel appointed to
monitor corporation's compliance with injunctive order); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that production of documents or deposition
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Upjohn and later decisions have established a number of guide-6
lines to be followed by corporate counsel during an investigation.
First, communications between the corporation and its counsel are
privileged only when counsel has been retained to provide legal
rather than business advice. Therefore, a corporation should seek
legal advice in the form of a written request by a corporate officer
who has authority to make such a request or in the form of a directors' resolution. Ideally, this request should refer to the possibility
of civil or criminal litigation. It also may be useful for the memorandum or resolution to direct counsel to retain appropriate assistance
from professional investigators, accountants, and others, if needed.
Inside counsel's use of outside counsel should not present a
problem in asserting attorney-client privilege if such counsel is retained for the purpose of rendering legal advice to the corporation.
Problems arise, however, when nonlawyer personnel assist corporate
or outside counsel in the conduct of an internal investigation. It is
advisable for accountants or professional investigators to act under a
written directive from counsel if acting pursuant to counsel's control.
Such personnel should be instructed to coordinate all activities with
counsel and not to discuss any matters learned during the course of
the investigation with anyone other than counsel. They should prepare all reports solely for counsel, give all reports and files to counsel, and receive payment from counsel.
In addition, when conducting an internal investigation, top level
management should issue a directive notifying middle and lower
level employees that counsel has been directed to conduct the investigation for the purpose of rendering legal advice to the corporation
and directing the cooperation of employees. This should satisfy the
Upjohn requirement that communications of employees to counsel be
made at the direction of corporate superiors and for the purpose of
rendering legal advice. 7 It also may be advisable to create a record
that sustains and substantiates the need for communications between
middle and lower level employees and counsel. This record should
include evidence that someone in top management decided that such
testimony by special counsel appointed to investigate possible securities law violations
would not violate attorney-client privilege).
6 In re John Doe Corp. (Southland) v. United States, 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that attorney-client privilege applies only to communications between corporations and attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice). In addition, attorney-client
privilege is waived when the attorney discloses information to outside counsel, accountants, or underwriters. See generally Brodsky, The "Zone of Darkness ": Special Counsel Investigations and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 123 (1980); Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate
Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn, Waiver, Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues, 38
Bus. L. 1653 (1983); Crisman & Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal
Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 123 (1983).
7 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394.
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communications were necessary to receive adequate legal advice or
to implement the legal advice rendered by counsel.
One problem with these procedures is a possible chilling effect
upon communications between employees and counsel. As a practical matter, therefore, it may be necessary to deviate from these procedures, though the consequent risk that the privilege may be lost
must be recognized. A similar problem is whether to warn corporate
employees that the matters they are discussing could result in civil or
criminal penalties for them as well as for the corporation. In some
instances, an attorney interviewing corporate officers or employees
during an internal investigation should warn them that their interests
may not coincide with those of the corporation and should suggest
separate counsel. The problem is determining when this is necessary
and how such warning will affect further communications with
employees.
Frequently, corporate counsel may have, or be perceived to
have, conflicting interests in the context of corporate investigations.
While Upjohn held that attorney-client privilege applies to communications made to both inside and outside counsel, problems have
arisen where inside counsel has conducted an investigation or cooperated in an investigation conducted by outside counsel. For example, an agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission,
may refuse to accept the conclusions of inside or regularly retained
counsel and, as part of consent decree negotiation, may insist that a
disinterested special counsel review the relevant material. Such special counsel's mandate is not to give legal advice to the corporation,
but to advise the agency whether the underlying facts on which inside counsel rendered an opinion were fully and correctly reported.
Conversations between special counsel and employees therefore
would not be privileged, although they would have been had they
been with company counsel. Likewise, otherwise privileged documents, generated or handled by special counsel, might lose that
status.
Accordingly, corporate counsel must give serious consideration
to possible loss of privilege before agreeing to such an arrangement.
Corporate counsel also should evaluate at the outset the desirability
of retaining outside counsel to conduct an investigation, or at least
the possibility of having outside counsel participate in an investigation to minimize questions of objectivity that may later arise. Corporate counsel should mark all investigative results "Confidential and
Privileged," and should control the dissemination of reports to
maintain the required level of confidentiality. Disclosure of the content of interviews should be strictly on a need-to-know basis, and
documents containing privileged material should be maintained exclusively by corporate counsel or at least segregated from general
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corporate files. Corporate counsel should also maintain interview
notes and other raw investigative materials.
While the great source of corporate investigations in past years
has been questionable illegal payment investigations similar to the
one that spawned Upjohn, the current wave of internal investigations
is the result of various state and federal laws dealing with both the
environment and compliance with various civil rights laws. In both
areas it is of utmost importance that the investigation be extremely
well organized to prepare the company to defend itself against suits
or proceedings in which violations of these laws may be alleged.
Questions of waiver of attorney-client privilege arise in regard
to disclosures made during investigations. It is clear that voluntary
disclosure to third parties outside the corporation results in waiver
of the privilege unless the disclosure is made specifically in furtherance of seeking additional legal advice or pursuant to a protective
order. It is less clear, however, under what circumstances the dissemination of otherwise privileged material within the corporation
results in waiver. At least one commentator has suggested that this
may be an area where the control group concept, otherwise repudiated in Upjohn, may apply.8 As a practical matter, however, the appropriate course would be to establish formal corporate procedures
requiring identification and segregation of privileged materials and
to permit access only on a need-to-know basis.
Attorney-client privilege also is waived when a communication is
made to counsel with the purpose of perpetrating a fraud or furthering a plan to commit a crime. Corporate counsel must recognize that
if a client is subject to the dictates of federal securities laws, communications regarding past wrongdoings may be privileged, but counsel's knowledge of the client's continuing failure to disclose such
misconduct may trigger the crime or fraud exception and thus preclude assertion of the privilege. 9 Conceivably, the ethical dilemma
posed for counsel may be alleviated if the client is aware that the
communications are not privileged. This knowledge may help the
client to decide to make the disclosure, subject to whatever protections can be negotiated with the particular governmental agency.
A corporate client and counsel also may have difficult decisions
in making selective disclosures of privileged information to the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
other governmental agencies. The lack of specific guidance in
Upjohn has resulted in continued uncertainty in this area and makes it
8

See, e.g., ABA

SECTION OF LITIGATION, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE

WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 48 (1983).

9 United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939)
(stating that "[i]t has always been settled that communications from a client to an attorney
about a crime or fraud to be committed are not privileged."). For a recent case dealing
with the crime or fraud exception, see In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1982).
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advisable for corporate counsel and client to weigh seriously the advantages of limited disclosure, the promise of leniency, and the incurring of relatively less expense and time than would be necessary
to litigate the matter, versus the disadvantages of the potential costs
of waiver vis-a-vis other information and vis-a-vis other parties. If a
client decides to disclose privileged information, client and counsel
should negotiate formal confidentiality stipulations with the agency
involved, and in some instances, should seek a protective order.
A final issue relating to waiver of attorney-client privilege is who
within the corporation has authority to waive the privilege. Although
it is not necessary that the directors exercise this authority in all instances, in some cases it may be appropriate. Nevertheless, a formal
corporate policy should vest the authority only in top management.
There are many additional situations involving the existence of
attorney-client privilege and the maintenance of its integrity. Two
emerging areas worth noting, however, raise special problems concerning the privilege. The first is the so-called "progressive injury"
cases. Outstanding examples are the Agent Orange and asbestosis
cases involving thousands of plaintiffs, a host of defendant manufacturers, and their insurers. One pattern has emerged in the asbestosis
cases in which the defendants and insurers enter into an agreement
pursuant to which they designate a facility to be the representative of
the manufacturers and insurers in all pending and subsequent cases.
This requires turning over to the facility a substantial amount of documentation that the individual defendants have developed. One important question arises: does the information, presumably
privileged under either traditional attorney-client privilege or workproduct doctrine, continue to be privileged once it is handed over to
the facility?
Another interesting area concerns the application of the HartScott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification Statute.' 0 Under the statute,
the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice may
claim substantial penalties against companies engaged in mergers or
acquisitions if the companies close the transactions without fully
complying with requests for information by the Commission or
Department.
The question arises: does the withholding of privileged communications, otherwise susceptible to inquiry by the Commission or Department, not only preserve the right of the Commission or
Department to challenge the merger or acquisition, but also preserve
the right to seek penalties on the theory that the parties closed without furnishing complete answers to questions posed? The legislative
history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Statute appears to support the
to Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ I note, 8
note, 12, 15c, 15g, 16, 18a, 26, 66, 1311-1314; 18 U.S.C. § 1505; 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1983).
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proposition that a company would be considered to have complied
substantially with requests although it withheld information that was
subject to legitimate privilege."' The Commission has stated, however, that the statute contemplates the submission of all relevant
documents and does not provide an exemption for privileged documents. The Commission has further stated that if the alleged privileged documents are withheld, notification is incomplete, and a
12
statement of reasons for noncompliance must be submitted.
Thus, while the Federal Trade Commission has not completely
obviated the possible assertion of' attorney-client privilege, a company that intends to claim privilege in a Hart-Scott-Rodino proceeding must comply in exacting detail with the Commission's rules. By
recent amendment, these rules require that to satisfy the substantial
compliance requirements of the statute, the claimant of a privilege
must identify the nature of the privilege claimed, explain all facts
relied upon, provide the identity of each document, including its authorship, addressee, date, and subject matter, identify all recipients
of the original and copies, and state the present location of each document and who is in control of it.' 3 Thus, where a company and its
counsel are likely to be involved in Hart-Scott-Rodino notification,
extreme care must be taken to meet all the usual requirements that
support attorney-client privilege and to comply strictly with the rules
set by the Federal Trade Commission.

I H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2572, 2604.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1314(c), however, provides that if documents are withheld after express demand has been made for them, the person from whom discovery was obtained
may file a petition for an order of the court to modify the demand requiring production.
The petition must include the grounds relied upon and may be based on a privilege of the
petitioner.
13 16 C.F.R. § 803.3 (1984).

Capital Formation Alternatives: An Overview
Stephen J. Friedman*
FRIEDMAN: I thought it would be interesting to discuss some of
the major trends in financing in the American financial markets because they are a very good index of the direction in which financing
is headed and of what practitioners can expect to be doing over the
next five or ten years. I would like to talk about five principal currents in the financial market.
The first development, and by far the most important, is the volatility of interest rates. The second is the "dealerization" of the public securities markets, both for debt and equity. The third is the
increasing internationalization of the capital market. A fourth trend
is the significant growth and profusion of a very interesting development called "synthetic securities." The fifth trend is in the area of
venture capital.
I will start with the volatility of interest rates. In this environment it is hard to imagine that for more than a quarter of a century
after the bank crash of 1929 and the remedial legislation of the 1930s
there was extraordinary stability of interest rates. Regulation Q! is
the system of regulation that authorized the Federal Reserve Board
and other regulators to impose ceilings on deposit interest rates.
Regulation Qauthority commenced in 1933, and until 1957, deposit
interest rate ceilings were raised only once. The United States experienced a period of extraordinary stability during which a very effective financing device developed called the long-term bond market
which was virtually unknown in other parts of the world at that time.
Beginning in 1966 and continuing through the Carter Administration, the United States began to experience a series of sharp interest rate increases, which had a devastating effect on the long-term
bond markets. Investors began to shorten their time horizons and
even insurance companies, which historically made loans of twenty
and twenty-five years duration, began to shorten their maturities to
fifteen, ten, and seven years. It became very difficult to finance in* Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York; former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission. A.B. 1959, Princeton University; J.D. 1962, Harvard
University.
1 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1984).
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dustrial plants on that basis. Of course, the most immediate and dramatic effect was on the mortgage market.
I remember when I was at the Treasury Department in 1978 reviewing the terms of the first variable rate mortgage, which was a
device that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board approved to deal
with the problem of interest rate volatility and to help thrift institutions withdraw from the uneconomic business of making long-term,
fixed rate mortgages. The initial version of the variable rate mortgage was not an attractive instrument and was not used very widely.
That little trickle now has become a river with an incredible profusion of similar instruments. If you have tried recently to finance a
house you know that it is almost impossible to comprehend the full
range of alternatives. That same profusion of new instruments has
developed in the public debt markets. Innovative investment bankers
have created an ever-growing "kitbag" of securities designed to do
two things. First, the securities give the issuer the protection of
long-term maturities by enabling him to keep the money for a substantial period of time. Second, they give the investor protection
against erosion of principal due to interest rate movements.
The following excerpt from Corporate Financing Week 2 captures the flavor of what is happening in this market:
Citicorp Person-to-Personcame to market last Tuesday with a $250 mil-

lion floating rate note issue, a "substantial portion" of which was

sitting with sole manager First Boston by Friday morning, according
to Curt Welling, V.P. The frns float 1/8of a point over the Fed CD
composite, a market that was in turmoil last week with rumors and
concerns about banks that are part of the run, and Welling said that
First Boston had "pulled back from the market" in offering the notes
and will "sit until a semblance of sanity comes back." Meanwhile, he
said the firm was comfortable holding this paper in inventory, while
declining to specify the amount unsold.
Although the source of the trouble was the CD base, Welling
said that First Boston had made the bid to Citicorp to do the deal
because the widening spread between the CD rate and Treasury bills
would offer investors better principle protection than bill-based
floaters. The floaters have a weekly yield reset,
a feature well-suited
3
to a highly volatile market, Welling noted.
Although this involved a Citicorp financing, it is relevant for

those of us who do financing work for medium and small sized companies. All of these financing techniques trickle down, and what
seems to be at the cutting edge of the market one year becomes a
conventional financing technique five years later.
There is a range of attempts to cope with the effect of volatile
interest rates. An interesting development in the public finance mar2 Banking Turmoil Slows CD-Based Citicorp Deal, Corporate Financing Week, vol. X, no.
21 (May 28, 1984).
3 Corporate Financing Week at 2. Citicorp Person-to-Person is a subsidiary bank
holding company that does financing throughout the country for Citibank.
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ket is the so-called "put-bond," which has been used widely in connection with housing bonds. The housing bond is a long-term
revenue bond that is supported by a flow of payments from home
mortgages. The revenue bond investor is given the option of "putting" the bond back to the issuer after a period of time or when certain interest rate parameters have been exceeded. From the
investor's point of view it is not necessarily a long-term investment,
but rather a shorter-term investment which, of course, affects the
return.
Typically a bank issues a letter of credit that backs up the issuer's obligation to purchase the bond and effectively promises the
issuer and the market the availability of financing to make the
purchase. The effect again is to convert the original long-term issue
into a shorter-term floating rate if the letter of credit is taken down.
An interesting sideline is that the importance of bank credit facilities
has given banks larger roles as underwriters of revenue bonds.
Housing revenue bonds are bank eligible, and because the letter of
credit is such an essential element of financing, banks have been increasingly co-managing underwriters in many of these deals.
There are two other interesting consequences of the development of volatile interest rates that often are not identified with that
trend because they are not instruments that are, strictly speaking,
securities. The first is the advent of zero coupon securities, and the
other is the interest-rate swap. Basically, a zero coupon security pays
no current interest, rather it is issued at a discount from face value
similar to old fashioned savings bonds or treasury bills today and it is
paid only on maturity. The difference between the principal amount
of the security and the issued amount represents the interest.
Unlike a treasury bill, however, zero coupons are generally of
intermediate or long-term maturity. The advantage to the issuer is
that there is no impact on cash flow during the period that the security is outstanding. With an ordinary investment such as a government bond, when interest coupons are paid on a semiannual basis,
the investor has to reinvest that interest, and the rate at which that
interest can be reinvested affects the yield-to-maturity of the total
investment. Although there is a fixed interest rate on the bond, the
total return from the investment is a function of the rates that are
current at the time those interest payments are made.
Thus, there is considerable uncertainty as to the total yield from
an ordinary long-term treasury bond or other long-term bond. A
zero coupon, however, is sold at a discount which represents a fixed
compound interest at the end of the term, so an investor knows precisely what the yield-to-maturity will be. It is a very convenient tool
for financing children's education and other future events. The full
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rate of the investment is locked in at the outset. It is a very innovative way to cope with the problem of volatile interest rates.
The second development falls into a category of what has come
to be known as "interest rate swaps." This is a market that is growing significantly and can be best described with an illustration.
There are two borrowers. Let us call the first borrower "LT." LT is
a company that has ready access to the long-term bond market. It
can raise money on a long-term basis very cheaply and effectively.
Assume that LT wants to use the proceeds from its borrowing for
current transactions. LT would like to borrow in the short-term markets and pay current interest rates but does not have satisfactory access to those markets.
Let us call the second borrower "ST." ST has access to the
short-term markets but has little access to the long-term markets. ST
would like to finance a plant that will pay out only over a long period
of time. In determining the economic viability of that plant, ST
would like a fixed rate so it can compare the cost of capital to the
returns that the plant will produce.
In the theoretical case ST and LT come together, and ST, who
has access to the short-term market, agrees with LT to pay him an
amount equal to a fixed, long-term rate on a notional amount of
$100 million for the next fifteen years. LT uses that stream of payments to cover his obligations on a $100 million long-term borrowing that he makes in the long-term markets. In return, LT agrees to
pay ST one percent above the prime rate or the LIBOR rate 4 on
$100 million for the next fifteen years. ST, who is actually paying the
long-term rate, uses that stream of payments to cover the interest on
his short-term borrowing of $100 million over the fifteen-year period. ST has accomplished his objective of paying the long-term
fixed rate, and LT is paying the short-term rate, yet no principal has
changed hands.
Two problems may arise in this theoretical case. First, LT and
ST may be unable to find each other. Second, if they found each
other, each would worry about the credit of the other over this very
long period of time. The result is that a bank acts as intermediary.
LT deals with the bank as if the bank were the short-term borrower,
ST deals with the bank as if it were the long-term borrower, and the
bank runs a "matched book."
Although that is the way it began, the market is changing dramatically. Many banks no longer are running matched books. They
are simply taking the interest rate risks on both sides and hedging
their risks through interest rates futures and other devices. Other
banks now are starting to offer arrangements called "floor/ceiling
4 LIBOR rate is the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate. It is the interest rate that
London banks charge preferred customers on loans of United States dollars.
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agreements." The bank will agree with a short-term borrower who is
subject to fluctuations in interest rates that if the short-term rates
rise above a certain percentage, the bank will pay the difference. If
the rates fall below a certain percentage, the borrower will pay the
difference. The borrower has a range in which it is prepared to take
the risk, and the bank is compensated by fee income. Some banks
now are issuing plain ceiling agreements in which the bank agrees
with the short-term borrower that if the rate rises above a certain
percentage, the bank will pay the difference.
I have called the second major trend in financing increasing
"dealerization" of the market. This is related to rule 415, which provides for shelf registrations for qualified issuers. 5 In the old days,
securities firms had two quite different departments. The corporate
finance department handled new issues and dealt with the attorneys
who did the prospectuses and the due diligence. The syndicate department would also deal with other investment banking firms and
assemble a group of firms to underwrite securities. The other department consisted of the brokers and traders. Except in the case of
those over-the-counter securities where the firm made a market and
acted as dealer and trader, the firm acted as agent and not as principal. Twenty years ago, acting as dealer was by far the less important
part of the firm's business.
One of the most extraordinary financial events of the postWorld War II period has been the institutionalization of savings in
this country and its profound effect on the financial markets. In 1948
there were approximately $3 billion in private pension plans. Today
there are over $500 billion in private pension plans. Over seventy
percent of the trading on the New York Stock Exchange is represented by financial institutions and that excludes mutual funds which
are treated as individuals. This significant change in the nature of
the investing community has had a dramatic effect on securities
firms.
Institutions buy securities in very large quantities because it is
expensive to monitor a large number of issues. Institutions have
very large amounts of money to invest, they need liquidity, and they
need companies that are widely followed. Because they buy in large
quantities, they also sell in large quantities. The auction process on
the floor of the stock exchanges, even the New York Stock Exchange
which has a very effective auction process, is simply not capable of
handling transactions of that size. During the 1970s many securities
firms were forced to acquire larger and larger amounts of capital to
position sales of blocks of securities. The positioning institutional
broker agreed to buy the block at a fixed price and take the risk that
the security could be distributed at that price or better.
5

17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1984).
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Those were clearly secondary market transactions, yet they have
had an impact on what is happening today in the capital raising market. The need to position securities forced a small number of firms
to acquire very large amounts of capital, and those firms developed
very sophisticated distribution mechanisms that were quite different
from the syndicate process for selling large blocks of securities. The
distribution of blocks involved direct dealings between the upstairs
dealers at the firms and institutions through a variety of electronic
means. They were wholly outside the auction process.
What does all this have to do with rule 415? Not long ago the
Securities and Exchange Commission began to feel the effect of interest rate volatility. Companies began to complain that the volatility
of interest rates resulted in very short "windows in the market," and
that they could not wait fifteen days while the Commission processed
their registration statements. In response, in the 1970s, the Commission progressively shortened the registration period applicable to
very large issuers to approximately forty-eight hours.
As the Commission was shortening the processing period, interest rates were becoming more volatile and corporate treasurers continued complaining. In 1981 the Commission proposed to extend
the availability of shelf registrations to primary offerings by larger
issuers. I was a member of the Commission at that time, and I know
that no one at the Commission recognized how significant this
"1small" change would be. Initially, there were virtually no comments. Finally, Morgan Stanley and a group of other firms looked at
what the Commission was doing and recognized that it would have a
profound effect.
Under rule 415, the registration statement is declared effective
before the terms of the offering are fixed. The issuer has very limited discussions with a small number of underwriting firms that indicate an interest in participating. The treasurer or chief financial
officer waits for one of these windows in the market to open. When
the window is open, immediately the firms are called and invited to
bid. The firms bid, the issuer picks a firm, and the offering is made
that afternoon or the next day. There is obviously inadequate time
to conduct any type of due diligence effort at that point. In a technical sense, the Commission has responded to that problem by integrating the 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosure systems, but the
underlying problem of the underwriter's obligation to learn enough
about the company still exists.
Not only is there insufficient time for due diligence, but there is
inadequate time to form a large syndicate. Consequently, the major
underwriters find themselves taking larger and larger positions that
could lose substantial value if the credit markets turn against them
before the positions are sold. Only a handful of firms have the capital
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necessary for these transactions, which has resulted in a large concentration of investment banking business. The securities industry,
and in particular, the underwriting capital raising process, are even
more concentrated than the banking industry.
Because there is inadequate time to form a syndicate, the distribution process tends to be undertaken through the trading desk
rather than through the syndicate process. This results in an increasing institutionalization of the markets. If a securities firm is holding
$100 million worth of a security in inventory, it wants to dispose of it
very quickly. Retail distribution can be slow. Therefore, firms tend
to solicit the people who can buy in the largest quantity, the large
financial institutions. There is a fair amount of empirical evidence
that a higher percentage of rule 415 offerings are sold to institutions
than any other kind of offerings. 6 If the trend continues, one can
envision large financial institutions engaging in the kind of sub-underwriting role, with attendant Glass-Steagall 7 implications, that insurance companies and banks play in Great Britain, where they are
an intermediate stage in the public distribution process.
Although legally and practically only very large companies are
involved, small issuers also should be interested in this trend. If rule
415 is combined with the integrated disclosure system, the lines between the public and private securities markets are progressively
blurred. There are many small and medium sized companies that are
in a continuous disclosure mode and have access to Form S-2, for
example. 8 Registration has become a very easy process, and the
question whether to sell securities in a registered offering or as a
private placement is now much less important. If you distribute to a
small number of people and you are unsure whether you qualify for
the private placement exemption, it is easy to register. I think we will
see increasing numbers of distributions into ongoing trading markets by companies of all sizes and shapes as long as there is enough
liquidity in the market to handle the distribution. There is certainly
no legal reason why a company that can file a Form S-2 registration
statement cannot finance through the ordinary trading market.
There is no need for rule 415 as long as the distribution commences
at the time of effectiveness of the registration statement. There is no
6 See H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1983 SECURITIES LAw HANDBOOK § 6.17(4) (1983). Bloomen-

thal expresses the Commission's concern that rule 415 will be used to bypass traditional
distribution techniques and place large blocks directly with institutional investors. See also

SEC Securities Act Release No. 6391, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,108 (1982).
7 Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 347a-347b, 412 (1982).
8 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1984). Form S-2 provides an abbreviated registration process
under the 1933 Act for qualified issuers which have been reporting companies for three
years and have filed all reports timely during the past twelve months and the portion of the
month in which the registration is filed.
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need to have a fixed price underwriting in which the underwriter
takes the risk of distribution.
Briefly, I will discuss the internationalization of the securities
market. Although it has a small impact on our lives today, in the long
run, this trend toward a single, if not worldwide, international capital
market will have the most profound impact on the financial regulatory system and ultimately on financing techniques.
In the primary markets, which includes the capital-raising process, it has become routine for the larger companies to decide
whether to finance in the Eurodollar market or the United States
market. The interest rate windows open up at different times in each
market.
More interesting is the growth of the integration of secondary
trading. If a financial institution wants an instrument to achieve a
certain financial objective for its portfolio, it carefully examines
Eurodollar securities of all types, including Eurodollar certificates of
deposit and Eurodollar bonds. Ten years ago the Commission issued an elaborate release dealing with the problem of flowback and
the steps that should be taken to avoid securities sold in Europe from
being traded in the United States markets without registration. 9 The
practices of market participants have advanced miles beyond the
conditions of that release. The Commission either does not know
what is happening or does not know how to deal with it. More significantly though, when the market is broader than the regulatory system, regulations do not work. Why bother to subject yourself to
United States disclosure rules when you can access the same investors by selling in Europe? Why worry about United States insider
trading rules when you can buy the same securities in Europe?
"Synthetic securities" is one of the most interesting and quickly
developing areas in the financial markets. The underlying idea is
that an investment banker takes existing securities that have certain
financial attributes and then recombines those attributes in different
ways that investors will find more attractive. For example, zero coupon securities are attractive because they lock in yields. Some clever
bankers found that it would be possible to combine zero coupon securities with the security and long-term maturity of the treasury
credit. The only problem is that while the Treasury issues treasury
bills at a discount, it does not issue bonds at a discount. That did not
deter the people who ultimately created a zoological garden of synthetic securities called "cats," "tigers," and "cougars."
Basically, these synthetic securities involve the purchase and resale of a very large treasury bond. The coupons are stripped from
the bond. There is a stream of semiannual payments, which the cou9 SEC Release No. 33-4908, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

1363 (July 9, 1964).
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pons represent, and then a large payment at maturity. The right to

each payment is sold on original issue discount basis. In other
words, the right to receive each interest payment is sold for a price
less than its face amount. The discount represents an agreed upon
interest rate that is attractive to an investor looking for a locked-in
yield. The treasury bond is divided into many little pieces. Through
the magic of compound interest a small investment will triple by the
maturity date.
How is the bond split? Typically it is placed in a bank custody
arrangement, and the bank sells receipts that represent the right to
receive each payment. "Tigers," for example, stands for treasury
growth receipts. "Cougars" and "cats" are similar arrangements.
The receipts have a federal credit, and a locked-in rate, they trade in
the secondary market, and some are listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.
There is a host of legal questions related to synthetic securities,
including those arising under the Investment Company Act' 0 and
the Securities Act of 1933. The Commission has issued a series of
no-action letters, 1 ' indicating that if it is possible to give investors
what the Commission calls direct rights in the underlying securities
held in custody, then the arrangement is legitimate. 12 Lawyers have
thus created legal structures designed to give investors direct rights
to the securities. For example, investors are given the right to sue on
the security in the unlikely event that the federal government defaults on its payments. This is the same approach that has been used
in the development of a family of new mortgage-based securities.
The traditional "Ginnie Mae" (GNMA) arrangement involves taking
mortgages, putting them in a pool, and selling a pass-through interest to investors.' 3 Investors are entitled to a pro rata share of the
return. Their interest and principal is a function of the aggregate
interest and principal payments by all the underlying mortgagors.
These new instruments are called CMOs, or Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations. They are not pass-through vehicles. The
mortgages are put in a pool, and then the bonds are issued as debt
obligations of the entity that maintains the pool. The bond can be
issued at an original issue discount or otherwise. Different series of
bonds represent the right to receive different payments anticipated
by the mortgagors. Short-term investors, for example, are given the

10

15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982).
11 Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Son Co. (December 16, 1974) (SEC No-Action Letter, on
WESTLAW, Fsec Library, Nal File); First & Merchants Corp. (September 5, 1975) (SEC NoAction Letter, on WESTLAW, Fsec Library, Nal File).
12 Direct rights in securities include, for example, the right to return on investment
and the right to sue on the security in case of default.
13 GNMA is the commonly accepted abbreviation for Guaranteed National Mortgage
Association.
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first three years of payments, which are priced to produce a yield that
is appropriate for a three-year maturity. Later payments would go to
pay the longer maturity bonds. It is also possible to use this technique to convert old, low-yield mortgages into short-term instruments through the addition of "put" rights.
One last trend that is particularly interesting is that of pooling
and selling interests in financial instruments. Recently, banks have
increasingly sought to syndicate, or sell participations in, loans as a
way of sharing the credit risk and the need for capital. Banks have
now started selling participations in loans to nonbank institutional
investors. This practice raises questions as to whether the pool is an
investment company and whether the participation interest is a security. Nonbank institutions, especially retailers and companies with
finance company subsidiaries that have large amounts of financial assets, such as receivables, are considering pooling these assets and
selling the interests. The utility of this idea is growing at a great rate,
and like all the recent changes in the world of financing, it is worth
understanding.

Capital Formation: Definition of "Security"
Thomas Lee Hazen*
HAZEN: I will attempt to highlight some of the unconventional
investment vehicles to which your investor-clients may have been exposed. Through these vehicles investors may find they inadvertently
have encountered the federal or state securities laws. Some of the
exotic investments that have been held to be securities include
scotch whiskey, self-improvement courses, cosmetics, earthworms,
beavers, muskrats, rabbits, chincillas, fishing boats, vacuum cleaners,
cemetery lots, and fruit trees.' Even religion, marketed in the appro2
priate manner, has been held to be a security.
Before discussing the characteristics of a security and the situations in which an investor would face the securities laws, I will briefly
remind you of the consequences of a court's holding that a security
exists. First, the federal antifraud provisions, including rule lOb-5
under the Securities Act of 19343 and section 17(a) of the Securities
* Professor, School of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A.
1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia University.
I Courts have held the following exotic investment schemes to be securities: scotch
whiskey, SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,142 (E.D.N.Y.); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973);
SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973), afd, 496 F.2d 1192
(4th Cir. 1974); self-improvement courses, SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); cosmetics, SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); earthworms, In re Worm World, Inc., [1978-1981
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,414 (S.D. Dept. of Commerce & Consumer
Affairs 1978); beavers, Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1967); muskrats, State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456
(1932); rabbits, Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (1932);
chinchillas, SEC v. Chinchilla, Inc., [1951-1956 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
90,618 (N.D. Ill. 1953); Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App.2d 103, 160 P.2d
846 (1945); fishing boats, SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1940); vacuum cleaners,
Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977); cemetery lots, Holloway v. Thompson, 42 N.E.2d 421 (Ind. App. 1942); In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763, 291 N.Y.S. 697
(1936); fruit trees, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Tung Corp. of
America, 32 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. 11. 1940).
For a more complete discussion, see T. HAZEN, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 1.5 (1985).
2 SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1976) (religious loan
program marketed with slogans such as "while the world's economy staggers weakly,
God's economy is stronger than ever" and "God's economy does not sink when the
world's economy hits a reef and submerges! Wouldn't it be wise to invest in His
economy?").
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983).
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Act of 1933, 4 the 1933 Act's counterpart to rule lOb-5, apply to
fraud in the sale of securities. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act also
provides an express private remedy for fraud where the injured purchaser is in privity with the defendant seller. 5 These three sections
apply to securities regardless of whether or not they are registered
prior to sale.
Perhaps more importantly, if an investor is deemed to have a
security and then sells it to another, he or she either has to register
that security at both the federal and state levels or find an exemption
from registration. The burden is on the party claiming that an exemption applies. Furthermore, failure to register a security grants
the purchaser a one-year right of recission. One year from the sale
of an unregistered, nonexempt security the purchaser may rescind
that transaction (or recover rescission damages) without having to
show fraud or other illegality. 6 Thus, the risks and costs of issuing or
selling unregistered securities can be quite high.
Attorneys who represent investors in these types of ventures
may have potential remedies for disgruntled investors. Conversely,
attorneys representing issuers may have problems that they did not
think existed in the first place. As noted a moment ago, the definition of "security" is broad enough to include many unconventional
investment vehicles. The state and federal definitions of a security
are virtually identical. "Security" includes the conventional types of
vehicles: stock, notes, profit sharing arrangements, and investment
contracts. 7 In some cases, however, even stock is not held to be a
security. 8
The key phrase that I will focus on is the one generally looked to
by the courts: "investment contract." Most of the case law that defines "security" has arisen under the concept of an "investment contract." 9 Two Supreme Court decisions, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
4 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1983).
5 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)(1983).
6 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1)(19). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1983) (statute of limitations).
7 Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1983)) provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
A similar definition is found in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-2(1 1)
(1981); A.L.I., Uniform Securities Act § 401(e).

8 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
9 The judicial interpretation of the definition of securities has developed primarily
from interpretation of the statutory phrase "investment contracts." With the lead of the
Supreme Court, federal and state courts have strived to arrive at a workable definition and
have formulated various tests and approaches. Throughout the history of struggling for

19851

DEFINITION OF SECURITY

Corp.10 and SEC v. W.J Howey Co., I I are helpful in defining "investment contract." The Howey test remains relevant today.
In the Joiner Leasing case defendants were selling or marketing oil
and gas drilling programs. They were selling a fee interest in land to
each purchaser and also a drilling service whereby the promoters
would drill to determine if the individual lots would be likely to produce oil or gas, and therefore, likely to result in profit. Defendants
claimed, of course, that they were not offering securities. They asserted that they merely were selling land and offering the ability or
service of drilling that land, and that the success of the investment
depended upon the presence of recoverable oil or gas under the
land.
Rejecting defendants' argument, the Court found the promotional oil and gas scheme to be a security. The Court focused on
three factors. First, the Court scrutinized the terms of the offer or
how the interests were being marketed. Second, it examined the
plan of distribution. Defendants had been contacting a wide range
of investors, promoting the scheme as a profit making enterprise, yet
few, if any, of the investors had any background in oil or gas drilling.
Finally, the Court examined the economic inducements-the profitability of the drilling operation. Because the economic success of the
investment was dependent on the test well, as it was not feasible for
an investor to buy a small plot of land and do his own test drilling,
the package of the land plus the drilling constituted an investment
contract. Therefore, this package was held to be a security which
2
either had to be registered or sold pursuant to an exemption.'
In the Howey case it appears that defendants had carefully focused on the Joiner Leasing decision and had attempted to develop an
investment scheme in which there would not be a connection between the service or investment aspect and the underlying land. In
Howey defendants had been selling orange groves in Florida. They
had subdivided an orange grove, and each individual investor would
purchase a fee interest and would be free to do whatever he or she
wanted with the orange grove. There were no tied-in arrangements
for picking the fruit or other related activity.
The promoters also had offered a picking or harvesting service,
Howey-in-the-Hills, which was an affiliated corporation. Thus, an inan appropriate definition, courts have been mindful of the fact that the bottom line question is whether the particular investment or instrument involved is one that needs or demands the protection of the federal (or state) securities laws. See, e.g., Marine Bank v.

Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982) (bank-issued certificate of deposit not a security subject to
federal securities laws since holders are already protected under federal banking laws, and
therefore do not need the extra protection that the securities laws afford).
10 320 U.S. 344 (1943).

11 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
12 320 U.S. at 352-53.
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vestor could to go Florida each year to pick the oranges or pay
Howey-in-the-Hills Service to pick them.
Defendants argued that, unlike in the Joiner Leasing case, this
scheme was not a security; it was a sale of land and the separate offering of a service that was distinct and independent. Defendants also
emphasized that the landowner had his choice of accepting or refusing this service.
The Howey Court looked to the "economic realities" of the situation, a phrase now used in every securities test.1 3 While acknowledging that the orange grove maintenance and harvesting contracts were
not legally tied to the land interests, the Court recognized that as a
practical matter, they were. The Court noted the economic realities
of the situation: if an investor expected a profit he or she would be
compelled to look to Howey-in-the-Hills or some comparable mass
picking or harvesting organization to take advantage of economies of
scale. Although there was no legal tie-in arrangement, the Howey
Court observed that owners representing approximately eighty-five
percent of the acreage investors had chosen to use the service
arrangement. 14
Noting that most of the grove's purchasers were out-of-state investors and had not had any contact with the orange industry in the
past, the Court in Howey found that the economic realities were that
this promotional scheme constituted an investment contract where
the success of the investment depended upon not merely the weather
and fruit-bearing abilities, but the management, harvesting, and mar5
keting abilities of the promoter.'
The Howey Court established a four-part test for determining the
existence of an investment contract.' 6 First, there must be the investment of money. This requirement has since been modified to include other types of valuable property. For instance, some cases
indicate that investment of services in an appropriate situation may
be a sufficient investment to constitute a security. Second, there must
be a common enterprise, a concept courts have had difficulty defining. 17 All courts would agree, however, that common enterprise
means the involvement of more than one person. Many courts have
stated that the promoter and one individual investor-the seller and
11 328 U.S. at 298.
14 Id. at 295.
15 In finding the promotional scheme to be a security, the Howey Court noted that not

only are formal stock certificates not required, but a nominal interest in the physical assets
of the enterprise, such as actually owning fruit trees, does not preclude the determination

that a security in fact exists. Id. at 299.
16 The Howey Court stated: "[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities

Act means a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in
a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party.
... 328 U.S. at 298-99.
17 See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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the purchaser-may be sufficient to create a common enterprise.
Third, there must be the expectation of profit. The profit may not
necessarily be in terms of annual return, but may show in the form of
capital appreciation or other types of benefits.
Finally, these profits must yield solely from the efforts of others.
Subsequent cases have modified substantially this last element.
These cases hold that an investor may have a security if the success
of the enterprise depends primarily or substantially on the efforts of
others. 18 One court has considered whether the success of the enterprise was due to the undeniably significant efforts of others rather
than the investor.' 9
The difference in treatment under the securities laws between
limited partnerships and general partnerships offers an illustrative
example of the impact of the requirement that the profits be the result of others' efforts. 20 Some states, such as Connecticut,2 1 have
statutes that expressly include limited partnership interests within
the definition of securities; most state statutes as well as the federal
statutes do not. Yet in the overwhelming majority of cases in which a
person has invested in a limited partnership interest, that limited
partner has purchased or sold a security. 2 2 This is so because under
limited partnership law, if a limited partner exercises too much con18 See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973).
19 Turner, 474 F.2d at 482. Accordingly, the fact that some efforts of the investor are
necessary for the success of the operation does not preclude a finding that the scheme is a
security. Such may be the case with:
a. Pyramid sales schemes. Koscot, 497 F.2d at 484-85; Turner, 474 F.2d at
482.
b. Licensing agreements where all of the significant efforts are those of the
licensor. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
c. Founder-membership contracts. See, e.g., Florida Discount Centers, Inc.
v. Antinori, 232 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1970); Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
20 The limited partnership is an arrangement that clearly falls within the reach of the
securities laws. In some instances, joint ventures and general partnerships might also fall
under the acts' coverage. In the case of a limited partnership interest, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act requires that the investment be a passive one. A general partnership
interest, however, will not fall within the purview of the securities laws unless there is
substantial reliance on the efforts of others.
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-15 (West 1981).
22 Since virtually all limited partnership interests involve the investment of money or
some other property and are geared to the expectation of a profit (sometimes in the form
of a tax shelter), the traditional definition of a security is clearly fulfilled. See, e.g., Siebel v.
Scott, 725 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1984); Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.
1983); Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633,
640-41 (9th Cir. 1980); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-09 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afd,
553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D.D.C.
1981).

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 10

trol over the business, he or she will be exposed to general liability. 2 3
As there is more than one person involved in a limited partnership,
the requirement of common enterprise is satisfied. There is reliance
on the efforts of others, specifically the general partner or an outside
management firm that has contracted through the general partner.
There is also expectation of profit, which would include profit from
the ability to take a deduction from a tax shelter.
Virtually every case that has considered the issue has held that a
limited partnership interest is a security because of the investor's
lack of control of the success of the enterprise. A district court in
Ohio recently held that if a limited partner exercises too much control over the enterprise, that limited partnership interest may not be
a security. 2 4 Of course, if that limited partner exercises too much
control over the business, he or she may no longer be a limited partner but is probably a general partner as a matter of state partnership
law.
At the other extreme is the general partnership in which the
general partner has the ability to control, if not the obligation to help
manage, the business. In most cases a general partnership interest,
especially a bona fide general partnership interest, will not be a security.2 5 On the other hand, persons attempting to take advantage
of the limited partnership tax advantages, while avoiding the securities laws, form general partnerships as essentially passive investment
deals. Courts have held that, although there may be the ability to
control the enterprise, if in fact the general partnership interest is a
passive investment where the efforts of an active single managing
partner are essential to the success of the business, the interest may
be held to be a security.2 6 Economic reality, and not the form of the
investment, is the key factor. Thus, there will always be a small per23 A.L.I., Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 7.
24 Darrah v. Garrett, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,472 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
25 Because a general partnership interest and most joint ventures usually carry with
them a substantial say in the management of the enterprise, they will not fall within the
purview of the securities laws unless there is substantial reliance on the efforts of others.
Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1983) (general partnership interest not a security);
Frazier v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981) (general partner's managerial rights
negate possibility that his interests in limited partnerships were securities); Slevin v. Pedersen Assoc., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (joint venture held type of partnership
rather than a security); Vicioso v. Watson, 325 F. Supp. 1071 (D.C. Cal. 1971) (contract
held joint venture rather than a security). See Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134
(N.D. 11. 1983) (refusing to dismiss claim that general partnership interest was a security),
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 417-25 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering the impact of
reliance on efforts of others in transforming partnership interest into a security). See gener-

ally Long, Partnership,Limited Partnership,andJoint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV.
581 (1972).
26 E.g., Morrison v. Pelican Land Development, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
98,863 (N.D. I11. 1982) (general partnership interest may be a security);
Goldberg v. Paramount Oil Co., 143 Cal. App.2d 215, 300 P.2d 329 (1956) (contract held
a security rather than a joint venture).
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centage of limited partnership interests that will not be securities and
a small percentage of general partnership interests that will be
securities.
The sale of business doctrine currently is a pressing issue. In
Frederickson v. Poloway27 the Seventh Circuit held that the sale of one
hundred percent of a business is not a security. Recently, the Ninth,

Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed Frederickson, reasoning
that a purchaser is buying a business, not the stock. 2 8 The Second
Circuit, however, has taken a much more literal approach by examining the statute and concluding that security includes stock, whether it
be a sale of ninety percent or one hundred percent. 29 There may be
reasons to exclude from the definition of a security the transfer of
one hundred percent control of a closely held business. An explicit
exemption, however, is not set out in the statute so that if one
chooses to sell a business by selling the stock rather than the assets,
it is likely that he or she will have to contend with the securities
30
laws.
Whether a pension plan constitutes a security also has been debated. Involuntary, noncontributory, benefit plans, such as the plan
in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,3 1 will not be deemed

a security because the employee is not making any investment;
rather, he or she is receiving a fringe benefit. A defined benefit plan
is much less likely to be dependent on the success of the plan man27 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).

28 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. (1984); Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342
(11th Cir. 1982).
29 Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Rufenocht v.
O'Halloran, [current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,514 (3rd Cir. 1984); Daily v. Morgan,
701 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1983).
30 Using the economic reality test of earlier cases, many courts have held that the sale
of stock in a closely held coporation may not be a "security," especially if it is, in essence, a
transfer of the ownership and management of the corporation's assets. E.g., Landreth, 731
F.2d at 1353; Christy, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th
Cir. 1982); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); Frederiksen v.Poloway, 637
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v.
Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill.
1981). See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security ': Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 367 (1967); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic
Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974); Hazen, Taking
Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When is Stock not a Security?, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 393 (1983); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine under the
Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1982). The circuits are in conflict as to the validity of this "sale of business" exception for including stock as a security. In addition to the
cases in note 27 supra, recent rejections of the sale of business doctrine include Daily v.
Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d
227 (2d Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Cole v. Ford Motor
Co., 566 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1983). See also United Housing Foundations, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shares in cooperative housing venture held not to be
securities).
31 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (holding that a compulsory noncontributory defined benefit
employee pension plan is not a security under the 1933 Act definition).
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ager's investment selections. On the other hand, a voluntary, contributary plan where the employee may or may not contribute and
the payout depends upon the success of the plan, will probably
be
32
deemed a security, absent some independent exemption.
I will mention briefly the issue with regard to notes. The question arises whether short-term commercial paper is included within
the definition of security. Although notes generally are held to be
securities, short-term notes are exempt.3 3 If a short-term note is offered and marketed as an investment contract rather than as typical
bank thirty to ninety day short-term commercial paper, it may be
deemed an investment contract. The ninety-day period is no longer
34
conclusive on the issue whether the note is an exempt security.
Sale/leaseback arrangements have been held to be securities
where the investor, although in form is participating in the
sale/leaseback arrangement, in substance is relying on the activities
of the promoter, the manager, or the person operating the plant, and
therefore, is a passive investor.
The Sixth Circuit recently held that interest in a trust or an escrow account may be held to be a security even where separate accounts are maintained and the investors' and beneficiaries' interests
are not commingled.3 5 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit the absence of
commingling or of what the courts call "horizontal commonality,"
which refers to the pooling of investor's funds or the common enter32 The Daniel Court noted not only the involuntary nature of the plan, but also the
fact that there was no employee contribution (i.e., no investment of money); these factors
strongly negated any inference that a security was involved. Id. at 559-60.
33 Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act exempts any "note. . . aris[ing] out of a current transaction" with a maturity not exceeding nine months. The exemption also covers
renewals of such loans. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1983). Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 also excludes such short-term notes from the definition of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1983).
34 The courts, by and large, have employed the economic reality test by asking
whether the transaction under scrutiny is an investment vehicle that would trigger the
Securities Acts' coverage, or whether it is more properly characterized as a commercial
venture. See, e.g., Vorrius v. Harvey, 570 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (participation by
commodity trading company's salesman in loan made by his supervisor to company was
not a security since investment was contingent on the solvency of the company which depended, in part, on the salesman's efforts); Cocklereece v. Moran, 532 F. Supp. 519 (N.D.
Ga. 1982) (no expectation of profit from loan itself rendered note not a "security");
Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring inquiry into the "economic realities" using the "commercial-investment" dichotomy); Union Planters Nat'l
Bank of Memphis v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1185 (6th
Cir. 1981) (loan participation agreement not a security; "[tihe securities laws are not a
panacea for commercial loans gone awry."); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (bank loans held not
to be securities); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, Texas, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1974) (six month note renewing indebtedness is not a security). See generally Lipton &
Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974); Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus.
LAw. 1567 (1980).
35 SEC v. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984).
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prise requirement, will not necessarily preclude the finding of a
security.
Commodities generally will not be held to be securities. If gold
or silver futures are in reality options rather than futures they may be
deemed to be securities, though the underlying commodities them36
selves will not be so categorized.
There is a split of authority as to whether the offering of a brokerage firm's management prowess and expertise in managing accounts is a security.3 7 The issue arising in the cases is whether the
placement of the investor's money in a separate account precludes a
finding of commonality, in spite of the brokerage's claim that it
merely is providing a service for which the investor is paying and that
the investor effectively is investing in the commodities. 38 A pooled
commodity account, which is similar to a mutual fund with stocks or
other securities, clearly will be a separate and distinct security, apart
from the underlying commodities or securities that the accounts are
39
holding.
FRIEDMAN: Why is a managed commodities account deemed a
security, but a managed securities account is not?
36 Based upon the extent of managerial and market making activities offered by the
seller, a gold investment has been held to be a security. SEC v. International Mining Exchange, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1981). Where all that is offered is the underlying
commodity, however, even combined with storage and marketing services, there is no security, as the investor is relying upon the market price of the commodity rather than on the
seller's marketing or managerial efforts. See, e.g., Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77
(9th Cir. 1980).
37 The Fifth Circuit has held that a managed brokerage account is a "security." SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Booth v. Peavey
Co. Commodities Services, 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970); Taylor v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga.
1983). In contrast, the Seventh, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held that such accounts
are not "securities." Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982); Brodt v. Bache
& Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. Chicago Board of Trade, 352 F. Supp.
1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
38 Those cases holding that there is no security generally point to the absence of a
common enterprise; the fact that the investor's funds are not pooled with those of anyone
else, as is the case with a mutual fund or investment club, precludes the finding of horizontal commonality where the investor shares his risk with other investors. These courts thus
have viewed a trading account as a pure service rather than an investment contract. Those
courts holding a discretionary trading account to be a security have found sufficient common enterprise in "vertical commonality," which is the common enterprise that exists between the investor and the broker making the investment decisions. These courts point
out that the broker's commission is usually tied to the profits and/or the asset value of the
account and therefore, he is sharing the risk with the investor. Common enterprise aside,
it is clear that all other components of the definition of a security have been met, as there is
certainly an investment of money with the expectation of a profit to be derived from the
expertise and efforts of the broker or investment advisor who is handling the account.
39 Another way to frame the issue in the brokerage account cases is to ask whether
the contract in question represents a bona fide service agreement, or whether the nature of
the arrangement is more in line with the traditional investment concept that has led courts
to find a security to exist in analogous arrangements.
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HAZEN: Because the courts do not have to reach that question to
hold the stockbroker accountable under the securities laws. When
dealing with a securities account, if the investment advisor has made
improvident investment advice or other fraud or fraud-like violations, he or she may be sued for the underlying violation of the securities laws regarding the funds of the securities held in the
account. Under the commodities laws, persons defrauded by a broker must either look to the Commodities Futures Trading Act, or
find a managed account to take advantage of the securities laws.
FRIEDMAN: That has some strange implications. It means that if
an investment advisor advertises his services he is making a public
offering.
HAZEN: Without an exemption that could be true. Getting back
to the issue of managed commodities accounts, the decisions are
split. Most of the decisions, however, seem to hold that without a
pooling of interests, there cannot be a security.

Capital Formation: Practical Problems
Zeb E. Barnhardt,Jr.*
BARNHARDT: I have the topic of practical problems in the capital
formation process. When I began this preparation, I listed things I

consider to be practical problems. As I looked through the list and
thought through the process of capital formation, it seemed that
what we are really talking about are "people" problems, and because
such problems are practical, they are avoidable in the first place.
In the capital formation process an attorney rarely has a chance
to start with a clean slate. Usually by the time a client comes to you,
the client has already done something that makes your job difficult
from the beginning. In the first place, the client has probably made
grandiose plans and is anxious to move very fast. For example, here
is a letter written by a client, obviously without legal advice. It arose
in a situation in which one group had been planning for several
months to enter into a joint venture with another group. The group,
however, could not get themselves together to decide how to proceed, and the design of the organization and plans kept changing. I
first heard this letter as it was read to me by an examiner from the
Secretary of State's office. The letter reads as follows:
Dear Friends:
The Joint Venture is now a reality. Our first venture will lease
the space from the landlord and will be equipped, staffed, and run as
XYZ business. Other ventures will be organized later.
To pay organizational costs such as legal and accounting fees,
each investor is being asked to invest $1,000 to be applied to his first
share of stock. This does not commit you to buy more shares later,
but does assure your status as a stockholder in the corporation. The
other party will match this investment. This is designed for profit
ventures, and therefore, profits are fully taxable. If you want these
profits sheltered through your retirement plan, we suggest you consult your accountant and/or lawyer for advice for your particular
situation.
We have tentatively set two weeks as the time for this initial investment, and hope to have you as an investor in our future.
Please make checks payable to XYZ Treasurer, Joint Venture
Corporation.

This letter is an egregious violation of the securities laws. The
* Partner, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. A.B.
1964, Duke University; J.D. 1969, Vanderbilt University.
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examiner knew that it could not possibly have been written by anyone who was acting on legal advice. As a result, the examiner called
the author of the letter and told him that he was in trouble. The
author did not understand what he had done wrong, and he called
me. I calmed him down and called the examiner to see what could
be done. We were able to resolve the matter by submitting a notarized statement signed by the author, certifying to the Secretary of
State that he had not intended to violate the securities laws, that he
had not acted on advice of counsel, and that before this venture
would go forward at a later date, the proper filings would be made
with the Secretary of State's office.
The basis on which we were able to resolve this matter illustrates
the "people" aspect of practical problems in the area of capital formation. Instead of immediately obtaining an injunction against this
venture, the examiner in the Secretary of State's office took a more
practical approach by picking up the telephone and resolving the issue fully in compliance with the intent of the securities laws.
In the area of capital formation, the first step in the process of
counseling is to get to know the client. Find out his or her plans by
listening. Too often the temptation is to agree initially when the client rushes in and wants everything done immediately. An attorney
may form the corporation or draw up the partnership agreements
without really understanding what the client needs. Producing what
the client says he or she wants may not meet the client's true needs.
Therefore, it is important to listen first and explore with the client
the ultimate goals.
If you are able to listen and understand your client's ideas, the
two of you will have a much more successful relationship. Your client will feel more comfortable coming to you with ideas and will be
more open to telling where errors may have already been made. You
do not want to learn six months later that your client violated the
securities laws at the outset; that knowledge is necessary early in the
process.
A great deal of planning is necessary to decide which type of
entity, such as a general partnership, limited partnership, or corporation, will fit the client's needs. It is necessary to talk about what is
involved in raising capital, particularly for a new venture, and to
identify the other people who should be involved in the process.
This group of people should be assembled early.
In this situation, the securities lawyer is acting as an expert in
the area of raising capital for such operations. In contrast, the regular counsel usually approaches a situation apprehensively because of
the knowledge that his or her malpractice insurance policy contains
an exclusion for securities laws violations. The regular counsel
wants someone else to handle the project and wants to be certain
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that the client is getting the best advice possible, but at the same
time, does not want to lose a regular client. The specialist needs to
work with the regular counsel, who is an excellent source of information about the client.
Obviously, accountants will be needed in this process. The client probably never has had any books audited. There may not even
be any books at this point. The attorney must consider the initial
offering that is being considered and the next offering that may be
considered in six months or a year. Specifically, the attorney must
consider whether there will be an integration problem if the second
offering is too soon, or whether this offering may be integrated with
what the client has already done. Of course, there are the usual registration and exemption considerations.
Accountants should be used to explain what is required by way
of financial disclosures. The best time to involve new accountants is
at the outset. The worst time is the time of writing the S-I registration statement' for the public offering, because then the new accountants may find they cannot give an opinion that would be
acceptable to the Securities and Exchange Commission. If accountants are involved in planning, disclosing, and auditing from the outset, the progression toward the public offering will be easier.
Accountants can also be helpful in determining various alternatives
available to structure the entity and to raise the capital.
Bankers and other lenders, such as insurance companies and
venture capital firms, should also become involved early in the process. The client may not need to go public, but rather, may need a
strong bank line.
If an actual offering is undertaken, there will probably be an underwriter or a selling agent, especially if it is a public offering. There
may even be a selling agent in an offering that is not registered with
the Commission, but is registered under state law. If you as the attorney anticipate such an offering, you should start the process of
selecting the underwriter or selling agent early so that you do not
end up rushing through that process, perhaps to become disappointed because no one wants to take your client's deal.
The securities regulator should be included as part of the team
in capital formation. It may seem strange to include the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the state blue sky authorities as a
part of the team. They will not be sitting in on the conferences with
everyone else involved, but can be invaluable in answering questions
that arise. For instance, you may call a regulator and obtain an informal interpretation or clarification as to the meaning of a rule or statute. Of course, you will not obtain a no-action ruling by telephone,
I

Form S-1, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
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or a determination as to whether your client's deal is exempt. There
are procedures by which you may submit a written request to answer
those types of questions, but they take more time.
I have too often seen the situation in which two parties come
together to go into business, unprepared for what they face. For example, one party is a salesman, the other an engineer, and neither
one knows how to run a business. Nevertheless, they want to be successful in their business and expect the attorney to assist them. In
this situation, it may be necessary to persuade the parties at an early
stage to hire someone who has managerial experience, and let the
salesman sell the product and the engineer supervise the designing
and manufacturing.
I will mention briefly another aspect of such capital planning.
An attorney should always consider the number of hats worn in a
single transaction. For example, if you are an investor in the transaction from the beginning, the situation may have some conflict of interest complications.
In the process of entity formation, it is especially important to
do things properly. It is never too burdensome to pull the general
statutes book off the shelf and read the limited partnership act. For
example, in Wisniewski v. Johnson2 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the requirement in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 3 that
the appropriate individual swear to the certificate of limited partnership will not be satisfied by an acknowledgment rather than a verification. It is therefore important to check to see what constitutes a
verification and an acknowledgment.
It is also important to keep abreast of developments in the state
blue sky laws. North Carolina has a new set of blue sky laws regulations, effective January 1, 1984. In North Carolina a filing with the
Secretary of State must be made ten business days prior to the first
sale of the securities for an an offering under certain regulations.
4
The filing is due even for offerings exempted from registration.
I will close by mentioning one other aspect that I think is critical:
communications. Throughout the entire process of working with a
client and the team, an attorney must keep the lines of communications open among the participants. Your client must feel free to discuss everything with you; otherwise, you will not have all the tools
needed to give adequate advice. If all the facts are not disclosed, the
deal cannot possibly reach its full potential. Communications continue to be important throughout the process and even after the deal
is closed. Communications become more important after the financing has been attracted, because the investors will want to know what
2 223 Va. 141, 286 S.E.2d 223 (1982).
3 VA. CODE § 50-45 (1980).
4 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -40 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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is happening with their money. If you let them know, even when the
news is bad, you will not be accused of concealing things. I am not
talking only about periodic reports filed with the Commission, because that is not communications of the type needed with investors
in a small business enterprise. A newsletter to let the investors know
how the company is running is more appropriate.
In sum, I think if the terms "counsel" and "communication" are
kept in mind, an attorney will not have unnecessary practical
problems that are difficult to solve.

Capital Formation: Attorney Exposure
Clarence W. Walker *
WALKER: The subject that I will address is the exposure of attorneys in capital formation transactions. Preliminarily, I wish to advise
that if you, as an attorney, have excluded securities coverage from
your professional liability policy, or if you have limited yourself in
your policy to relatively low coverage, you should change it. Enormous costs can accumulate if an attorney becomes involved as a defendant in securities litigation, whether it is an enforcement suit for
an injunction brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
an action for ancillary relief, a civil action for damages by a plaintiff
or a class of plaintiffs, or a rule 2(e) proceeding instituted by the
Commission for administrative discipline of an attorney because of
some alleged malfeasance in connection with a capital formation
transaction. 1
In the mid- 1960s a change occurred in the judicial and regulatory attitude toward lawyers participating as lawyers in securities
transactions. At that time, statements like the one in United States v.
Benjamin2 began surfacing in cases, illustrating the pivotal role lawyers fulfill in the distribution of securities and protection of the investment community. Affirming a criminal conviction of an attorney,
the Benjamin court stated:

In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments of inflicting pecuniary loss more
potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not
mean that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should subject
an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply because
more skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress equally could not have intended that men holding themselves
out as members of these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut
their eyes to what was plainly to be seen 3 or have represented a
knowledge they knew they did not possess.

This change of attitude was accompanied by a revamping of rule 23
* Partner, Kennedy, Covington, Cobdell, & Hickman, Charlotte, North Carolina.
A.B. 1953; LL.B. 1955, Duke University.

I See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1984). For an explanation of rule 2(e), see text accompanying note 7.
2 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
3 Id. at 863.
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of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule made class actions far
easier to bring and to handle.
This combination of events resulted in a quantum change in the
trend toward the inclusion of lawyers in lawsuits or actions relating
to securities transactions. Some of these suits were civil damage actions, such as Katz v. Amos Treat & Co. ,4 and others were SEC enforce5
ment actions, such as SEC v. Frank.
Another area of concern for lawyers now and since the mid1960s is the enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission of its own rule 2(e), which had not attracted much attention until that time. 6 Rule 2(e) is a disciplinary rule, promulgated by the
Commission, that empowers the Commission to suspend or disbar
an attorney or other professional from practicing before the Commission if the Commission finds that the professional lacks the requisite qualifications to represent others, that he lacks character or
integrity, that he has engaged in unethical or improper conduct, or
that he has willfully violated or aided or abetted a violation of any of
the securities laws or rules or regulations promulgated by the
Commission.

7

That final ground, violating the securities laws, has been by far
the most prolific and pervasive source of rule 2(e) proceedings since
the Commission began enforcing the rule in the mid-1960s. The
third ground, unethical and improper conduct, was one of the
grounds on which the administrative law judge in In re Carter and
Johnson 8 found that Carter and Johnson were subject to suspension,
although the Commission did not follow that decision.
Enforcement of rule 2(e) and SEC enforcement suits became
much more prevalent beginning in the late 1960s. The most dramatic enforcement suit was SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,°
4 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969). In Katz an individual brought an action against his
attorney, his broker, and the president of the brokerage house, alleging violations of the
federal securities laws in sales of unregistered stock and for misrepresentations during
sale.
5 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying
note 17.

6 See generally Comment, SEC DisciplinaryRules and the FederalSecurities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J. 969. While there had been a
total of only four rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys in the period up to 1960, there
were eleven such cases in the decade of the sixties, and the pace quickened substantially in
the seventies. Id. at 983.
7 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1984).
8 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Admin. Proc. File No.
3-5464 1981). The Commission held that because it had not adopted standards of professional conduct which covered the attorneys' conduct, the attorneys were not liable. The
Commission emphasized, however, that in future proceedings it would apply the interpretation of unethical conduct developed in the opinion.
9 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,4360 (D.D.C. 1972).
The Commission brought an enforcement action against two law firms and an accounting
firm for antifraud, reporting, and proxy violations that had allegedly occurred during a
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decided in 1978. The most dramatic rule 2(e) proceeding was In re
Carter and Johnson, the case that I previously mentioned. Both of
those cases drew much comment and concern from the bar because
they dealt with issues that are very important to practicing lawyers in
the securities field and involved partners in highly respected New
York and Chicago law firms.
Two events have tempered this trend toward greater exposure
of securities lawyers to either civil or enforcement suits. The first
was the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder' ° that
negligence would not suffice as a ground for liability, at least in the
case of an implied civil action for damages under rule lOb-5. Liability required what the Court called "scienter," which has been variously defined but is, by all definitions, something more than ordinary
negligence. The other event was a shift that occurred a few years
ago in the Commission's enforcement emphasis-away from enforcement against lawyers, accountants, and other actors on the periphery of securities transactions, and toward insider trading. In
spite of those two events, the trend towards greater exposure for
lawyers continues. The trend is important to lawyers who practice a
significant percentage of their time in the securities area.
Before turning to the specific areas in which attorney exposure
arises, I want to mention the duties imposed upon lawyers in capital
formation transactions or in securities transactions generally. The
first of those duties is the duty of diligence, which, in these securities
transactions, translates into a duty of inquiry into the facts underlying whatever the attorney is doing, whether giving an opinion or preparing a disclosure piece. The key is how far the lawyer must go in
making an independent verification of the facts that form the basis of
his or her opinion, or of the facts that go into the offering circular,
the official statement, or whatever disclosure piece he is being prepared. The cases may offer some guidance on this question.
The second duty is the duty of disclosure placed upon the attorney with respect to facts that come to his or her attention in the
course of the representation. The key issue here is: to whom is the
duty of disclosure owed? Is it owed to the client, or in the case of a
corporate client, to the board of directors or to the shareholders, or
in the case of a publicly held client, to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or to the public generally? Also, how does that determination interface with the duties of confidentiality that the lawyer has
series of corporate acquisitions by an issuer and the merger of the issuer with another
corporation. The Commission asserted that securities attorneys involved in a merger
transaction had obligations to the public independent of their duties to their clients, and
perhaps paramount to such duties.
10 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Court held that an accounting firm hired for periodic
audit purposes was not liable for aiding and abetting in a rule 1Ob-5 action where there
was no scienter.
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under the ethical rules relating to client confidences? This problem
emerged in In re Carter and Johnson and has. yielded a great deal of
comment.
I will focus primarily on the duty of inquiry as it relates to lawyers participating in capital formation transactions. To what extent
and how that duty translates into liability depends in part on whether
the issue arises in an enforcement action or in a civil damage action.
It also depends to some extent on what role the lawyer plays in the
transaction itself. These roles may be divided into three categories.
The first is the role of the lawyer as adviser and counselor. In that
role the securities lawyer has a relatively low level of exposure. It is
the exposure that all lawyers have to a malpractice suit, where liability may be directly to the client and to specific individuals expected
to rely upon the professional advice.
An interesting case that illustrates the judicial attitude toward a
lawyer who is functioning merely as an advisor is Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, I decided in the District of Colorado. Nicewarner concerned

the sale of a one-percent undivided interest in royalties from an invention, which the lawyer mistakenly concluded was not a security,
and therefore, not subject to registration under either state or federal securities laws. The court held that it was a security and that the
client had violated the securities laws by selling the undivided interests without registration.
The question arose whether the lawyer was a participant in that
sale, such that he was liable under section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933. The Nicewarner court noted that the lawyer had represented
the inventor, had advised the inventor with respect to tax matters
and other concerns, had prepared the documents of transfer on the
assignment of the undivided interest in the royalties, and had structured the inventor's entire corporate plan. The court inquired
whether this background of involvement with the client reduced the
quantum of participation in the sale that is necessary for liability as a
seller under section 12(1) of the the 1933 Act. The court stated,
"[i]n the present case, while it appears that the sale would not have
been consummated without the services of some attorney, the evidence fails to establish that Hudson did more than serve as an attorney." 12 The court held that the attorney was not a participant
because he had been counseling the client and had not been interfacing with investors in that situation.
The second role of the attorney is the role of drafter of disclosure documents. In this role there is a significant increase in the

11

244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
12 Id. at 266. This holding echoed the notion, embodied in the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, that the attorney's primary responsibility is to
his client, and short of his active participation in a fraud, he has no liability to others.
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level of exposure, because the lawyer knows that the work product
will be read and relied upon by others who will use it as the basis for
an investment decision. The client frequently relies heavily on the
lawyer for the structuring, the emphasis, and many of the substantive
materials that .go into the offering circular or the disclosure piece.
Thus, there will be an increase in the attorney's exposure that is
commensurate with that intended use and that level of reliance.
It is not clear how much independent verification a lawyer
should do. The best formulation that I have heard is one stated by
Leonard Leiman at the Thirteenth Annual Securities Laws Institute
in New York. He stated that "[t]he lawyer must be thorough in asking questions, and he must slow the process of preparing an opinion
or disclosure document if the client's answers to his questions do not
seem reasonable."' 3 I cannot overemphasize the importance of
slowing the process, because one thing that attorneys deal with in
almost all capital formation transactions is the impatience of the client. The client wants to proceed with it and does not want to be
delayed by the ponderous activities of some attorney perfecting a
disclosure piece. Nevertheless, it is absolutely essential that an attorney take the necessary time, especially when the client is in a hurry.
The importance of the duty of inquiry is illustrated by SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc.,14 a civil injunction suit brought by the
Commission. Management Dynamics involved a shell corporation,
which is an inactive publicly held corporation whose shares had become worthless but were still held by hundreds of people. This situation provided an attractive vehicle for a buyer to avoid the
registration requirements by purchasing the corporation at a very
low price, filling it up with operating assets and automatically establishing a publicly held corporation. In the press releases and other
information released to the public after the shell was activated, there
were numerous representations about the new company that were
clearly false and misleading and very material. At that stage, the
Commission became involved and put an end to the shell
corporation.
The lawyer had been very active in putting the shell together.
The question arose because of the lawyer's participation as a seller in
violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act. The district court found that
some of the material was deceptive and misleading and that the attorney.had violated section 5. The court of appeals affirmed the
finding of a violation of section 5, and therefore, enjoined the attorney. In response to the attorney's excuse that he had functioned
13 Leiman, Liability of Attorneys Involved in the Preparationof Disclosure Documents, PLI, 13
281 (1982).
14 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
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merely as a lawyer and advisor and had acted in good faith, the court
of appeals stated:
As an experienced securities lawyer, Levy should have known that
contingencies cloud the horizon of almost every business venture,
and he should have asked Barrett [the business man] to tell him
about potential obstacles to the planned developments. Moreover,
and particularly because of his expertise, he should have insisted
that these possible impediments
15 be identified in any communication
which describes the projects.

Management Dynamics illustrates the importance of the attorney's asking probing questions and slowing the process to ensure that the
disclosure is proper, even in the absence of any specific red flags that
indicate something is wrong.
In re North American Acceptance Corp. Securities Cases 16 further illustrates the vulnerability of the attorney in capital formation transactions. This case arose out of the sale of capital notes by the use of
sales literature that the court found to be materially misleading. The
material had not been prepared by the lawyers but had been submitted to them for their review and comment. Essentially, plaintiffs
claimed that the lawyers had failed to show sufficient concern about
certain omissions from the sales literature before the material was
distributed. The lawyers moved for summary judgment, claiming
that even if there were material omissions in the literature, scienter
on their part was lacking. Scienter is necessary to support aiding and
abetting liability under the Hochfelder standard. The court denied
summary judgment for the attorneys, stating that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the law firm's failure to call attention
to the omissions was not a reckless or intentional act.
The attorney in SEC v. Frank had prepared an offering circular
containing some fairly extensive passages describing tests that had
been performed on the client's product, an additive that hastened
the curing process of rubber products. The attorney asserted that he
had merely acted as a scrivener, and that the client had provided him
with this technical information which he included in the offering cir-

cular in good faith. The Commission, however, claimed that the attorney had access to information, which should have indicated to him
that these claims were, at least in significant parts, spurious and
incorrect. '

7

The trial court agreed with the Commission and granted a temporary injunction. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, because the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on a
highly contested factual issue in an important matter. 18 The case
15 Id. at 809.

16 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Frank, 388 F.2d 486.
18 Id. at 491-93.
17
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nevertheless demonstrates that even if information appears to be
technical material, an attorney should at least ask the right questions,
read the material, and make a record of having gone through a careful process of verification before distributing the material to the
public.
The third role of the attorney in capital formation transactions is
issuer or giver of opinions. The same duty of diligent inquiry applies
here that applies to the drafters of disclosure documents. The level
of exposure in this role may be higher. An official opinion of an attorney on letterhead and signed with his or her name in relation to
some aspect of the securities transaction, is often the key that opens
the transaction to participation by public investors. Therefore, the
level of exposure and the sensitivity of this role may be somewhat
higher than when the attorney is working with disclosure documents.
Thus, you as the attorney owe it to yourself and to your client to be
diligent, not merely in determining the law, but in ascertaining the
underlying facts. 19
The importance of fulfilling this duty is illustrated by several
cases. In SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.20 an attorney gave an
opinion to a transfer agent, in connection with a transfer of shares by
some insiders, that the stock was free stock, which could be transferred without registration under the securities laws. The opinion
reflected an obvious effort by the attorney to satisfy the needs of the
transfer agent without involving himself in any exposure by incorporating an earlier opinion by reference, and thus sidestepping the critical legal issue. The Commission sought a civil injunction against the
attorney as an aider and abettor of a securities act violation. The
district court held that the lawyer was an aider and abettor in a section 5 violation, because it was clear that the transfer agent had understood the opinion the attorney gave him as an opinion that the
stock was free stock. The case involved more than negligence because the attorney apparently knew what he was doing.
In In re North American Acceptance Securities Cases, which I previously mentioned, the law firm involved had given opinions that the
issues of capital notes in question were exempt from registration as
an intrastate offering. This case arose prior to rule 147, and there
was no certainty in the area of intrastate offerings at the time. The
main question was where the principal place of business was for purposes of the intrastate exemption. The court examined the authority
19 In SEC v. Spectrum, 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), the Commission sought injunctive relief against an attorney whose opinion as to the availability of an exemption was
allegedly given without factual foundation. The court said: "[i]n the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of the opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of
the public too high to permit due diligence to be cast aside in the name of convenience."
Id. at 542.
20 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
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on the issue of intrastate exemption and the facts and held that the
intrastate exemption was not available. In response to the attorneys'
motion for summary judgment, the court held that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the lawyers acted intentionally or recklessly in arriving at the wrong conclusion about the availability of the
2
exemption. '
The decision in Stokes v. Lokken 22 is one of the few decisions
favorable to the attorney. In Stokes in response to an auditor's request, the attorney gave an opinion that his client's bulk sale of gold
and silver coins was not a security. He did so after consulting with
officers of the company concerning the manner in which the company went about selling and dealing in these bulk gold coins. The
court held that the sale was a security. Plaintiffs claimed that the
attorney had recklessly and blindly accepted information from an officer of the company about the way in which the company operated.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the officer was a convicted felon. The court dismissed the idea that the criminal record of
the company officer compelled a more probing inquiry and independent verfication of what he said about the operation of the
company. The Stokes court held that the lawyer was simply giving an
opinion, was acting in good faith, was not a participant in the trans23
action, and therefore was not subject to liability.
There is little consistency among these cases. They are fact
cases and have different results depending on how different judges
view them. The point is that you as the attorney should ask skeptical
probing questions to determine the facts that are in the offering material or that underlie your opinion. When anything arises that does
not seem right, you should slow the process.
I think it is very dangerous for a lawyer to become involved in
capital formation transactions in some role other than the professional role, whether as a participant, an advocate for the client, or as
an investor. Such participation increases the attorney's motivation
to do things that he or she would not do if functioning solely as an
attorney and lowers the level of resistance to all of the things that can
be done wrong in these transactions.
Moreover, this participation may condition the attitude of the
trier of fact if the case is ever litigated. Usually the trier of fact is a
judge because SEC enforcement actions typically are bench trials,
since the Commission seeks injunctive and equitable relief. Frequently it appears in these cases that when a lawyer is involved as a
principal or has become an advocate and not an independent counselor, advisor, or professional, the courts are predisposed against the
21 North American, 513 F. Supp. at 630.
22 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
23 Id. at 91,462.

98,209 (8th Cir. 1981).
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lawyer. One such case is SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. ,24 a suit
for an injunction against a lawyer and others that arose out of an allor-none registered public offering. This type of offering involves escrowing the money, and if the securities are not all sold, the money is
returned to the investors. As occasionally happens in these offerings, the deal in Manor Nursing did not sell out. The lawyer in the
transaction became involved in the process of changing transactions
to give the false appearance that the offering had sold out so his client could keep the public investors' money. The lawyer again
claimed that he was acting merely as a lawyer and in good faith. The
Second Circuit concluded that as an experienced securities lawyer,
defendant was well aware that failure to correct a misleading prospectus and retention of the proceeds constitute violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, even though the issue had
not been fully subscribed. Consequently, the lawyer was held liable
for the violations.
Another case that illustrates how an attorney may step beyond
his role is Felts v. National Accounts Systems Ass 'n, Inc. 25 The lawyer in
Felts was a part-time district attorney in a small Georgia town. He
was employed by National Accounts Systems Associates to act as its
attorney, apparently because he was a well-known local figure, and
the company wanted his name. The attorney permitted the company
to elect him president and director. He gave persons in the company
a signature stamp so that they could use it to stamp his signature on
corporate papers as president. His signature was stamped on some
promotional material that the court found to be materially misleading. The court held that the lawyer was liable, along with the
promotors and others, for the rule lOb-5 violations growing out of
this misleading promotional material. The court also held that, absent a showing of good faith on his part, the attorney was subject to
joint and several liability for all of the issuers' violations because he
had permitted the issuer to use his name as its president and director
26
and had given them his unrestricted use of his signature stamp.
I want to cover briefly the statutory grounds of a lawyer's liability under the securities laws. The most pervasive of these statutory
grounds is rule lOb-5 2 7 of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.28 The significant breakthrough in terms of attorneys' exposure under rule lOb-5 was the development the concept of
aiding and abetting liability in the late 1960s. As aiding and abetting
liability in securities cases developed, the range of defendants in se24 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
25 469 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
26 Id. at 68.

27 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
28 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
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curities cases broadened, and that broadening of the net caught
many attorneys.
If the three requisite elements of aiding and abetting are present, and if there is a securities law violation, an attorney may be held
jointly and severally liable with the principal violator. The three elements are: a securities law has been violated, the aider and abetter
either knew or had a general awareness that the law was being violated, and the aider and abetter gave substantial assistance in effecting the wrong.
Numerous cases enunciate this three-pronged test. 29 The principal area of disagreement among the courts is the level of scienter
required to establish aiding and abetting liability under rule lOb-5.
According to Hochfelder, something akin to conscious intent must be
demonstrated. The court in Hochfelder reserved judgment as to
whether recklessness would satisfy the scienter standard under certain circumstances. The lower courts have not been consistent on
the issue whether recklessness itself will satisfy the scienter requirement in cases of aiding and abetting liability, or whether the high
conscious intent standard is necessary. According to some courts,
the level of culpability required depends on whether there is a fiduciary obligation owed to the plaintiff by the alleged aider and abettor.
If there is such a fiduciary obligation, the level of culpability de30
creases to ordinary recklessness.
Since Hochfelder, when dealing with a primary violator or a primary defendant, the circuits have generally held that recklessness
suffices for rule lOb-5 liability. 3 1 What constitutes recklessness is a
very murky and troublesome question. The Court's formulation in
Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 3 2 is helpful:

In determining what constitutes 'willful or reckless disregard of the
truth' the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defend29 See, e.g., SEC v. Washington County Utility District, 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir.
1982); lIT, an Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Edwards &
Hanly v. Wells Fargo Securities Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 483 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey,
493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1973); Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 486 F.2d
139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973).
30 See, e.g., Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1982) (accountant/client relationship); Edwards, 602 F.2d at 484 (securities clearing house/broker-dealer
relationship); Woodward, 522 F.2d at 84 (bank lender/cosigner of bank loan relationship).
31 See, e.g., HT, 619 F.2d at 923; Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44, 46; Healey v. Catalyst Recovery
of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598
F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The courts in these cases
have concluded that there is no indication in Hochfelder that the Supreme Court intended a
radical departure from the common law analog of fraud which imposes liability for
recklessness.
32 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ants knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure of
disclosure to apprise themselves of the facts
33 where they could have
done so without any extraordinary effort.
This formulation is the one that is likely to be applied to lawyers.
Thus, it is important to remember the admonition to ask the right
questions, listen carefully to the answers, and slow the process if the
answers do not sound right.
In Aaron v. SEC3 4 the Supreme Court determined that the scienter requirement applies under Rule lOb-5 in SEC enforcement actions. One of the interesting questions that remains unresolved is
whether this will result in a different outcome in SEC enforcement
cases or whether the courts will speak in the language of recklessness
rather than in the language of negligence when dealing with the
same facts.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 193335 is a very limited area
of exposure for attorneys. I do not know of a single case decided
against a lawyer for providing purely legal services, under section
11.36
An important area of attorney exposure that is developing is liability under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.3 7 This is a general antifraud provision, which applies to a seller of securities whether or

not the securities are registered. A lawyer functioning as an advisor
for a client in the securities transaction might not seem to be a seller,
38
but the Fifth Circuit has determined otherwise. In Croy v. Campbell
33 Id. at 1306.
34 446 U.S. 680 (1980). In Aaron a manager of two employees who had made false
and misleading statements to induce the public to purchase stock in a corporation, was
sued under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act as an aider and abettor. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to determine whether the manager had scienter-whether he knew or
had reason to know that the employees under his supervision were engaged in fraudulent
practices.
35 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). Section 11 creates an express right of action for securities
purchasers against sellers when registration materials contain certain untrue statements or
omissions of material fact.
36 Sellers are defined under Section 11 to include issuers, officers, directors, and
signers of registration statements, as well as certain professionals whose opinions are included in the registration statement. Merely acting as an attorney is not sufficient to impose liability.
37 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12(2) provides:
Any person who offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or
oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact. . . (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, or such
truth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from
him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of
such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id.
38 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the lawyer involved was actually a tax lawyer who had become involved with plaintiffs by recommendation. He read the material provided by the syndicator of the particular project and told the client
that it was "one of the best deals I have ever seen." The lawyer's fee
was paid by the syndicator. The court held that the attorney's participation in the deal was not a sufficiently important cause of plaintiffs'
buying the securities to place the attorney in the position of a seller
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Therefore, he was held not to
be liable.
In Junker v. Crory39 the level of the lawyer's activity was greater.
Junker involved a freeze-out merger where the complaint was a
breach of the corporate fiduciary duty because the merger terms
were unfair. The controlling stockholders caused the corporation to
acquire a sister corporation that had a third-party minority stockholder. The majority forced through a disproportionate exchange
ratio that undervalued the properties of the acquired company,
which consisted mainly of land and buildings. The lawyer had participated throughout by structuring and orchestrating the merger, participating in stockholder meetings, making representations, and
urging the shareholders of the acquired company to proceed with
the deal. The Junker court held that the level of the attorney's participation was such that he was a seller for purposes of section 12(2).
While there must be scienter to establish liability under rule
lOb-5, there need only be negligence under section 12(2) and the
burden of proving lack of negligence is on the defendant. Section
12(2) is thus a handy alternative for plaintiffs who cannot prove that
the attorney's conduct was intentional or reckless to satisfy the standards of rule lOb-5 liability. Since Hochfelder, section 12(2) has become a fertile area of pursuit.
The Fourth Circuit has accepted the notion that a lawyer participating in a transaction can be a seller within the definition of section
12(2). In Wassell v. Eglowski4 0 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court decision that the lawyer was a participant because of the level
of his participation in the deal. In other words, he was a substantial
cause in bringing about the sale, and therefore, was jointly and severally liable with the principals in the transaction. 4 '
Another emerging area of attorney exposure is controlling personal liability, something that would not occur to most attorneys.
Section 20 of the 1934 Act 4 2 and section 15 of the 1933 Act 4 3 pro39 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981).
40 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975), affid, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976).
41 The attorney represented the corporation in a sale of control to an outsider. To

facilitate the takeover, the attorney solicited a proxy from the principal shareholders,
voted their stock to approve the takeover, and removed restrictions from the stock. Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982).
43 Id. § 77t.
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vide that "controlling persons are liable, joint or severally with the
primary violator," if it appears that they acted without good faith.
Where the burden of proof of good faith lies is not clear because
some courts place it on the plaintiff and others on the controlling
person. In any event, an attorney participating in the affairs of a client in a significant way can be held to be a control person, and therefore jointly and severally liable with the client for its own securities
law violations, even in a situation in which the attorney is neither a
seller under Section 12(2), nor an aider and abettor under rule 1Ob5.
In West Lake v. Abrams 44 the court refused to grant summary
judgment on the issue whether outside counsel of a broker-dealer
was a control person of the firm, which was a primary violator. The
lawyer unquestionably was not a primary violator, but it was claimed
that he was a control person. He had been outside general counsel
for the company and had consulted frequently with management on
major decisions. The staff counsel for the company testified in an
affidavit that he never took any action without calling this lawyer and
consulting with him. The court held that there was a genuine issue
of fact as to whether this lawyer was a control person under section
20 of the 1934 Act, and therefore, jointly and severally liable with the
brokerage firm.
I will return to what I mentioned at the beginning: when functioning as a lawyer in a securities transaction, remember that it is a
risky task and sometimes a lonely one. Protect yourself and your client by asking the right questions, and if you do not get satisfactory
answers, slow the process.

44

565 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

